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ABSTRACT 
 
In this study the aim is to examine what the impact of the imbalance in the power dynamics 
between the state, business and labour is on corporatist institutions in South Africa and South 
Korea. In both countries, the corporatist institutions have failed to bring the actors together 
and to resolve the various issues as these institutions were expected to do. When looking at 
the establishment of corporatist institutions in the two countries it is clear that the state had to 
incorporate the interests of labour in their decision-making process due to the increasing 
power of labour during the democratisation process. However, the current situation proves 
that the corporatist institutions in South Africa and South Korea have faced various problems. 
Therefore why the corporatist institutions in the two countries have not functioned properly is 
explored in this study.  
 
It was found that labour has been placed at a disadvantage compared to the state and business. 
The influence of labour as an agenda setter and a representative of labour has diminished. On 
the other hand the state and business, which used to form a coalition under the authoritarian 
governments, have started gaining power along with globalisation. The adoption of neo-
liberal economic policies, has resulted in the fragmentation of labour, generating 
unemployment and irregular jobs. The imbalance of power between the actors has negatively 
affected the corporatist institutions.  
 
Under the circumstances, the corporatist institutions did not ensure that the voice of labour 
was heard and heeded. Instead of using corporatism, labour in South Africa tends to use the 
tripartite alliance in order to advance its interests. Labour in South Korea is likely to use mass 
action, and this tendency prevails in South Africa as well. Also, the corporatist institutions 
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have been criticised due to their lack of accountability and institutional problems; this has 
negatively affected their credibility. The corporatist institutions have become little more than 
names.  
 
In the cases of South Africa and South Korea, corporatism seems to have been adopted as a 
mere crisis response when the two countries faced political economic crises and it is seen as 
another control mechanism created by states experiencing democratisation. Furthermore, the 
imbalance in the relationship between actors negatively affected the corporatist institutions 
and in the end they collapsed.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
In hierdie studie word die impak van die magsbalans tussen die staat, sakesektor en 
georganiseerde arbeid op korporatisme in Suid-Afrika en Suid-Korea ondersoek. In beide 
gevalle het die korporatiewe instellings nie daarin geslaag om die nodige konsensus tussen die 
drie sleutel akteurs te bewerkstellig nie. As gevolg van demokratiseringsprosesse in beide 
state, en die toenemende invloed van arbeid, was die staat verplig om die belange van arbeid 
in besluitnemingsprosesse in ag te neem. Die korporatiewe instellings in Suid-Afrika, nl. 
NEDLAC en die KTC in Suid-Korea staar egter verskeie probleme in die gesig, Waarom die 
korporatiewe instellings nie behoorlik gefunksioneer het nie, word in die studie onder die loep 
geneem. 
 
Arbeid het in ‘n onderdanige posisie jeens die staat en die sake sektor te staan gekom 
aangesien die invloed van georganiseerde arbeid as ‘n agenda skepper en verteenwoordiger 
van arbeid afgeneem het. Aan die ander kant het die aanvanklike koalisie tussen die staat en 
die sakesektor gedurende die outoritere periodes - voor demokratisering - weer eens verstewig 
as gevolg van die invloed van globalisering. Namate neo-liberale ekonomiese beleide 
nagevolg is, het die vakbond beweging al meer gedisintegreer, werkloosheid het toegeneem 
en gelei tot werksgeleenthede wat al meer tydelik en ongereguleer is. Die ongelyke 
magsbalans tussen die rolspelers het die korporatistiese instellings negatief beinvloed. 
 
Onder die omstandighede, kon die korporatistiese instellings nie daarin slaag om aan die stem 
van arbeid gehoor te gee soos wat gehoop is nie. In plaas daarvan om dus van die 
korporatistiese instellings gebruik te maak, het arbeid in Suid-Afrika eerder van die vakbond 
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beweging se rol in die regerende alliansie gebruik gemaak om beleid te probeer beinvloed. 
Arbeid in Suid-Korea, soos in Suid-Afrika, is ook meer geneig om van massa aksie gebruik te 
maak. Daarbenewens is die korporatiewe instellings daarvan beskuldig dat hulle nie 
deursigtig is nie en gebuk gaan onder institutionele gebreke, wat die geloofwaardigheid van 
die instellings ondermyn het. 
 
In die Suid-Afrikaanse en Suid-Koreaanse gevalle blyk dit dat korporatisme bloot as ‘n soort 
‘krisis reaksie’ tot ekonomiese en politieke probleme ontwikkel het – in samehang met 
demokratisering - en nie as diepgaande beieldsprosesse in eie reg nie. Die gebrek aan ‘n 
magsbalans tussen die drie rolspelers het daartoe gelei dat die korporatiewe instellings in 
beide gevalle effektief tot niet gekom het. 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1-1. BACKGROUND
1
 
 
The National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) has been building a broad 
coalition to force the government and employers to take concrete steps to address youth 
unemployment in South Africa. After protracted negotiations within the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), NUMSA has been granted the right to embark on a 
protected strike on the issue of youth unemployment. The union’s National Executive Committee 
(NEC) set Wednesday 19 March 2014 as the National Day of Action (NUMSA, 17 March 2014). 
 
The Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) has withdrawn from the Tripartite Committee, 
comprised of labour, management and government sectors. The worry became a reality… the 
Committee is in danger of extinction. This will certainly result in additional instability in the 
labour market (Yonhap News, 23 December 2013).
2
 
 
In March 2014, NUMSA, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)’s largest 
affiliate, announced a national strike, lashing out at the government and business for 
bypassing NEDLAC regarding the youth wage subsidy issue. This is illustrated by the above 
quotation. Labour’s criticism was that NEDLAC had not engaged with labour and community 
as it used to, even though workers would be influenced directly by the Employment Tax 
Incentive Act (ETIA). The youth wage subsidy issue, which will be discussed in 3-3-4, shows 
the current dwindling status of NEDLAC as a social dialogue mechanism in South Africa. In 
the case of South Korea, it is possible to observe that labour withdrew from the corporatist 
                                                     
1
 There are several common surnames such as Kim and Park in South Korea. In order not to make it confusing, 
names of Korean scholars and important figures such as presidents are written in the following order, surname 
and first name. 
2
 In this dissertation excerpts from minutes and conversations in Korean were translated into English. The 
original Korean can be seen in the relevant footnote. 한국노총의 노사정위원회 탈퇴가 우려하던 바와 같이 
사실화되었다. 노동시장이 좌초 위기에 빠지게 될 가능성이 커졌다 (연합뉴스, 23 December 2013). 
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institution at the end of 2013. Both South Africa and South Korea established corporatist 
institutions, NEDLAC and the KTC respectively, that were supposed to coordinate the state, 
business and labour’s demands, however labour’s discontent shows that the corporatist 
mechanisms have not worked properly.  
 
South Africa was under the apartheid regime until democratic elections took place in 1994 
and ended the era of politics dominated by a minority. South Korea, on the other hand, has a 
long history of military authoritarian rule from 1961 to 1987. In both countries, individual and 
political freedoms were severely restricted under the authoritarian governments in the name of 
protecting national security and fostering economic growth. Given these conditions, it is 
noticeable that labour in both countries was heavily suppressed. While there was a close 
relationship between state and business, labour was exploited in the interests of rapid 
industrialisation and not organised enough to challenge the collaboration between state and 
business. Under these circumstances, the fact that labour played an important role in 
achieving democratisation in both countries is intriguing.  
 
In South Africa and South Korea labour has been referred to as the most significant actor in 
the process of democratisation. Von Holdt (2003:8) and Koo (2000:231) point out that 
militant and mobilised trade unions in newly industrialising countries emerged in opposition 
to authoritarian regimes and repressive workplaces towards the end of 1990s. The growing 
number of members and increased labour unrest stemming from this posed a significant 
challenge to both governments. The ever-increasing power of labour forced both governments 
to incorporate the interests of labour in their plans for the future, in one way or another. 
According to Rothstein (1987:306), the stronger the organisation of labour, the more likely 
the state is to construct corporatist frameworks and associate labour with these. In South 
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Africa the strong trade union movement, COSATU, became an important role-player with the 
African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) in the 
political decision-making process. The establishment of NEDLAC indicated the realisation of 
a partnership among state, business and labour. The South Korean government also sought a 
way to incorporate labour. As a result, the Korean Tripartite Commission (KTC) was 
established in 1998.
3
 
 
After democratisation however, the corporatist institutions in South Africa and South Korea 
have deteriorated. Labour’s discontent with the corporatist institutions can be seen from the 
statements above. The establishment of corporatist institutions initially brought about hope for 
labour, which was a largely marginalised group under the authoritarian governments. Both 
countries pursued reforms to transform the political and economic institutions inherited from 
the authoritarian governments to those appropriate to liberal democracies and liberal market 
economies. Labour in both cases expected to gain political rights as well as fair access to 
economic redistribution. However, at present, the corporatist institutions in neither country 
are functioning.  
 
Against this backdrop, the aim of this study is to compare NEDLAC in South Africa and the 
KTC in South Korea, focusing on the impact of the power dynamics among the actors after 
democratisation. Although I discuss authoritarian periods in both South Africa and South 
Korea, the main focus is on the relationship between actors after democratisation. 
Corporatism is a means of organising interest representation. The interaction between state, 
organised business and organised labour in both countries will be analysed. Organised 
                                                     
3
 The KTC changed its name to the Economic and Social Development Commission (ESDC) in 2007. In this 
process, the ESDC amended its structure. The KTC used to have subcommittees and special committees, 
however, the ESDC now has standing committee instead of these two. The restructuring was conducted in order 
to raise the efficiency. In this research, the KTC will be referred to as the corporatist institution in South Korea. 
Many people are still likely to refer to the corporatist framework as the KTC. 
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business and organised labour are associations of members united as a single, representative 
entity for the purpose of serving their members’ interest through collective bargaining. In 
terms of the conceptualisation of the state, it is useful to look at Migdal’s (1988) State in 
Society, which provides state-society relations in the Third World. Migdal (1988) defines the 
state ideally as “an organisation, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the 
state’s leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement 
the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social 
organisations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way”. It is noticeable 
that Migdal also argues that the state does not exist outside or above society, but that it is a 
part of society. The state and society constantly influence and reshape one another. These 
concepts will be used throughout this research. 
 
In this research, results indicate that the balance of power between the actors have significant 
impacts on corporatism. Furthermore, by examining these two corporatist institutions, it will 
be possible to identify the patterns of similarities and differences between these two cases.  
 
1-2. RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The study of corporatism increased in Western European countries during the 1960s and 
1970s. Schmitter (1974) in particular contributed heavily to reinvigorating corporatism which 
was initially advocated by Manoilesco (1934) during the 1930s. Beyond the European 
continent, corporatism in Latin America drew attention from Wiarda (1997). Wiarda (1997) 
pays attention to the modernisation process of institutions under the military regimes across 
Latin America. He focuses on the regional characteristics, mostly traditional patriarchal 
norms, which are attributed to corporatism in Latin America. 
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Countries in Africa and Asia embarked on corporatism relatively late in comparison to 
countries on other continents; thus, corporatism in Africa and Asia emerged in the late 20th 
century. Possibly because of the relatively short lifespan of corporatism in these two regions, 
little attention has been paid to corporatist features in Africa and Asia. As can be seen in the 
literature review, relatively few comparative analyses across different regional contexts have 
appeared. Wiarda (1997)’s Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great Ism is 
one of the few in which corporatism in history is traced and in which its practice in various 
regions including Africa and Asia is analysed. However, this comparative approach was done 
as a brief introduction of the variety of forms of corporatism in Asia and Africa. Thus, this 
researcher hopes to fill some of these gaps by providing more detailed and the latest 
information. This researcher pays attention to the cases of South Africa and South Korea, 
which underwent political transition during the late 20th century, indicating complex relations 
between the state, business and labour within the corporatist framework.  
 
South Africa and South Korea are late-late-industrialising countries; their development 
experience, especially the relationship between the state and society, is somewhat different 
from that of developed countries. The term “late-late-industrialisation” describes a situation 
where industrial development and modernisation began in the later phase of world history. 
Ishida (2011) attempts to distinguish early-industrialising and late-industrialising countries by 
using two indicators: GDP and the proportion of agricultural labour in the total workforce. 
According to Ishida (2011:6), “any nation whose proportion of farm labour force was greater 
than 15 per cent in 1975 is considered a late-industrializing nation, and a nation whose GDP 
exceeded US$ 4,000 later than Japan did is considered a late-industrializing nation.” Among 
late-industrialising countries, Ishida (2011) identifies two categories, namely, late-
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industrialising countries and late-late-industrialising countries, the latter of which consists of 
countries that fulfilled these requirements above during the 1980s or even later.  
 
However, in this study, I instead follow Amsden’s (1989) definition and focus on the 
characteristics of the state, which is the capacity that can mobilise society in order to achieve 
rapid industrialisation. Despite their late start, late-late-industrialising countries have reached 
a certain level of industrial development by means of a more rapid path of industrialisation. In 
order to do so, these late-comers faced the challenge of importing, adapting, and improving 
the technologies and know-how already developed by other countries. Amsden (1989) claims, 
on the basis of a careful examination of the industrialisation processes of South Korea and 
Taiwan, that late-late-industrialising nations share “industrialisation on the basis of learning” 
(Amsden, 1989). The late-comers learned and borrowed technology from the more advanced 
industrial powers rather than inventing new technologies or products. In this process, the state 
penetrated the society efficiently, constraining it, if necessary. Since this process had to take 
place within such a short time, the way that the state penetrated society was intense.  
 
However, as the industrial work force grew, tensions increased between labour and business 
(supported by the state). Labour and business disagreed over issues such as wages, length of 
the working day, and working conditions. Labour unions emerged to protect the rights of 
workers and to represent them during negotiations with their counterparts. Most employers 
vigorously opposed trade union activity, and struggles between workers and employers 
became violent. In both South Africa and South Korea, the labour movements represent the 
interests of workers and struggle for workers’ rights, and their establishment took place 
simultaneously with the emergence of political movements which led to democratisation. This 
led the state in the end incorporating labour. Labour in South Africa and South Korea gained 
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autonomy and became institutionalised, which means that it became an equal partner in the 
decision-making process. The establishment of NEDLAC and the KTC in the two countries 
reflect the increasing power of labour and the fact that the state, business and labour were 
considered to be equal, which is different from in the pre-democratisation period.  
 
In the cases of South Africa and South Korea, it should be noted that the state realised that 
without the consent and support of labour it would not have been able to realise economic 
development along with democratisation. Under the authoritarian governments, the state was 
able to push forward economic policies based on the coalition with business. However, after 
democratisation, in addition to labour becoming stronger, the state also faced pressure from 
international organisations, such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) to abide by 
international norms regarding labour relations.  
One of the major roles that these corporatist institutions were expected to play was to 
contribute to further economic growth by bringing about peace between conflicting social 
partners through consensus-building. For example, these institutions, NEDLAC and the KTC 
have been expected, among others, to bring about real wage increases, “defend” or “protect” 
jobs, and train workers.  
 
However, as seen in 1-1, labour’s discontent erupted as mass action and withdrawal from the 
corporatist institutions. This shows that NEDLAC and the KTC have not succeeded in 
bringing these groups together. Against this backdrop, the focus of this study will be on the 
corporatist institutions in both countries and I will explore interactions between the state, 
business and labour, the imbalance in the power dynamics between the actors and its impact 
more specifically on corporatism. To do so, I will attempt to answer the following research 
question: 
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What is the impact of the imbalance in the power dynamics between the state, 
business and labour on corporatist institutions in South Africa and South 
Korea? 
 
In response to this question, there will be an attempt to address the following issues: 
 
 What are the dynamics of state-business-labour relations within NEDLAC and the 
KTC in South Africa and South Korea respectively?  
 What are the differences and similarities between the two cases in the context of their 
corporatist institutions?  
 
In this study the above questions will be studied by means of case studies. The corporatist 
institutions, NEDLAC in South Africa and the KTC in South Korea will be analysed. 
NEDLAC will be analysed through macro-eonomic policies and the ETIA and the KTC will 
be analysed through the Non-regular Workers Protection Act (see Table 1.1.). Further 
explanations of this case selection can be seen in 1-4-3-3. 
 
Table 1.1. Selected Issues in this Research  
 
South Africa South Korea 
Macro 
level 
 
Key economic policies since 
democratisation 
(the RDP, GEAR, ASGISA and the 
NDP) 
 
None  
Micro 
level 
Employment Tax Incentive Act of 2013 
(Youth wage subsidy) 
Non-regular Workers Protection Act of 
2007 
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1-3. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
In this section, a brief review of corporatism in both South Africa and South Korea will be 
provided. How this research is related to previous studies and how the gaps in research will be 
filled, will be shown. Since the theoretical perspective of corporatism is provided in Chapter 
2 and corporatism in South Africa and South Korea are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 
respectively, only the key perspectives will be provided in this section.  
 
1-3-1. LITERATURE ON CORPORATISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
In this section literature on corporatism in South Africa will be divided into literature on the 
pre-apartheid, apartheid and post-apartheid eras. Literature on corporatism in the pre-
apartheid period mainly focuses on the relationship between capitalism and the state on one 
hand, and how these two actors subdued labour on the other hand. One of the prominent 
examples is Yudelman’s (1984) The Emergence of Modern South Africa: State, Capital, and 
the Incorporation of Organized Labour on the South African Gold Fields, 1902-1939, in 
which how a symbiotic alliance between the state and business, especially mining companies, 
successfully subjugated labour, is discussed. Yudelman’s work also describes the corporatist 
tradition of South Africa in the 1920s; at that time organised (white) labour was subordinated 
and co-opted by an alliance of the state and business. 
 
Simons and Simons (1969) in Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950 provides a 
historical overview of how and why the white working class compromised its socialist 
principles for a share of white power. The classes had different interests and this often caused 
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conflicts among them. However, in order to gain political and economic interests under White 
rule, the differences were put aside. 
 
Lipton in her book (1986) Capitalism and Apartheid, also suggests that capitalism could 
benefit from or coexist with apartheid. Lipton traces and analyses the evolution of apartheid 
and suggests that the close relationship between the state and business became the driving 
force for the economic growth in South Africa. Lipton in her analysis of the relationship 
between capitalism and apartheid raises questions about class and race with regard to the 
development of South Africa (e.g. the role of white liberals), and describes how the nature of 
capitalism and its relationship to government stimulated debates between liberals (e.g. 
arguing that racism had a negative effect on the accumulation of capital and that the 
development of capitalism would eventually discourage racism) and Marxists (arguing that 
Apartheid benefited capitalism). Corporatism per se is not discussed, however, these classical 
works show that there was dualism in labour relations along race lines, and that the workplace 
was governed by a highly corporatist system. However, only white workers were 
incorporated, they had bargaining power and benefited from corporatism within the regime of 
racial oppression and segregation.  
 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s South African industrial relations entered a critical 
phase with the emergence of independent Black trade unions. Before this African workers and 
their freedom of movement were heavily controlled. As a result, African workers faced 
limited employment opportunities and had negligible bargaining power (Kingdon and Knight, 
1999). Along with industrialisation, black workers gained more leverage by using the capacity 
to organise unions and mobilise union members. Van der Walt (1997) argues that business 
showed interest in engaging labour in a range of issues as early as the mid-1970s and 
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Friedman (1987) highlights that a democratic culture or union democracy existed among 
union activists at that time.  
 
The move towards corporatism was cemented in the mid-1980s, when COSATU and the 
South African Employers’ Consultation Committee on Labour Affairs (SACOLA) revised the 
Labour Relations Act during negotiations (van der Walt, 1997). COSATU played a significant 
role when most political organisations were banned during the 1980s, standing in the forefront 
of the anti-apartheid movement. There was an increase in the power of labour after 
democratisation such as active intervention in the development of economic and labour 
policies, and as a result the state decided to establish the corporatist institution (Adler and 
Webster, 2000:2).  
 
From the 1990s onwards, there was heated debate over the adoption of corporatism. There 
were two sides, proponents and opponents of the adoption of corporatism in South Africa. 
Lundahl and Petersson (1996) were of the opinion that corporatism would bring about 
benefits for the working class in South Africa, which experienced social and political 
marginalisation and polarisation. Webster (1995) argued that labour’s participation in policy 
arenas would help strengthen workers’ control of economic decision-making, and democratise 
the workplace. The opinions of opponents are given later in this section. 
 
Adler and Webster (2000) describe the trend towards corporatism in South African industrial 
relations. These authors highlight the consultation and negotiation of public policies between 
the government, trade unions and employer associations, which may have played a direct role 
in the implementation of NEDLAC in South Africa. The authors point out the importance of 
labour’s capacity vis à vis other actors at NEDLAC as well as its own members regarding 
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mobilisation and restraint when necessary. On the other hand, Maree (1993) points out some 
limitations. One of them is that corporatism can worsen the “dualism” of the workers, those 
who belong to the formal economy or are members of unions and those who belong to the 
informal economy which accounts for a large part of the South African economy.  
 
In an article written for the South African Labour Bulletin, von Holt (2002) shows his concern 
with regard to corporatism and the labour movement, arguing that unionism receded as unions 
focused more on “strategic” state-level bargaining, participation and negotiations. Habib 
(1997) and Habib and Padayachee (2000) were concerned that corporatism might be a mere 
tool used by the state to control labour, by binding it into the corporatist framework. 
Buhlungu (2008), Lehulere (2003) and Mckinley (2003) point to the marginalisation of labour 
within the alliance and its decreasing influence on the state; however, most researchers do not 
go into details about the dynamics of the relationship of key participants within the corporatist 
institution (Habib, 2013). Therefore, this researcher aims to fill the gap between the existing 
literature of corporatism in South Africa and whether these dynamics are sui generis or can be 
compared to those in othere developing countries. 
 
It is noteworthy that Habib (1997:69) sees corporatism as a “crisis response” to the adoption 
of a neo-liberal economic programme in the early 1990s. In terms of the emergence of 
corporatism, Habib (2013) uses Stepan (1978)’s analytical framework which highlights the 
response of the elite to the mass labour movement and challenges especially in the Third 
World context. Especially after democratisation in South Africa, political and economic elites 
recognised that their neo-liberal economic programme was bound to provoke massive 
discontent and protest. As a result of this perspective, and in order to achieve social peace, 
these elites adopted corporatism, emphasising social unity and reconciliation.  
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In this context, it will be siginificant to examine the relationship among the actors and how 
they interact in the decision-making process. Interestingly, Maree (1993), Schreiner (1994) 
and Habib (1997) point to a rift that has emerged between the actors, that is, the ANC and 
COSATU. They state that the demands of labour have been constrained and absorbed in the 
name of national unity and that COSATU has become marginalised in the course of decision-
making. Webster and Buhlungu (2004) also point out that, while the ANC has become the 
dominant participant in the alliance with COSATU and the SACP, labour has become 
marginalised. Labour has been expected to discard its own interests in the name of national 
development by being incorporated and recognised as one of the participants in the corporatist 
structure. However, members of labour unions expected the unions to represent their interests 
and furthermore, the interests of the working poor and the unemployed. This turned into a 
challenge for labour (Habib, 1997; Southall and Webster, 2010). Seekings and Nattrass 
(2006) explore the continuing inequality in South Africa in the post-apartheid era, they point 
out that the South African labour market is now divided into “insiders” and “outsiders”, in 
other words, those who are skilled and employed and those who lack skills and education and 
remain in the informal sector. The latter remain out of corporatist institutions; they do not 
benefit from agreements made under corporatism.  
 
All in all, this imbalance of power between the state and labour after democratisation in South 
Africa is noticeable and negatively affected labour’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the state and 
business. Against this backdrop, the researcher will focus how this imbalanced power impacts 
on the corporatist institution in South Africa.  
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1-3-2. LITERATURE ON CORPORATISM IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
Since South Korea is one of the prominent examples of a developmental state, the symbiotic 
relationship between state and business, which are deeply intertwined was addressed in a 
number of studies. The relationship resulted in the rapid economic growth (Amsden, 1993; 
Kang, 2002).  
 
Under Japanese colonialism in the early 20th century, capitalism began to burgeon, the 
colonial government and business (mainly Japanese capital) started forming a coalition in 
order to monopolise natural resources through mining rights. After independence, chaebols 
inherited this tradition of coalition (Minns, 2001; Kim Dong-won, 1993). Since South Korea 
is a late-late-industrialising country and remained an agricultural state until the 1960s, it was 
difficult for labour to forge any political links. 
 
Although the labour movement was oppressed, the right-wing Korean Labour Federation for 
Independence Promotion (KLFIP) was created in 1946 right after independence (Rowley and 
Yoo, 2004). In Rowley and Yoo’s (2004) Trade Unions in South Korea, evidence of the 
existence of state corporatism in South Korea is presented and it is stated that the KLFIP 
enjoyed monopoly status by cooperating with the state. It can also be seen that South Korea 
used to have a tradition of state-corporatism.  
 
Unlike the KLFIP, unions’ political activities were banned and there was strong government 
intervention in labour disputes (Chang Dae-oup, 2006; Gang Shin-joon, 2002). Deyo’s (1989) 
Beneath the Miracle: Labour Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism and Koo’s (1990) 
Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation trace the origins and early 
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development of the South Korean labour movement. These authors argue that South Korea’s 
successful economic development is partly attributable to the political subordination of labour 
and its compliance with the corporatist state. 
 
However, along with the industrialisation, labour started showing more awareness of poor 
working conditions such as low wages, long working hours and industrial accidents. Kwon 
Seung-ho and  O’Donnell’s (2001) The Chaebol and Labour in Korea: The Development of 
Management Strategy in Hyundai shows the emergence of the organised labour movement 
during South Korea’s industrialisation and there is an analysis of labour-management policies.   
 
With democratisation in the latter half of the 1980s, the model of government-labour-business 
relations changed from state corporatism to pluralism. In this context, (societal) corporatism 
as a new model of an interest representative system drew attention (Park Moon-kyu, 1987). 
Along with globalisation and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997, a number of studies were 
focused on the increasing power of labour and the emergence of societal corporatism. Since 
the latter half of the 1990s, when South Korea was facing an adverse economic situation, a 
search ensued for a policy making style of societal corporatism. This is also because the rapid 
change in the industrial structure, which is associated with the economic crisis, has led to the 
demand for some kind of policy agreement and cooperation between the state, business and 
labour.  
 
Han Chong-hee, Jang Ji-ho and Kim Sun-hyuk (2010:290) point out that the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997 became the reason why the government incorporated labour. Baccaro and Lim 
(2006) argue similarly that the economic crisis became the momentum for the adoption of 
neo-liberal policies, which made it possible for social pacts to be formed in South Korea. 
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Baccaro and Lim (2006) are of the opinion that the government had to introduce neo-liberal 
industrial relations and expected discontent from the unions; thus, they argue that the 
incorporation of labour became inevitable. These analysts share Habib’s (1997) view of 
corporatism as a “crisis response”. 
 
Han Chong-hee, Jang Ji-ho and Kim Sun-hyuk (2010:291) point out the limitations of the 
relationship between labour and the state. Although corporatism was officially adopted, these 
authors argue that this was more about formalities. In reality, along with globalisation, the 
neo-liberal labour market reforms increased the flexibility of the labour market, and curtailed 
the power of the trade unions as significant layoffs occurred. The authors also argue that the 
influence of the “state-led economic development” model still prevails and hampers labour 
when it exercises its power within corporatism.  
 
From the process of literature review, it is possible to see that South Africa and South Korea 
developed in a similar way and how labour gained power along with the industrialisation 
process, how the state had to incorporate labour by creating corporatist institutions, and how 
these corporatist institutions were perceived by both the opponents and the proponents. In this 
regard, it is noticeable that many scholars have already suggested undertaking studies in late-
late-industrialising countries on the subjects mentioned above. Scholars such as Adler and 
Webster (2000) assert the necessity of filling the literature gap by comparing late-late-
industrialising countries with South Africa. Habib (2013) also points out that the South 
African literature on corporatism needs a more sufficient approach moving from the 
discussion of the adoption of corporatism to the analysis of whether it will contribute to the 
“sustainable inclusive development” of South Africa. This can be applied to the case of South 
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Korea as well. However, little has been written in terms of an explicit analysis in this regard, 
furthermore, there has been little comparison between South Africa and South Korea.  
 
Bramble and Ollett’s (2010) studies are the only studies on this topic that the author of this 
study is aware of. Bramble and Ollett (2010) contend that corporatism was adopted to shift 
power from the working class to the capitalist class. One interesting argument that Bramble 
and Ollett (2010) put forward is that corporatism in South Africa has a stronger policy and/or 
more political influence than it has in South Korea, due to the different political arrangements 
between the state and labour. In other words, the state-labour relations in South Korea differ 
from those of the ANC and COSATU which were built during the long struggle against the 
apartheid government. Also another main difference is that the ANC has more than the 
majority of the population’s support, while South Korea’s ruling party has only slightly more 
than half of the population’s vote, and there is more competition.4  
 
Despite the difference between the two countries resulting from the different political 
environments (in South Korea there is not such a close relationship between the ruling party 
and labour), there is an important similarity; that is, corporatist arrangements were adopted 
with the expectation of eliminating conflicts of interest among the state, business and labour. 
However, the corporatist institutions in neither of the countries have functioned successfully. 
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that corporatism originated in Western European countries. In 
these countries interests are represented in a different way within the existing structures and 
there is a long history of corporatism. Therefore, the researcher will examine whether it is 
possible to apply the European experience of corporatism to the cases of South Africa and 
                                                     
4
 In South Korea, it can be said that there is a balance between the ruling party and opposition, however, in 
reality the practice of “winner takes all” prevails. Also, parties remain tied to the rather simple patron–client 
networks dominated by an individual leader. 
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South Korea. This can be one of the contributions of this study to the body of the existing 
literature.  
 
1-4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
 
In this section an overview of the methodological approaches used to conduct this study, is 
provided. This research entails a qualitative comparative analysis of the cases of South Africa 
and South Korea. A discussion of comparative analysis and related approaches, case 
selection, data collection and their validity will be provided. Furthermore, the strengths and 
limitations of the research methods will be discussed.  
 
1-4-1. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Before embarking on a research path, it is crucial to identify the appropriate method to design 
the research. A research design is defined as: “a blueprint of the research, dealing with at least 
four problems: what questions to study, what data are relevant, what data to collect, and how 
to analyse the results” (Philliber, Schwab, and Samsloss, 1980 in Yin 2003:21). Thus, a 
research design is the framework or plan for a study, and furthermore is used as a guide in 
collecting and analysing data. Yin (2003) notes that the importance of the research design is 
to: “help to avoid the situation in which the evidence does not address the initial research 
questions” (Yin, 2003:27).  
 
In this study, a (comparative) case study research design is used to demonstrate the causal 
argument of this study. According to Yin (2009), a case study is “an empirical enquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially 
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when the boundaries between phenomena and context are not clearly evident”. By adopting 
this design, the researcher provides an in-depth study of corporatist institutions and the 
interactions among actors within the framework. The power dynamics of relevant 
stakeholders in the context of the corporatist institutions in South Africa and South Korea will 
be observed. 
 
The researcher is aware of several weaknesses in the case study design. Case studies involve 
analysis of small data sets, such as one or two cases. This aspect of “a lack of rigour” is also 
noted by Yin (1984, 21). Biased views by the researcher can also influence the findings and 
conclusions of the study. This can lead to a problem with generalisation, since small data sets 
are not enough to produce a valid generalisation. In order to overcome these weaknesses and 
to ensure the validity of the result, multiple sources of evidence, both primary and secondary 
sources are utilised to see if they converge. Also, a case study research design is selected for 
this study not to generalise a theory but to extend the existing theory of corporatism and to 
establish whether the theoretical foundation can be applied to the new settings around 
corporatism institutions and the power dynamics of stakeholders in South Africa and South 
Korea.  
 
1-4-2. THE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
 
The unit of analysis refers to the objects that are observed and about which information is 
systematically collected in order to create “a summary of descriptions of all such units and to 
explain the differences among them” (Lambrechts, 2014). The unit can be an individual, 
group, or organisation. In this study, the researcher seeks to explain the similarities and 
differences between the two social organisations, namely NEDLAC and the KTC. These are 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
20 
 
determined by the research question and this also affects the data collection methods. In this 
study, firstly, actors’ interaction at corporatist institutions in South Africa and South Korea 
are analysed and secondly, the corporatist institutions themselves to see whether they 
functioned by bringing the actors together and resolving various agendas as they were 
expected to do. 
 
1-4-3. RESEARCH PURPOSE 
 
The study comprises three types of research: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory 
(Babbie, 2007). All three approaches are used in this study. According to Marshall and 
Rossman (2011), exploratory research is used to investigate issues about which little is 
known. In this study, the main focus is on what the impact of the power dynamics of the state, 
business and labour is on the corporatist institution. In descriptive research detailed 
information is provided about the nature of issues. Looking at representations of two case 
studies involving the decision-making processes at NEDLAC and the KTC respectively, this 
study generates information about the power dynamics between the state, business and labour. 
Explanatory research involves explaining why something happens, and assessing causal 
relationships between variables. Causes and reasons for why corporatism collapsed in both 
South Africa and South Korea are provided.  
 
1-4-4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
In the process of this research, the qualitative approach will be used. According to Babbie 
(2007:286), qualitative research can help us to interpret and better understand the complex 
reality of a given situation. Qualitative research contributes to the understanding of the 
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complexity of a problem; thus, providing deeper understanding of the state-business-labour 
relations and corporatism in South Africa and South Korea, which this researcher wishes to 
analyse. 
 
The qualitative research will draw on analyses of both secondary and primary source material. 
The data collection section will provide more information in this regard. Data analysis of this 
research is inductive, which involves developing generalisations from a limited number of 
specific observations or experiences.  
 
1-4-4-1. CASE STUDY 
 
This research is case study-based. A case study is defined as: “a strategy for doing research 
which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon in its real 
life context, using multiple sources of evidence” (Robson, 2002:178). Case study research can 
involve single and multiple case studies. This study is a multiple case study, because it 
involves the empirical analysis of two countries (South Africa and South Korea) and uses 
multiple sources of data. Multiple case studies are expected to yield more robust results and 
compelling arguments, than a single case study (Gerring, 2007).  
 
There are several advantages and disadvantages associated with conducting case study 
research. According to Robson (2007), one of the most prominent advantages is that it gives 
the researcher the opportunity to conduct an in-depth study, capturing complexities, 
relationships and processes. The researcher in this case, studies dynamic processes within 
NEDLAC and the KTC. However, there are some challenges as well. One of the major 
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challenges is that it might not be possible to generalise the knowledge to other people or other 
settings. Additionally, results are more easily influenced by the researcher’s personal biases. 
 
1-4-4-2. THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
 
The major aim of comparative research is to identify similarities and differences and 
interrelationships among political actors, institutions, political systems and political 
processes.
5
 As Mills et al. (2006:621) point out: “comparisons not only uncover differences 
between social entities, but reveal unique aspects of a particular entity that would be virtually 
impossible to detect otherwise”. Comparative research enables the researcher to develop 
concepts and generalisations based on identified similarities and differences among the social 
entities under comparison. This then serves as a means of enhancing one’s understanding and 
awareness of other social entities (Sasaki, 2004).  
 
A comparative analysis can be challenging, as the researcher is required to study a variety of 
contexts and cases. Collier (1993:6) pointed out several “inherent problems” of a comparative 
analysis. For one, conducting a comparative analysis can challenge researchers to find 
comparable cases. Furthermore, since it involves very few cases, the researcher can face 
difficulty in reconciling contradictory explanations. Since this study could face similar 
                                                     
5
 This study follows the tradition of comparative politics, which involves the systematic study and comparison of 
the world’s political systems. Comparative Politics is one of the oldest fields of political analysis. It seeks to 
explain differences and similarities between as well as among countries. Comparative Politics covers a broad 
range of topics. A single country or institution, such as political parties, militaries, parliaments, interest groups, 
political process (decision making) in a country can be categorised as comparative politics. Studies of two or 
more countries/regions provide more extensive information. Such studies are useful because they involve groups 
of countries that may have several things in common, such as similar history, cultures, language, religion, 
colonial backgrounds, and the like. Regional or area studies allow you to hold common features constant, while 
examining or testing for certain other features. Classic themes of comparative politics are: industrial 
development; social revolution; democracy and authoritarianism; and state formation. Atul Kohli (2004), James 
Mahoney (2010), Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012) focus on economic development. Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens (1992), Ruth Berins Collier (1992) are leading 
scholars in their field of democracy and authoritarianism. Theda Skocpol (1979), Farideh Farhi (1990) are 
devoted to the comparative analysis of revolution.  
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problems, its case selection was information-oriented and thus able to reduce variables by 
including only comparable cases that pertain to the research question and hypothesis.  
 
The researcher looks at only two cases in this study. Through selecting the two cases, it 
became possible for the researcher to conduct an in-depth study capturing detailed 
information. Throughout the process, it was also possible to identify causal processes which 
provided the researcher with internal validity which allowed her to prove causality. Since the 
researcher tries to establish a causal relationship, that is, the impact of the imbalance on the 
power dynamics between the state, business and labour on corporatist institutions, selecting a 
small number of cases as was done in this study was crucial. This would have been 
impossible if the research had chosen to discuss a large number of cases. 
 
Also, if the units of analysis are two different countries/institutions, the researcher might be 
required to make a field trip to a foreign country and to understand a foreign language. 
However, in this case the researcher is a native Korean speaker, thus there was no language 
barrier during the field research that took place in South Korea. During the field research in 
South Africa, the researcher was accompanied by an English native speaker who could 
transcribe the conversation. Also, e-mail was used to confirm whenever there was confusion. 
In that way, the language barrier could be overcome. Despite the disadvantages mentioned 
above, a comparative analysis can indicate different patterns or similarities that may exist 
within a specific set of cases chosen by the researcher (Ragin, 1994).  
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1-4-4-3. CASE SELECTION 
 
Selection of cases should not be random, but information-oriented. Case selection can be 
challenging to a researcher, since the researcher can be faced with bias. Also, problems are 
likely to develop if one chooses a very small sample in a completely random fashion. In the 
same context, Seawright and Gerring (2008:295) argue that: “even if cases are initially chosen 
for pragmatic reasons, it is essential that researchers understand retroactively how the 
properties of the selected cases comport with the rest of the population”. Seawright and 
Gerring (2008:296) also argue that: (1) a representative sample and (2) useful variation on the 
dimensions of theoretical interest should be considered.  
 
Some might question the possibility of a comparative study between these two 
institutions/countries (NEDLAC in South Africa and KTC in South Korea). There are 
however, several reasons why the researcher chose these two countries.  
 
First of all, the two case studies were chosen on the basis of their similarities. The countries 
experienced similar political and economic situations. Both are late-late-industrialising 
countries and both South Africa and South Korea were under authoritarian governments until 
the late 20th century. During the democratisation process, labour in the mining sector in South 
Africa, and in the heavy industries such as ship-building, chemical- and automobile industries 
in South Korea played a leading role in achieving democratisation. Their mass action, 
including stoppage at work, was a threat to both countries’ economies. From these 
similarities, it can be seen that these two countries represent certain characteristics of late-
late-industrialising countries. Considering that corporatism is derived from advanced 
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countries in Europe, South Africa and South Korea are suitable cases for the study of whether 
corporatism works in a similar way elsewhere in the world.  
 
However, if there were only similarities, the comparison would not be meaningful. There are 
also certain differences between the two countries, for example, in South Africa, COSATU 
and the ruling party, the ANC, have a close relationship through the tripartite alliance. On the 
other hand, labour and the state do not have a close relationship in South Korea even after 
democratisation. Also, South Korea has a relatively better socio-economic environment than 
South Africa, in terms of the level of inequality and poverty. These two variables could have 
influenced the relations between the state and labour and have implications for corporatism. A 
case study of a country in Latin America or Eastern Europe could have been possible. 
However, as will be discussed as one of the limitations that the researcher faced, inclusion of 
another case was restricted. 
 
There was another problem in the process of selecting cases. Since a comparative case study 
was adopted, one more issue area from South Korea should have been selected. However, the 
country’s macro-economic policy was structured before democratisation. When studying the 
KTC, the researcher tried to find another issue which could show the interaction between the 
state, business and labour. However, there is no further issue like the Non-regular Workers 
Protection on which the KTC spent such a long time and so much effort (As another case, the 
labour brokering issue was initially considered, however, in the case of South Korea, using 
labour brokers has already become widespread and it did not emerge as an issue and most 
importantly it did not receive as much as attention the Non-regular Workers Protection Act 
did). In this process, it is also possible to conclude that the corporatist institution in South 
Korea never functioned efficiently and failed to intervene in many important issues.  
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1-4-4-4. THE PROCESS TRACING APPROACH  
 
This study is a comparison of South Africa and South Korea’s corporatist institutions, 
NEDLAC and the KTC, from the establishment of these institutions in the late 1990s to 2014. 
Also, the power dynamics in the state-business-labour at the corporatist institutions are 
analysed. Some historical background will be provided in order to increase the understanding 
of the relationship between the state, business and labour, and the creation of corporatist 
institutions. In this process, process tracing, a data analysis method for identifying, validating, 
and testing causal mechanisms within case studies, will be used.  
 
Gerring (2007: 173) explains that process tracing involves looking for a continuous chain of 
sequential events. Since it requires the researchers’ patience and given that resources are 
limited, only a small number of cases can be included. However, additional cases can 
strengthen confidence in the generalisation of findings from process tracing. Since this 
research aims to assess hypothesised causal mechanisms, process tracing can help address 
interaction effects. This helps to extract the best way to answer to the research question of this 
research project.   
 
Process tracing requires the collection of large amounts of data. In the case of South Korea, 
minutes of the KTC were predominantly used to explore the interactions among actors. In this 
process, a process-tracing technique, in this case the minutes of meetings, was used to look 
for a continuous chain of sequential events. The minutes and annual reports were obtained 
when the researcher visited the KTC in Seoul, Korea in December 2012. Also, various related 
reports were later obtained from the website of the KTC. The issue related to the Non-regular 
Workers Protection Act was discussed from April, 2007 to April 2009. Thus the researcher 
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obtained the entire minutes from 2007 to 2009, these minutes are a detailed report of the 
interaction between actors and this enabled the researcher to analyse each participant’s 
interactions and the outcomes. Since its creation, the KTC has dealt with several issues such 
as the reduction of working hours, however, the issues related the Non-regular Workers 
Protection Act received the most attention, thus detailed records were available with regard to 
this particular issue.  
1-4-4-5. INDICATORS OF COMPARISON 
 
While conducting a comparative study, the researcher might face a problem with regard to 
setting up indicators that can best represent analysed social phenomena. In this research, the 
focus is on assessing corporatist institutions in South Africa and South Korea and on the 
interaction among the actors at the corporatist institutions. The influence of the imbalance of 
the relationship between the state, business and labour over time will be analysed to figure out 
the impact of the dynamics of the relations among these actors on the corporatist institutions. 
With this in mind, the researcher had to consider the process of selection and construction of 
reliable indicators that enable the researcher to investigate the state and labour relations 
effectively. 
 
In order to assess the dynamics of relations between the state, business and labour, the macro-
economic policies (South Africa) and the labour-related policies (South Africa and South 
Korea) will be described. The process of decision-making and how the actors engaged in this 
will be used to assess the corporatist institutions in both countries.  
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In South Africa, the state has adopted a series of macro-economic programmes such as the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (1994-1996), Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) (1996-2005), Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South 
Africa (ASGISA) (2006-2012) and the National Development Plan (NDP) (2013 onwards). 
Thus, it is possible to observe the interaction between the state, business and labour in terms 
of the adoption of each programme. In addition to this, there are cases that indicate the 
decreasing influence of NEDLAC. When the ETIA was formulated and enacted in 2014, 
NEDLAC was bypassed. In this process, it is possible to observe the imbalance in the power 
dynamics among the state, business and labour since labour’s demands were not incorporated. 
This is a significant indicator that shows the imbalanced power dynamics among the 
stakeholders.  
 
In South Korea the state has not introduced specific macro-economic programmes as in the 
case of South Africa. Thus, the focus is on the various agendas negotiated between the state, 
business and labour when the KTC was created in 1998. In South Korea, the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997 brought about a tremendous change in employment structure. South Korea, 
which used to have the lifelong employment system, was under pressure from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and transnational companies to adopt the flexible labour 
market system. This critical event and its consequences have led to a fluctuating pattern in 
state-business-labour relations. This reached a climax when the Non-regular workers’ 
problems became a huge social problem in society and when the Non-regular Workers 
Protection Act was introduced and discussed at the KTC’s sub-commission from 2007 to 
2009. However, the Non-regular Workers Protection Act has not led to a solution regarding 
the use of non-regular workers. Furthermore, the fact that labour withdrew from the KTC 
indicates the collapse of the corporatist institution in South Korea.  
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It is significant to make an assessment of the corporatist institutions in both countries in the 
context of the emergence of corporatism in late-late-industrialising countries. Within the 
corporatist institutions, the society and economy of a country was organised into major 
interest groups, and representatives of those interest groups were expected to settle any 
problems through negotiation and joint agreement. In this context, labour, which used to be 
marginalised vis-à-vis the state and business, became an equal partner at the corporatist 
institutions. This is in stark contrast to the period under the authoritarian governments in both 
countries. However, when looking at the today’s state-society relations at the corporatist 
institutions in both countries, it is clear that the power of especially labour has ebbed and 
flowed. In the end, it has been placed at a disadvantage again. This in the end led to the 
collapse of corporatism. A comparison of corporatism in South Africa and South Korea and 
the evaluation will provide the grounds for analysis of one of the most pertinent dilemmas in 
these late-late-industrialising countries today. Since corporatism was adopted to pursue two 
main goals namely economic growth and social stability in South Africa and South Korea 
which experienced a massive transition period prior to democratisation, how to maintain 
corporatist institutions is an intriguing question. It is interesting to assess how/whether this 
approach worked, and if not, why it has failed.  
 
1-4-5. SECONDARY DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
In this research, secondary sources including academic books and journal articles were the 
main source of information. Secondary data was information collected by others; thus, the 
researcher could save time as he/she did not have to collect the data himself/herself and could 
move quickly to the data analysis phase. However, the researcher had no control over the 
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research design or the methods for data collection. In order to balance this, the researcher used 
interviews and primary sources to complement secondary data.  
 
Secondary data were mainly used in Chapter 2 (various approaches to state-society relations 
and the corporatist approach in particular, which is the framework for the study), Chapter 3 
(historical context and the creation of corporatism in South Africa) and Chapter 4 (historical 
context and the creation of corporatism in South Korea) of the study. 
 
1-4-6. PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
Primary sources are used to complement other measures, in this case secondary sources. A 
primary source is an original object or document; first-hand information. Primary sources 
enable the researcher to get as close as possible to what actually happened during a historical 
event or time period. Primary sources that are used in this research include official 
government records such as National Treasury, Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) from the 
national statistical service of South Africa and documents from the Korea Labour Institute, as 
well as annual reports and various other documents (working papers and special reports) 
published by NEDLAC and the KTC. Interviews are another data collection strategy used in 
this project. Interviews in social research are encounters between a researcher and a 
respondent, in which the latter is asked a series of questions relevant to the topic of 
investigation (Ackroyd and Hugues, 1981:66). In this research project, minutes of the KTC 
were analysed in order to generate primary data about the South Korean case.  
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1-4-6-1. INTERVIEWS 
 
Interviews are classified according to their degree of standardisation, such as the standardised 
(structured) interview and the non-standardised interview (Henning, 2004). In this research, 
the non-standardised interview method was chosen, since it can give the researcher and 
interviewee a great deal of flexibility in asking and answering questions. Sometimes this “go 
with the flow” approach can be time-consuming but it has flexibility and gives the researcher 
the opportunity to explore new avenues; thus, resulting in first-hand opinions from 
interviewees. Though the non-standardised interview method was chosen, by integrating a 
problem-based approach, conducting interviews was both effective and efficient. Only 
participants aware of the problem of corporatist institutions who could both describe and 
evaluate the problem were selected. During the process of interviews purposive and snowball 
sampling were used. Purposive sampling served to establish the profile of interviewees. 
Snowball sampling made the selection of a few individuals who could identify other 
individuals who might be suitable participants in the study, possible. These techniques were 
used especially when the researcher conducted key informant interviews. Whenever the 
researcher faced difficulties contacting interviewees, the researcher asked respondents to refer 
her to other possible respondents. 
 
Interviews were conducted in South Africa and South Korea. Concerning the selection of 
respondents for interviews, the researcher selected the most suitable participants (Henning, 
2004). In order to select the most suitable interviewee, a desktop-based analysis of the 
background literature was used. After analysing minutes of the KTC and annual reports of 
NEDLAC and the KTC it was possible to identify possible participants at NEDLAC and the 
KTC, who could pass on their first-hand experience and provide insights for the study. Based 
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on the series of preliminary interviews, in-depth interviews including interviews with related 
actors were conducted in 2014. 
 
Interviews were of two categories: informal interviews and key informant interviews. The 
researcher conducted several informal interviews (7 participants in total) with related actors in 
order to understand the broad situations in South Africa and South Korea in 2012 and 2013. 
In South Africa, interviews were conducted with members of NUMSA and the Southern 
African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU) in the Western Cape Province. 
They were chosen since NUMSA is one of the biggest affiliates of COSATU and the textile 
industry is one of the biggest industries in Western Cape. During the series of interviews, the 
main focus was on how these shop floor members perceived labour’s leadership and 
corporatism in South Africa, in other words, whether it has brought about any benefits for 
them. This preliminary assessment helped with the shaping of a questionnaire for the next 
phase, that is the key informant interviews. Also, their perspectives indicate that the 
corporatist institution in South Africa has not functioned properly. In this research project, 
informal interviews comprised loosely structured conversations with various respondents 
mainly from labour, which seems to have been put at disadvantage compared to the state and 
business. Key informant interviews targeted stakeholders in NEDLAC who could provide 
more in-depth information about the corporatist institution in South Africa. In South Africa, 
NEDLAC does not provide detailed minutes to the public, thus key informant interviews were 
chosen to generate primary data. The key informant interviews were conducted with the 
actors from the government (Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation and 
Department of Labour), NEDLAC, business (BUSA) and labour (COSATU and NUMSA) 
representatives at the corporatist institution of South Africa. Also, political commentators 
from media who have been researching NEDLAC were interviewed in order to gain insights 
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from observers. Key informant interviews were conducted with a minimum of 2-3 
participants from each group (9 participants in total), who were selected according to their 
comprehensive experience at NEDLAC. When it was difficult to get hold of interviewees, the 
researcher interviewed former (BUSA and NEDLAC) officials. Each interview lasted 45-60 
minutes. Most of them were conducted face to face, however due to time constraints, 
telephonic interviews were also used. The series of interviews were supplemented by e-mails, 
and e-mails were also used whenever there was lack of clarity.  
 
In South Korea, key informant interviews were conducted with high-level labour officials of 
the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and the FKTU in December 2012. 
During the interviews, it was possible to confirm the officials’ discontent with regard to the 
KTC. Also, the researcher was able to see how severely fragmented labour in South Korea is. 
In the case of South Korea, the minutes of the KTC yielded detailed information about 
interactions between actors. This will be discussed in the next section. In March and April 
2014, additional interviews with an academic who was in charge of the series of KTC 
commissioned reports were conducted. He was especially helpful when selecting the case of 
the Non-workers Protection Act of South Korea for this study.  
 
1-5. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
In this research the focus was on the corporatist institutions and the nature of the relations 
between the state, business and labour and how they influenced the corporatist institutions in 
both countries. The research design and methodology used in this study had to be rigorous in 
order to understand the complexity of the state, business and labour relations at corporatist 
institutions. The two cases, NEDLAC in South Africa and the KTC in South Korea, were 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
34 
 
carefully chosen based on their similarities but several variations made it possible for this to 
be called a comparative study. 
 
Corporatism was initially adopted in order to achieve social stability as well as economic 
growth. This happened at the same time in South Africa and South Korea. However, in this 
research project, the main focus is the imbalance of power among actors and the impact of 
this on the corporatist institutions in both countries.  
 
Thus, other aspects such as the implications of corporatism, the macroeconomic effect on 
commerce, employment, and incomes among others, were left to further research. Rather this 
research project is focused on the general assessment of corporatism. However, some 
statistics were used to show that corporatism could not achieve its goals such as contributing 
to economic growth.  
In addition to this, several methodological problems were experienced while conducting the 
research. For example, the inclusion of more cases of late-late-industrialising countries, such 
as Eastern European countries, would have deepened the findings. Another issue is that the 
researcher faced several difficulties while conducting interviews with actors from business 
and the state. In South Africa, NEDLAC recently underwent restructuring and experienced 
organisational problems; therefore, it was initially difficult for the researcher to identify 
contacts. In order to overcome this obstacle, the researcher worked through other informants. 
The interview with a former coordinator at the Trade and Industry Chamber was useful and 
helped the researcher to grasp the interaction between actors at NEDLAC, and their various 
attitudes.   
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In South Korea, there was lack of participatory willingness from interviewees, including those 
from labour. Officials from the KTC declined to be interviewed, even though they were 
assured of anonymity. They reasoned that they needed to get official permission from the 
institution. Furthermore, the research itself is not necessarily related to positive aspects of the 
KTC. In other words, the aim of the research is to figure out the causal relations regarding the 
collapse of the KTC, thus, the interview request was turned down. However, the officials 
kindly allowed me to access documents and publications. Also, minutes and various reports 
were easily accessed through the website, which helped the researcher based in South Africa, 
to gain detailed information despite the geographical distance. 
 
One of the most significant limitations is that the researcher chose two issues from South 
Africa (macro-economic programmes and a labour-related law) and the one issue (a labour-
related law) from South Korea. As mentioned earlier, South Korea did not adopt macro-
economic programmes within the corporatist framework, since the country had achieved 
relatively high economic development before democratisation. The researcher is fully aware 
of the imbalance in terms of issue selection. In order to overcome this, the researcher went 
through the minutes and annual reports of the KTC from the 1998 to the present. Also, the 
researcher consulted with an academic in South Korea in order to find another issue. 
However, there is no such issue which weighs as heavily as the non-workers protection issue. 
Therefore, the researcher tries to show a broad picture of the relations between the state, 
business and labour to overcome this limitation. Also, the fact that the KTC has been involved 
in only a few issues indicates that the corporatist institution in South Korea has not worked 
properly.  
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1-6. OVERVIEW AND DISSERTATION STRUCTURE 
 
The corporatist institutions in South Africa and South Korea have been assessed as not being 
successful. Labour in particular has been placed at a disadvantage in the decision-making 
process. This has led to labour becoming discontented and finally withdrawing. Business 
seems to be indifferent and the state that is supposed to play the role of mediator, is also 
pushing forward its own agenda unilaterally. 
 
Even though labour could gain some benefits, ranging from the legalisation of labour 
movements and the establishment of labour parties to wage increases, labour has yielded 
autonomy and lost members, due to the fact that it allowed retrenchment. This led to the 
imbalance of power between labour and other actors and this negatively affected corporatism 
in both South Africa and South Korea. Against this back drop, the dissertation is structured as 
follows: 
 
 CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK – CORPORATISM 
 
In Chapter 2 the focus is on corporatism as a theoretical tool. In the first part, there will be a 
comparison between corporatism, pluralism and Marxism. Pluralists see society as consisting 
of numerous individuals and interest groups, and focus on conflicts among them. Marxists 
feel that the state is a coercive instrument of the ruling class. In the Marxist framework, the 
state is criticised because it is seen as only representing the capitalists’ interests (Cawson, 
1986). Both sides overlook the role of the state as a mediator preventing a clash between 
competing interests. The state should pursue the shared common good, which is beneficial to 
all members of society. Especially in countries like South Africa and South Korea which 
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underwent democratic transition, it is a prerequisite to have a mediator to coordinate different 
interests, and this mediator should have a sense of urgency. In the second part, the focus will 
move to corporatism, including its historical development and defining it within the South 
African and South Korean contexts, with the aim of positioning this study in a wider 
discussion on corporatism.  
 
 CHAPTER 3: CORPORATISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
In this chapter the corporatist institution, NEDLAC, in South Africa will be examined. The 
focus is on the relations between the state and other South African societal actors, business 
and labour, within the corporatist framework. There is firstly a brief discussion of the history 
of corporatism in South Africa. Also, the evolution of the labour movement will be discussed. 
In this process, it will be possible to observe how the power of labour increased as time went 
by; how it became a driving force to end apartheid, and also how it led to the establishment of 
NEDLAC in South Africa.  
 
After that, the institution itself and its policies, as well as the implications of these policies, 
will be discussed. The macro-economic policies and the ETIA as a case study will be 
examined to show how corporatism in South Africa failed as a social dialogue mechanism. 
An overall assessment of NEDLAC will follow.   
 
 CHAPTER 4: CORPORATISM IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
In this chapter the corporatist institution, the KTC in South Korea, will be examined. The 
focus is on the relations between the state, business and labour within the corporatist 
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framework. Firstly, the history of corporatism in South Korea will be discussed. Secondly, the 
structure, functions and outcome of the KTC will be discussed. Afterwards, the shifting 
balance of power between the state, business and labour will be discussed to show how this 
negatively affected the KTC. The focus of the chapter is specifically on the Non-regular 
Workers Protection Act in order to illustrate the interaction between actors at the KTC. In 
conclusion, an overall assessment of the KTC will be provided. 
 
 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
In Chapter 5 results of the analysis of the case studies are reported. There is a summary of 
research findings and conclusions are drawn. Also, whether the theory of corporatism, as 
derived from the European experience, fits into the context of South Africa and South Korea 
will be discussed in the theoretical reflection section. The preliminary findings of the study 
are as follows:  
 
 After democratisation, the balance of power among the actors became asymmetrical, 
which negatively affected the corporatist framework. In both South Africa and South 
Korea, corporatism is not regarded as important by the state, business and labour. The 
corporatist institutions are seen as formalities or as lacking institutional capacity and 
accountability. In this context, it is difficult for the KTC and NEDLAC to play the role 
of social dialogue institutions. 
 Along with globalisation, both countries have adopted neo-liberal economic policies, 
whereby the influence of labour has been affected. The flexible labour market policy 
in particular has negatively affected the membership of trade unions through 
retrenchment, in turn, labour’s overall influence at the corporatist institutions has 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
39 
 
declined. On the other hand the state and business have gained influence vis-à-vis 
labour. These actors have formed a form of coalition similar to what could be found in 
both countries before democratisation. Labour still maintains its influence in the 
mobilisation of union members; thus, it uses strikes and mass action instead of 
corporatism to achieve its goals.  
 Even though labour has gained some influence in the policy decision-making process 
and as a result several laws have been introduced in favour of labour, labour has 
become marginalised at the corporatist institutions. The state and business have 
formed coalition vis-à-vis labour. The state in particular pushed forward their agendas 
unilaterally. The imbalance of power among the state, business and labour resulted in 
the collapse of the corporatist institutions in South Africa and South Korea. 
 Corporatism seems to have been adopted as a mere crisis response to South Africa and 
South Korea’s political economic crises, and it is seen as another control mechanism 
created by states in transition to democracy.  
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CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2-1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a framework for the study, in which the research 
questions, developed in Chapter 1, can be analysed. Firstly, a comparison between pluralism, 
Marxism and corporatism will be made, in order to examine how state-society relations are 
viewed by the advocates of each theory. The three theories share many characteristics; 
however, corporatism sheds light on the analysis of the relations between the state, business 
and labour in the capitalist industrialisation process providing close nexus between them.  
 
Secondly, the emergence and development of corporatism will be analysed. This historical 
approach reflects how corporatism emerged and developed over time. Particular historical 
conjunctures which influenced the characteristics of corporatism will be reviewed. In this 
process, it is inevitable that the focus will be laid on the European experience, since 
corporatism emerged as a means to address problems in capitalist countries in Europe.  
 
In addition, corporatism in the Latin American countries will be discussed. The strong and 
centralised governments in Latin America used to be referred to as state-led corporatists. 
Subsequently, corporatism in Africa and Asia will be briefly discussed. By looking at other 
regions and countries, it will be possible to understand how corporatism in different countries, 
other than Europe, has developed.  
 
In the next section, the focus will be on corporatism itself and macro-, meso- and micro- 
corporatism will be examined. In the beginning, macro-corporatism was in the limelight, 
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which deals with the interest representation system of state, business and labour at a national 
level. However, in the 1980s, the focus shifted to meso- and micro- rather than macro-
corporatism. In 2-3-3, the differences between the derivatives will be discussed. Some 
scholars such as Allen (1990), Cawson (1986) and Moore and Booth (1989) have pointed out 
that the adoption of meso- and micro- corporatism has become one of the crucial conditions 
for the success of corporatism. By focusing on sector and enterprise levels, it was possible for 
some countries to foster competitiveness in a certain industrial sector.  
 
In 2-3-4, the resurrection or re-emergence of corporatism in some European countries will be 
discussed. In the 1980s, corporatism was in decline, some corporatist scholars argue that 
corporatist structure in itself had become weak and moderate compared to the past (Baccaro 
and Lim, 2006; Baccaro, 2003; Molina and Rhodes, 2002). Baccaro and Lim (2006) and 
Molina and Rhodes (2002) analyse which characteristics of corporatism still exist, as 
indicated in Baccaro’s What is Dead and What is Alive in Corporatism (2003). From the 
1990s onwards, the main feature of corporatism changed; “political exchange” in corporatist 
arrangements rather than “a system of interest intermediation” was highlighted as the 
fundamental element of corporatism (Molina and Rhodes, 2002:322). Through this process, it 
is possible to understand how this trend was adjusted and implemented in both South Africa 
and South Korea. 
 
Since most studies on corporatism are based on the European experiences, it is not possible to 
apply the European corporatist model directly to South Africa and South Korea, which are 
late-late-industrialising countries. In European countries societal actors have become 
institutionalised and have become part of the fabric of society. South Africa and South Korea, 
which experienced democratisation recently, did not follow the same pattern nor create the 
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same environments for establishing corporatist traditions. Another distinctive feature of the 
relations between the state and society in South Africa and South Korea is that both countries 
simultaneously experienced democratic transition inward and globalisation outward. These 
aspects were coupled with particular historical conjunctures in South Africa and South Korea, 
which may have influenced the characteristics of corporatism in both countries. By examining 
the existing literature, an all-encompassing theoretical framework for the dissertation can be 
provided in this chapter.  
 
2-2. VARIOUS APPROACHES TO STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS  
 
In this section the different theoretical approaches of pluralism and Marxism regarding the 
state, and how they view the state will be discussed. Through this process, it will be possible 
to examine common and conflicting elements that exist between pluralism and Marxism, 
corporatism and pluralism, and corporatism and Marxism.  
 
2-2-1. THE PLURALIST APPROACH 
 
Pluralism has been flourishing on the background of societal groups being autonomous, and 
equal in their influence on the policy making process (Smith, 1995:209). Based on this 
premise, pluralism has secured the dominant position in the political discourse in the United 
States. The existence of a multitude of different groups is one of the fundamental democratic 
principles in the United States, and the government is designed to encourage the 
representation of competing interests. Under these circumstances, no one group dominates as 
Smith (1995:209) says: “the modern liberal state means that no single group, class or 
organisation dominates society”. The reason that competing interests can balance is due to 
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power and access being dispersed among several groups. This is the concept of “polyarchy”; 
different groups have power on different issues. In the process of competition, “bargaining” 
and “compromise” tend to be fair to all (Held, 1997:247). 
 
Scholars such as Dahl (1967:24) advocate certain advantages associated with pluralist 
democracy that exists in the United States: the system fosters the peaceful settlement of 
conflicts to the mutual benefit of most; coercion can be minimized; the consent of all citizens 
is promoted. However, since the main assumption in pluralism is that power is dispersed to 
the various interest groups, many different groups representing various interests end up 
competing for their own desirable outcome, access to formulating policies (Held, 1997:247). 
For Cawson (1986), the concept of access to the decision-making process is important in 
pluralism. Cawson (1986:46) posits that: “the more access is available, the more pluralistic 
the system is”. However, it seems to be inevitable that there are conflicts of interest between 
various groups in pluralism. How can these conflicts be settled? Another question also arises 
in tandem: “What is the role of the state in this situation?”  
 
Some scholars such as Williamson (1985) and Smith (1995) point out that the theory of 
pluralism is underdeveloped when it comes to conceptualising the state. Smith (1995:212) 
defines the state as “a set of institutions” including the executive, legislature, judiciary and 
civil service, or as a “discrete” organisation making policy in response to a multitude of 
groups pressing on the government. In the same way, Williamson (1985:141) also points out 
that pluralists are likely to highlight the significance of government institutions. These 
arguments suggest that pluralists do not sufficiently analyse the state and the state is a mere 
responsive actor in the political arena. In this regard, Smith (1995:218) emphasises the need 
for the examination of the position of the state from the pluralist perspective. 
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The characteristics above reflect the concept of classical pluralism; different points of 
pluralist view have emerged recently (Jordan and Richardson, 1987). So called reformed-
pluralists and neo-pluralists agree to most of the assumptions of classical-pluralism; however, 
they argue that economic resources affect interest groups, thus inequalities in power and 
access exist. Lindblom (1977) points out that the political arena in the West is controlled by 
business, identifying an “unusual kind and degree of control over governmental policy 
making exercised by business”. Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987:275) argue in the same vein, 
namely that business is often in a superior position to other groups and enjoys advantages. It 
is justifiable to refer to Dahl’s (1967:137) statement that “groups who make themselves heard 
can be heard”, meaning that the group which has more resources can have more access among 
a multitude of groups. Neo-pluralist scholars suggest that groups have different degrees of 
access to the decision-making processes and that the state is biased towards certain interest 
groups, such as highly resourced groups. However, in this situation, balance can still be 
achieved because, “internal checks” by politicians and bureaucratic agencies and “external 
checks” by rival interest groups, play an important role to counterweight the domination of a 
certain group (Smith, 1995:210). 
 
When it comes to a group-centred view, it seems that pluralism and corporatism share a 
common characteristic. According to Schmitter (1974:96), the focus in both theories is on the 
importance of “formal associational units of representation”. Also, the potential of conflicting 
interests among societal groups lies in both theories. However, while pluralists value diversity 
and competition among groups, corporatists believe that the state should co-opt a few and 
selected groups, and control and coordinate the activities of these groups. In corporatism, 
even if it is a form of societal corporatism, power is not evenly dispersed between the state 
and interest groups. The main position of corporatism is that the state grants only a limited 
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number of interest groups the power of decision-making (see the definition of corporatism in 
2-3-1) (Schmitter, 1974:96). What should be noted is that the significant difference between 
pluralism and corporatism is not the number of interest groups. In corporatism there is a much 
closer link between the state and interest groups than in pluralism. Another difference is that, 
while in pluralism, bargaining can take place in situations where interest groups decide that 
they will gain in the event of a decrease of conflict; corporatism is based on the scope for 
positive-sum gains; in other words, interest groups may be asked to give in now in exchange 
for gains in the future. 
 
Several problems related to pluralism are evident when this state-society relationship is 
applied to countries other than the United States. As discussed already, the possibility that the 
state can also generate demands to which groups or society as a whole must respond, is 
overlooked. For this reason, pluralism has been challenged by state-centred approaches, such 
as neo-Marxism and corporatism. In reality, most late-late-industrialising countries have 
experienced top-down decision-making processes and implementation in the process of 
economic development and this political culture still prevails in many countries. 
 
2-2-2. THE MARXIST APPROACH 
 
Marxism is another theory which focuses on the problem of state-society relations and 
develops studies on the exercise of power both within and between states. Scholars such as 
Crouch (1983:320) point out that Marxism has a theoretical power, which is capable of 
explaining the relationship between the political and the economic power relations in the 
modern society. However, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communism 
threatened the position of Marxism. Even though in some societies, organised labour has 
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gained political control of the state, it has not succeeded in ending the ownership of private 
property and replacing the capitalist mode of production. Marx’s prediction of the inevitable 
economic collapse of capitalism has not taken place and it became necessary for its adherents 
to revisit Marxist theories (Solo, 1978:831).  
 
Initially, Marxism made a great impact on the labour movements in Europe since Marx 
advocated for the organisation of workers in trade unions and revolutionary movements, 
which ultimately led to the formation of socialist political parties. In Marx’s analysis of the 
capitalist mode of production, the key premise is that capitalism was based on class 
exploitation. In contrast, Marxism stresses class interests. In Marxism, the asymmetric 
relationship between classes is believed to lead to conflictual relationships in the capitalist 
mode of production. Marxists posit that when capitalists increase the rate of exploitation, the 
workers revolt, which can lead to the collapse of capitalism. Marxists regard the state as a veil 
or façade; in other words, the state is seen as an instrument of the dominant ruling class, 
which owns the means of production (Taylor, 1995:249). 
 
There are several corporatist criticisms of Marxism. First of all, to Marxists, economic 
relations and class relations are crucial because these determine the actions of the state, the 
importance of the state seems to be minimal (Marsh,1995:272). In corporatism, the role of the 
state as mediator cannot be discarded. Secondly, Marxists treat interest groups as less 
significant in the analysis of power structure and political conflict. Thirdly, Fremantle 
(1956:174) argues that the Marxist notion of a class being hostile to other classes and the 
associated inevitability of conflict, is mistaken. Since capitalism cannot develop without 
labour, nor labour without capital; the two classes can be in harmony and agreement, as 
corporatists suggest.   
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One of the fundamental assumptions of Marxism has been criticised even within the Marxist 
stream, in terms of the relations between the state and society, especially, a capitalist society. 
Crouch (1983:320) questions why the state in a capitalist society must serve the interests of 
capitalism and argues that Marxist theory does not provide a satisfactory answer. Regarding 
this, neo-Marxism provides some useful insights.  
 
According to Poulantzas (1973), capital is composed of several distinct fractions and even 
their interests often conflict. In this situation, Poulantzas (1973) argues that the state must not 
serve the interests of capital as a whole. Even though the central function and responsibility of 
the capitalist state is still to protect the capitalist interest, the state can be wedded to one 
particular interest. In this way, the state has a degree of independence in adopting policies. 
This is the concept of relative autonomy and it is one of the crucial points that neo-Marxists 
make. It shows that Marxist theories have evolved to accept that the capitalist state has a 
degree of autonomy to manage conflicting interests of capitalist economies (Poulantzas, 1973; 
Jessop, 1990). 
 
The most distinctive feature of corporatism compared to Marxism is that it pays attention to 
cooperation rather than conflict between state and society; in other words, the possibility of 
peaceful social change. Corporatists presuppose collaboration and harmony between capital 
and labour as a desirable goal and as a potential driving force for further economic 
development. In corporatism the focus is not on class conflict but on “social cooperation” 
along with the “process of collective action” and “interests intermediation” (Panitch, 
1980:166). With regard to capitalism, corporatists argue that the capitalist state can provide 
welfare guarantees to the working class. In this way, it is possible to achieve “cross-class” 
equilibrium (Solo, 1978:841). Cawson (1986:50) argues that the state can improve the 
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welfare, working conditions and the material progress for the working class at the same time 
as serving the interest of capital. Cawson (1986) suggests that the state can serve the interests 
of the dominant class and guarantee the long-run interest, not only of the dominant class, but 
of the state as a whole.  
 
Then, how is it possible to achieve a common goal, prioritising the interests of the nation 
without any resistance from societal groups? In this context, the explanation of Gramsci 
(1971), who broadens the whole Marxist perspective, would be useful. According to him, 
capitalist society is not controlled by coercion but by consensus or consent. To Gramsci 
(1971), the concept of hegemony is vital; hegemony is a relationship between classes in 
which a dominant class presents its interests as the interests of all. He emphasises ideas and 
ideology which can play a crucial role in making the ruling class convince everybody that its 
ideas are universal, and thereby win consent. If a class succeeds in legitimising its dominance 
through the formal political structure of the state, the class is considered as hegemonic. 
Consent and consensus play a decisive role in achieving hegemony. Gramsci sees a crucial 
role for both intellectuals and the education process (Gramsci, 1971:182). This parallels the 
ideas of neo-Marxists such as Poulantzas (1973). Some corporatist scholars share this 
perspective; corporatism is a strategy pursued by capitalism, justifying the subordination of 
working class (Crouch, 1979:19).  
 
So far, the main characteristics of pluralism and Marxism have been reviewed and there has 
been an attempt to try to figure out their similarities to and differences from corporatism. 
Common and contrasting aspects exist in pluralism and Marxism; that is, both sides doubt 
whether the state really represents the common good and posit that society is an arena of 
conflict.  
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It should be noted that pluralism and Marxism have reshaped themselves over time. 
According to Smith (1995:224), Dahl and Lindblom have shifted towards positions more 
aligned to Marxism, and accepted the criticisms of Marxism against classic pluralism. When 
it comes to Marxism, the collapse of Communism resulted in Marxists reconsidering the 
importance of basic assumptions of pluralism such as “diversity of society” and 
“parliamentary democracy”. This development led to the term “Marxist pluralists” (Jessop, 
1990:248-249).  
 
In this section, different assumptions from pluralism and Marxism regarding the state and 
concepts of the state were reviewed, some of which are compatible with corporatism. The 
most important feature about corporatism, as stated by Schmitter (1974) is that the state is 
autonomous and it should be treated as the most important variable in state-society relations. 
The corporatist approach towards the state-society relations will be discussed in more dertail 
in 2-3.  
 
2-3. THE CORPORATIST APPROACH  
 
In the previous sections, it can be seen that overlaps and conflicting elements exist between 
corporatism and pluralism, and also corporatism and Marxism. In this section the emergence 
and the development of corporatism over time will be reviewed. In this process, it will be 
possible to extract the initial conditions needed for corporatism to emerge and to see what its 
functions are. Corporatism contributes to the theory of the state by focusing on the political 
and social impact of a limited number of interest groups and their complex relations with the 
state. Looking at how corporatism has been applied and adjusted in different countries, will 
also give more insight into the cases of South Africa and South Korea.  
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2-3-1. EMERGENCE AND EARLY THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT  
 
In this section, the emergence and theoretical development of corporatism will be examined. 
In this process, the corporatist experience of Europe will be revealed. It is often said that the 
history of corporatism can be traced to the mediaeval era when the co-existence of monarchy 
and church, and the guild system prevailed. Williamson (1985:19) argues that the monarchy 
and the church were locked into an “organic community”, which shared common features 
with corporatism. The existence of guilds as a third force along with the church and the 
monarchy serves as a reminder of the present corporatist structures.  
 
One of the prominent scholars in corporatism, Crouch (1979:123) views “Roman Catholic 
social thought” in the 19th century as leading to corporatism. From the early 1800s onwards, 
the Roman Catholic church started focusing on social problems; the deteriorating conditions 
of labour drew particular attention and various Catholic social initiatives were developed in 
the light of this situation. In this classical form of corporatism, all classes of society would be 
united through the agency of the Catholic church (Crouch, 1979:22).  
 
Crouch (1979:17) argues that the tendency of corporatism became stronger as a result of both 
World Wars. The total mobilisation needed to wage the war andjustified the integration of 
state, business and labour. In the process of confrontation against an external enemy, internal 
conflict derived from societal actors became less important. After World War I, along with 
the financial crises of the 1920s and 1930s, and in order to protect the national economy, the 
corporatist state became widespread. At the same time, it is also possible to observe that 
corporatism was associated with each country’s unique political economic situation.  
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One of the prominent examples is that corporatism was associated with Fascism. In Italy from 
1922 until 1943, corporatism became influential amongst Italian nationalists led by Mussolini. 
Italian Fascism involved a corporatist political system in which the economy was collectively 
managed by state, business and labour through formal mechanisms at the national level. One 
of the distinctive features is that corporatism under Fascism was legitimated to use coercion to 
resolve persisting social conflict (Crouch, 1979:18). 
 
The corporatist approach was developed with certain historical conjunctures but corporatism 
in earnest emerged as a result of focusing on problems in Western advanced capitalism. 
Manoilesco’s (1934) argument that the 20th century will be the century of corporatism is 
often referred to when describing the early burgeoning of corporatism, because he predicted 
the gradual “corporatisation” of Western capitalist economies. Manoilesco (1934:80) states 
that:  
 
within a corporatist economy the individuals were to become once more socially embedded as 
members – or working parts – of a natural organic whole, namely through the establishment of a 
series of links and socially meaningful relations according to individuals’ natural vocations and 
ascribed occupations (Manoilesco, 1934:80). 
 
Manoilesco describes economic policy-making in advanced capitalist countries, as 
increasingly dependent on the process of consensus-building within the political system 
(Lehmbruch, 1979:153).  
 
Shonfield (1965:231) argues that in order to achieve a high level of macro-economic 
performance, modern capitalist states had to include the major interest groups in decision-
making. In the same vein, Panitch (1979:119) sees corporatism as having developed as an 
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approach for solving the individualism and competition in the capitalist mode of production, 
which led to industrial and political conflict between classes. Panitch (1979:119) argues that 
corporatism promises “class harmony” and “organic unity” in order to resolve conflicts in 
capitalism.  
 
The rise and fall of corporatism was closely linked to the state’s economic activity, mainly to 
the resurgence of industrial conflict and government’s attempts to regulate it. The revival of 
corporatism took place after World War II. In Western advanced capitalism, the eclipse of the 
economy after World War II led to the re-examination of the pluralistic “overloaded 
government”; meaning, the state faced excessive demands from various societal groups 
(Crouch, 1979:14-16). At that time, labour became strong enough to organise itself to face 
capital in order to improve working conditions, and many scholars argue that this triggered 
the re-emergence of corporatism (Molina and Rhodes, 2002:307).  
 
Against these backgrounds, it is also possible to link corporatism to the development of 
Fordist society. In the early 20th century Fordism appeared as a response to the capitalistic 
crisis of the worldwide depression of the 1930s and 1940s. Fordism refers to the system of 
mass production and consumption. The economies of the industrialised countries enjoyed 
continuous growth, with wages and profits steadily increasing in parallel. Fordism recognised 
that workers are also consumers (Scharph, 1991).  
 
Fordist production entailed an intensified industrial division of labor. There was a strong 
division between mental and manual, a mass of semi-skilled workers. This became the basis 
for trade unions movements. Trade unions started enforcing competitive wages for their 
members. In this process, coordinated wage setting between national associations of 
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employers and trade unions existed. Through negotiations, labour could achieve both high 
wages and considerable income equality, this can be seen as one of the functions of 
corporatism (Scharph, 1991).  
 
In a discussion of corporatism after World War II, it should be noted that corporatism 
developed along with Keynesianism.
6
 By the 1950s, labour became the largest single group in 
most developed countries in Western Europe. Labour supported the postwar Keynesian 
welfare state, with its goals of full employment and social security (Aglietta, 1979). Schmitter 
(1979:25) refers to Keynes as: “the first major theorist to perceive certain emergent 
imperatives of capitalism and to link them explicitly with corporatism”. It is noticeable that 
Schmitter (1979) perceives Keynesianism and corporatism as compatible in that they involve 
the state. In order to overcome economic inefficiency, Schmitter (1979) and Almodovar and 
Cardoso (2005:346-350) argue that the state should play a leading role in implementing 
economic policies to foster full employment, promote economic growth, regulate working 
conditions, resolve labour conflict, and allow for the growing participation of labour 
organisations in the economic policy-making process. 
 
The state is the agent that chooses a type of industrialisation and the implications of this 
transformation have an impact on labour. Labour was easily mobilised on behalf of their own 
interests and was often the most powerful political force. Thus, the state had to play an 
important role orchestrating various demands from labour and business. However, Atkinson 
                                                     
6
 Keynesian economics was developed during the 1930s in an attempt to understand the Great Depression. 
Keynes, an economist, argues that active government intervention in the market is the only method of ensuring 
economic growth and stability. He claims that insufficient demand causes unemployment and that excessive 
demand results in inflation. Thus government should manipulate the level of aggregate demand by adjusting 
levels of government expenditure and taxation. He believed that this would pull the global economy out of the 
Depression (Tily, 2010). 
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and Coleman (1985) stress that a corporatist system will function successfully only if the state 
is strong and autonomous.  
 
Various theories of corporatism have emerged since 1970. These theories are distinguished 
from earlier variants that had a Catholic element and a Fascist element. The corporatism that 
emerged in the 1970s is often called neo-corporatism.
7
 Since groups’ interests are more 
interdependent in corporatism in the 1970s, Lehmbruch (1979:55) argues for “the high degree 
of cooperation” among groups in the decision-making process and states further that this 
should be distinguished from traditional corporatism. Lehmbruch (1979:55) sees that 
“bargaining” among “autonomous” groups is a crucial element of corporatism, along with 
“the high degree of cooperation” among groups in the decision-making process. Since the 
1970s, many scholars have attempted to define corporatism. In Still the Century of 
Corporatism, Schmitter (1974) defines the “ideal-type” of corporatism, whose definition is 
widely used: 
 
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units 
are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non competitive, hierarchically 
ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the 
state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in 
exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of 
demands and supports (Schmitter, 1974:93-94).  
 
In Schmitter’s (1974) definition, a “system of interest representation” is regarded as the most 
essential element. Another prominent scholar, Panitch (1980) also defines corporatism as the:  
 
                                                     
7
 In this research, I will use the term corporatism as encompassing both the form associated with Fascism and 
neo-corporatism since the 1970s, as well as the latest, a loose form of corporatism, a social pact. 
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political structure within advanced capitalism which integrated organised socio-economic 
producer groups through a system of representation and cooperative mutual interaction at the 
leadership level and mobilisation and social control at the mass level Panitch (1980:173). 
 
Panitch (1980) thus concurs with Schmitter (1974), who emphasises the crucial concept of 
corporatism as a “system of interest representation”. Likewise, the first generation of 
corporatism theorists such as Lehmbruch, Panitch and Schmitter in the 1970s and the early 
1980s, focus on its institutional structure of interest representation. However, in the 1990s and 
2000s, the focus moved to “a particular policy-making process” in the corporatist system. 
This tendency will be discussed in 2-3-3 (Molina and Rhodes, 2002; Baccaro, 2003).
8
 
 
Schmitter (1974) provides a more detailed definition of corporatism by distinguishing 
between state corporatism and societal corporatism. The biggest difference is that state 
corporatism is regarded as having the characteristics of an authoritarian society, that is the 
state creates interest organisations. Societal corporatism refers to corporatism where the 
participants have their own autonomy (Schmitter, 1974:102).
9
 What should not be overlooked 
regarding these definitions is that this distinction is not a “two-fold” classification, rather it 
should be perceived as a “continuum”, due to changing country positions over time. For 
example, Panitch (1979:120-121) says that the authoritarian model of corporatism was 
generally found, as in the case of Italy, under Fascism in the 1920s and 1930s. However, 
corporatism in Italy in the 1990s and beyond differed completely. Corporatism developed in 
mainly Western advanced capitalist states along with liberal democracies, and it should be 
noted that in liberal democracies, societal actors actively interact with the state in the process 
                                                     
8
 Schmitter (1974) calls the structure of interest representation, neo-corporatism (1) and the system of policy 
making neo-corporatism (2). 
9
 Italy under the Fascist regime is a prominent example of state corporatism. The other form is the corporatism 
found in other Western European countries such as the Netherlands, the so called societal or liberal corporatism. 
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of policy-making. It can therefore be said that corporatism contributes to creating favourable 
conditions for these countries to follow the path towards liberal democracy.  
 
According to Lehmbruch (1979:55-58), Austria is a prominent example of liberal 
corporatism. In order to meet the conditions of liberal corporatism, firstly, interest groups gain 
statutory positions with compulsory membership. Lehmbruch (1979) states that they can 
therefore, become equal partners with the state in the bargaining process. Secondly, the 
cooperation among state, business and labour should be institutionalised. Thirdly, during a 
series of negotiations, all participants are free to state their opinions before legislation is 
passed in parliament. 
 
Societal corporatism in Austria allowed the labour movement to have political recognition 
and influence in the economy, in order to avoid the harsh class conflict that plagued Austria in 
the 1930s (Katzenstein, 1984:75). In fact, since the 1950s the participation of business and 
labour has been institutionalised, which has positively affected Austria’s macro-economic 
statistics. Fuess and Millea (2001) disclose that wage increases contribute to improvements in 
productivity in Austria. In Austria, there has been a formal “social partnership” between 
labour, business, and government since 1957. Fuess and Millea (2001:12-13) argue that the 
pay demands in corporatist economies are relatively modest as a result of the agreement 
within the corporatist institution. In an environment in which union wage demands have been 
restrained, agreement to raise wages may have a favourable effect, through improving 
“morale” and “workers efforts”, thereby benefiting productivity. It is crucial to this research 
to explore whether the outcomes of the consitions of corporatism in the case of Austria, are 
still applicable to the cases of contemporary corporatism in South Africa and South Korea.  
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The state is likely to be placed at the centre of corporatism, since the state is the only actor 
which has the legitimate right to enact legislation. It can easily happen that there is no 
equilibrium between the state and other societal actors. Also, inside the corporatist institution, 
bargains may be struck only at the top level. The business sector’s opinion can be easily 
dominated by big business. From the labour side, the voice of the rank and file may easily be 
ignored and not heard at the level where decisions are taken. These elements can cause the 
instability of the corporatist structure. With regard to the first element, the way labour is 
regarded as subordinate is criticised. Panitch (1979:142) argues that the condition for 
successful corporatism is partnership between all participants and equal treatment. Panitch 
(1979:135) counter argues that labour does not need to be placed as the subordinated actor. 
Corporatism can also face instability when labour threatens to withdraw (see 4-2-2 and 4-3-3).  
Panitch (1979:142) further mentions that instability of corporatism can even be found in the 
Netherlands and Sweden, which are regarded as successful cases of corporatism. He shows 
that the state used coercive methods in these countries in order to prevent instability. 
However, this does not mean that the state has to force labour to yield or operate to the 
detriment of workers’ interests. Panitch (1979:142) shows in his case study that the state used 
coercive methods only when labour failed to fulfil its responsibilities. In this context, what he 
emphasises is that the coercive measures were not used to destroy labour’s power but to 
secure stable corporatism. Panitch (1979:142) highlights that labour also accepts a certain 
responsibility towards society and that it should also maintain a certain standard of behaviour. 
It is noteworthy that Panitch (1979:142) emphasises the role of labour in the corporatist 
structure although, generally less attention is paid to this.  
 
Unlike Marxists’ concern that labour will have to make many concessions, corporatist 
scholars such as Crouch (1979) argue that labour can obtain benefits from corporatism if it is 
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strongly organised. In order to achieve this, Lehmbruch (1979:58-61) points out the 
importance of centralisation in each group. Compared to the state, business and labour are 
relatively fragmented and this can negatively affect their bargaining power. The 
fragmentation of business and labour can influence the continuous and structured 
participation of interest groups in policy making and the implementation and determination of 
the stability of corporatism. The fragmentation of business and labour can influence the 
continuous and structured participation of interest groups in policy making and the 
implementation and determination of the stability of corporatism. In order to overcome this, 
“the labour movement has to obtain participation in political power by the channel of the 
party system” (Lehmbruch, 1979:58-61), so that trade unions can gain more access to 
governmental and administrative decision-making. 
 
Lehmbruch (1979:166-167) shows that labour can play an active role in the establishment of a 
cooperative incomes policy and its implementation, by citing the examples of West Germany 
and Austria. However, Lehmbruch (1979) emphasises that this structural transformation could 
not be easily realised, specially when the state and business were reluctant to implement. 
Corporatism is likely to focus on the domain of incomes policy; however, if redistribution is 
neglected in the long run, the cooperative incomes policy will also be at risk. Therefore, the 
willingness of the state and business in the process of forming income policy and its 
implementation is also important. Lehmbruch (1979:168) suggests some structural 
characteristics, such as a high degree of centralisation and concentration, that labour requires 
if it aspires to maintain its position as an equal power in the corporatist structure.  
 
Recent studies show similar findings to those of the previous research. Even though, the 
fragmentation of labour can be a possible cause of instability in corporatism, some scholars 
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such as Hassel (2003, 2009) argue that when labour has a medium level of power at the 
corporatist institution is likely to be successful. Hassel (2003, 2009) argues that the state 
should also have a medium level of power. Thus, a balance in relations between actors at the 
corporatist instition is crucial.  
 
In this section, I briefly recapped the history of the emergence of corporatism and the 
development. However, the cases mentioned are confined to some countries such as the 
Netherlands and Austria. Also, this section only deals with corporatist structure at the national 
level. Consequently, it is necessary to look at countries other than European. Furthermore, 
corporatism at a sectoral or regional level also deserves to be analysed. This will be followed 
by a discussion of corporatism in the 1990s. 
 
2-3-2. THE CORPORATIST EXPERIENCES IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN 
EUROPEAN 
 
In this section, the focus will shift from the corporatist experiences in Europe to countries on 
other continents, mainly in Latin America. Before delving into the corporatist structures in 
Latin America, it is important to look into the close historical relations between Latin 
America and Iberian countries. Given that Spain and Portugal possessed vast colonies in Latin 
America for more or less 300 years from the 16th century to the 19th century, until Peru, the 
last colony in Latin America, gained independence from Spain in 1824; it is obvious that most 
countries in Latin America inherited political, economic and social structures from their 
former colonial rulers.  
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During the Spanish and Portuguese occupation, “Catholic, corporate, feudal, authoritarian and 
elitist” characteristics were firmly established in the region, which contributed to constructing 
corporatism in Latin America. One of the distinctive features of Spanish and Portuguese 
societies was the “patrimonialist” system where the state regulated the entire political and 
economic system (Wiarda, 1974:15). Wiarda (1981:37-38) and Wiarda and Kline (2001:16) 
assert that corporatism in Latin America can be understood in conjunction with the 
patrimonialist system. 
 
However, corporatist structures in Latin America were gradually associated with their own 
distinctive traits (Wiarda, 1981:133). Under this circumstance, Schmitter’s (1974) definition 
has been criticised by several scholars who have tried to apply his “ideal-type” of corporatist 
structure to Latin America (Wiarda, 2009; Hammergren, 1977). This is highlighted by studies 
done by Wiarda (2009), who undertook wide-ranging studies of Latin America and provides a 
comprehensive study of Latin America in conjunction with corporatism, noting that Schmitter 
(1974) overlooks the cultural tradition of Latin America. Even though Schmitter (1974)’s and 
Wiarda (1981)’s definitions have some features in common, Wiarda (2009) emphasises the 
cultural historical tradition of Latin America with regard to corporatism and how this tradition 
was embedded in political structures in Latin America (Hammergren, 1977:446). For 
example, corporatism was associated with different political systems in different countries; 
corporatism was adopted by the right wing in Chile, while it was coupled with leftist-populist 
regimes in Mexico and Venezuela.  
 
Wiarda (1981:141) argues that corporatism in Latin America has played an important role in 
preserving Latin American countries’ traditions. Between 1810 and 1824, when wars for 
independence took place in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, the respective societies 
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experienced radical change. However, although new governments were established, political 
practice and institutions remained unchanged; they were still “semi-feudal, corporatist, 
patrimonial, and authoritarian”. This tendency lasted until the 1930s. With regard to this, 
Wiarda (1981:47) argues that the traditional structure in Latin America remained largely 
unchanged although “some new layers were added” onto the existing system throughout its 
modern history.  
 
Wiarda (1974:1981) attempts to establish a new corporatist theory for Latin America. Firstly, 
Wiarda (1981:63) emphasises that the corporative structure in Latin America played an 
important role in maintaining the traditional constitution of societies and that the 
consequences of change were limited. Corporatist structure, which was based on hierarchical 
order, helped keep the pressures for radical changes in society and industrial relations and 
became a bulkwark against full-scale revolution from below, thus making it possible for the 
existing patrimonial system to be maintained. Wiarda (1981:70) argues that corporatism 
serves the interests of the dominant groups in Latin America; it succeeds by incorporating the 
new rising societal groups, such as trade unions. Through corporatism, the dominant groups 
such as large landowners, commercial farmers, business elites and bureaucratic elites, were 
able to keep the new social groups under their “control” and “direction”. 
 
Secondly, when it comes to the theoretical perspective, Wiarda (1981:69) argues that 
Marxism and Weberian theories which many scholars have tried to apply to the situation in 
Latin America, were basically derived from the European experience. Since the two theories 
initially emerged from the “dissolution” of traditional society in the wake of industrialisation 
and modernisation, and the transformation resulted in conflict situations, such as revolution 
and confrontation between traditions and modernity in the European society; Wiarda 
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(1981:70) argues that these approaches cannot be applied to Latin American societies where 
the concept of “reconciliation ” rather than “conflict” prevailed.  
 
Thirdly, Wiarda (1981:129) links the corporatist approach to nationalism. In Latin America, 
the state is regarded as “a moral leader, authoritative, and integral” (Wiarda, 1981:130). This 
is in line with the patrimonial system, whereby top leaders appoint and have direct control of 
the political economic apparatus. In Latin America, the role of the state is seen as: “to 
coordinate and stimulate national development, also to regulate the relations among corporate 
groups” (Wiarda, 1981:130). The state has the responsibility to encourage cooperation among 
different groups and to manage the economy to pursue common goods.  
 
Hammergren (1977:449-451) also raises the need to analyse corporatism in Latin America. 
Hammergren’s (1977) view differs from that of Wiarda (1981) regarding the paternalistic 
feature of corporatism in Latin America. First of all, she points out that the gap between real 
and actual form of control with regard to applying corporatism in Latin America, is 
problematic. Hammergren (1977) argues that the low level of compliance shows that the 
control of government does not reach every corner of the country. As one of the reasons, 
Hammergren (1977:455) points out that politics in Latin America are personalised. This 
affects the political organisations in Latin American countries, which have been fragmented 
and where there is a palpable “absence of strong central institutions”. Corporatist theories 
highlight the importance of the role of vertically organised functional groups, in other words, 
centralisation of power. However, she argues that in many Latin American countries, the 
structure of interest groups is different from that of Europe. Her argument is backed by 
Huntington (1968:196-197) who argues that a diffusion of power exists among interest groups 
in Latin America. Hammergren (1977:452) points out that interest groups are incorporated 
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vertically; however, they have mobility because these small groups have sufficient power to 
operate on their own, without being incorporated by the state. Hammergren (1977:452-455) 
additionally cites the example of “patron-client” relationship that is prevalent in Latin 
America. Hammergren (1977) argues that if labour is weak, the help of a congressman is 
more useful than that of the corporatist structure. To Hammergren (1977;456), corporatism is 
merely seen as the means that helps centralise power and reduces the power of societal actors. 
In addition to the distinctive features of corporatism in this region, Wiarda (1981) argues that 
corporatism in Latin America was adopted in response to a series of crises in the 20th century.  
 
First of all, economic crises derived from the Great Depression in the 1930s, accelerated the 
emergence of corporatism in Brazil and other Latin American countries. In order to overcome 
the crises, it was imperative to choose a corporatist structure, which allowed the state to 
intervene in the economy. A series of changes were implemented through the “mediating 
institution” (Wiarda, 1981:49). The Estado Novo in Brazil, Perónismo in Argentina, the 
Movimento Nacionalista Revolucionario in Bolivia and the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
in Mexico are examples of corporatist institutions that came into existence after 1930 
promoting economic nationalism (Wiarda, 1981:57).  
 
The correlation between corporatism and import substitution industrialisation should not be 
overlooked (Wiarda, 1981). Import substitution industrialisation which advocates replacing 
imports with domestic production, was adopted from the 1930s until the late 1980s by most 
Latin American countries. This is based on the premise that a country should attempt to 
reduce its foreign dependency through the local production of industrialised products. The 
governments of Brazil, Argentina and others were inspired to introduce state-induced 
industrialisation. In this process, these countries above were seeking a “strong government” 
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and the state promoted a wide range of transformation in the political and social areas; in the 
process, corporatism was widely adopted.  
 
At the same time, corporatism in Latin America was associated with various ideologies. 
Collier and Collier (1977:503-506) argue that two patterns are found in Latin America. There 
are cases of corporatism being based on an association with “populist coalitions” and cases 
based on an association with “bureaucratic-authoritarianism”. Collier and Collier (1977:503) 
point out that import substitution industrialisation became a breaking point of this dichotomy.  
In the case of “populist coalitions”, labour was in alliance with the government, which needed 
labours’ support to legitimise itself. The newly emerging class from the industrial sector also 
became part of this coalition. These governments pursued the “populist” development 
strategies to promote import substitution industrialisation (Collier and Collier, 1977:503-504). 
Against this background, the corporatist structure was established for the protection of the 
organised labour movement and the extension of benefits to the working class.  
 
Bureaucratic authoritarian regimes seek the deepening of the productive structure through the 
growth and maintenance of private investment, in particular investment by transnational 
corporations (Schamis, 1991:203). Examples of corporatism associated with bureaucratic-
authoritarianism are the authoritarian regimes established after the military coup in 1964 in 
Brazil and in Chile and Uruguay in the 1970s. At that time, these countries experienced the 
“exhaustion” of the initial phase of import substitution. Corporatist structure played an 
important role in controling organised labour and income in the name of overcoming the crisis 
of inflation and balance of payment deficits, thereby facilitating capital accumulation and 
attracting foreign investment. Bureaucratic authoritarian regimes present the characteristics of 
state corporatism. The regimes established a limited number of groups, and their relations 
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with the government were characterised as “vertical” and “functional”. They tended to 
weaken the bargaining position of other groups including labour (Collier and Collier, 
1977:504). 
 
O’Donnell (1977) highlights that authoritarianism is a consequence of the need to introduce 
stability in social relations in Latin America. It should be noted that authoritarian 
governments are more capable of stablising economic crises than open systems are, since 
authoritarian governments are often successful in implementing an adjustment programme by 
generating political support and suppressing the opposition. This stability attracts foreign 
capital which boosts industrialisation and the modernisation process. However, as 
Hammergren (1977:45) argues, even though the state had central power, it did not have an 
extensive ability to control society in Latin America. Interest groups were also strong, and 
labour chose to stay outside of the corporatist structure because they could rely on regional 
elites. In the course of the development process, many countries adopted state corporatism; 
however, as societal actors were strong, it was difficult to rope them into the corporatist 
structure.  
 
It is noticeable that the quality of labour is not homogeneous. In Latin America, the quality of 
labour is regarded differently from how it is regarded in Western Europe. Many scholars treat 
labour as being inclined to liberal democracy. For example, many scholars such as 
Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) contend that the working class is the agent of 
democracy. They argue that labour believed that democracy would increase interests of the 
working class as a whole. However, Levitsky and Mainwaring (2006:22-23) argue that labour 
is not a homogenous group. In Latin America, labour collaborated with authoritarian 
governments from time to time and enjoyed their support. Populist governments in particular 
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offered material and organisational benefits to labour. In Argentina, under Peron labour was 
backed by government and vice versa (Coker, 2001). 
 
Recently, some scholars have focused on corporatism in Latin America in conjunction with 
socio-economic changes in the aftermath of democratisation and globalisation (Patroni, 2001; 
Samstad, 2002). During the wave of democratisation in Latin America, societal actors gained 
accessibility and denigrated state control, where state corporatism has traditionally been 
prevalent. In the aftermath of globalisation, most of the countries in Latin America had to 
reorient the role of state towards neo-liberalism (Wiarda and Kline, 2001:65).  
 
Wiarda (2009) argues that during the 1980s and 1990s, corporatist institutions as well as the 
study of corporatism declined. Nevertheless, Wiarda (2009:84) argues that “corporatism has 
been partially eclipsed, not that it has been erased”; however, it is still functioning in modified 
form along with democratisation and globalisation. He underlines the resilience of 
corporatism, in the numerous social pacts between the state, business and labour that have 
corporatist features. Furthermore, corporatist practices can be found in areas of labour 
relations and social welfare, among others. Also, Wiarda (2009) points out that corporatism in 
many countries has been formally abolished at the national level. However, Wiarda (2009) 
argues that it is noticeable that corporatist relations are still found at regional level as well as 
sectoral level. This argument is compatible with meso-corporatism, which will be discussed in 
section 2-3-3. 
 
In this section, the Latin American experiences with corporatism have been examined. 
Compared to Latin America, which has a long history of corporatist tradition, the corporatist 
structures in Africa and Asia only emerged in the late 1980s. Trade unions in Africa and Asia 
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were actively involved in liberation movements and in achieving independence. They were 
also at the centre of resistance against authoritarian governments. However, the emergence of 
corporatism took place relatively late in these regions. One of the main reasons is that these 
two regions experienced industrialisation late. In addition, many African countries 
experienced continuous failure of state-led development due to continiuos civil wars or ethnic 
conflicts. Also, many governments were pressured to adopt structural adjustment programmes 
from international agencies, such as the IMF and World Bank, which were deeply engaged in 
African countries’ political economy. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for states in 
Africa to have autonomy when pursuing national development (Beckman, Buhlungu and 
Sachikonye, 2010). 
 
In general, trade unions did not have much influence on governments in Africa even though 
there are several exceptional cases including those of South Africa and Zambia. The reasons 
vary. In the case of Mauritius, the weakness of labour was coupled with colonialism and its 
legacy. Dommen (1999:29) states that colonial law allowed trade unions a minimum of only 7 
members. As a result, the number of trade unions mushroomed in a short time. However, the 
colonial rulers tended to manipulate this fragmented situation, given the weakness of the trade 
unions’ negotiation power, which was due to the vast amount of trade unions. The 
fragmentation of trade unions impeded their political influence. Mauritius also experienced a 
short authoritarian period in the early 1970s when its labour was controlled (Brautigam, 
1997:54). In Ghana, labour gained autonomy during the 1990s by adopting a policy of non-
association with political parties, as a result labour had to stay out of politics. In the case of 
Uganda under President Yoweri Museveni, there were no nor are there any party politics; 
therefore, it was difficult for labour to find allies, which ultimately rendered it marginalised. 
At the same time and across the entire African continent, the increase of the informal sector 
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makes it difficult to mobilise labour (Beckman, Buhlungu and Sachikonye, 2010). With the 
exclusion of South Africa, it is difficult to find any corporatist features on the African 
continent. In accordance, in the case of Asian countries including South Korea and Taiwan, 
labour was excluded from the developmental process, while the authoritarian state and 
business maintained close relations, which is often referred to crony capitalism. In many 
Asian countries, trade unions were created by the state and enjoyed a monopoly. It was 
however, difficult to aggregate the power of labour which constitutes one of the axes of 
corporatist institutions. 
 
2-3-3. MESO-CORPORATISM: BEYOND THE MACRO-ECONOMIC APPROACH  
 
Up to this point, corporatism in Europe and other regions, mainly Latin America, has been 
discussed in the context of macro-corporatism. In other words, the focus has been on 
cooperation with topmost organisations at the national level. The literature discussed, also 
focused on general social and economic policies, mainly incomes policy. However, Moore 
and Booth (1989) argue that along with the emergence of neo-liberalism during the 1980s, the 
corporatist structure in the European countries experienced a new phase. New forms of 
bargaining and negotiation between interest groups and the state emerged, which took place 
below the national level. In the 1980s, many Western European countries faced competition 
from the newly industrialised countries (NICs) such as South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
The approach based on meso-corporatism became widespread when these NICs started taking 
over the manufacturing sector, which Western European countries had dominated. Stark 
competition with NICs, where production costs and wages were less was regarded as a threat. 
Macro-corporatism, which used to analyse the relations of the major actors, such as state, 
business and labour, could not provide the proper theoretical framework for sectoral and 
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regional economic adjustment. Allen (1990:13) contends that effectiveness of national 
corporatist institutions was undercut and that this led to an approach based on meso-
corporatism. Allen (1990:18) further argues that the meso-corporatist approach is useful in 
explaining the dynamics of sectoral and regional economies in a country. Many scholars 
(Allen, 1990:19; Moore and Booth, 1989; Cawson, 1986) agree that within capitalism where 
there is severe competition among sectors in an open market, the meso-corporatism approach 
provides a more realistic view. For example, Allen (1990:21) argues that the automobile-, 
chemical- and industrial electronics industries, among others, became internationally 
competitive in West Germany when the regional government played an important role in 
creating favourable conditions for these selective sectors.  
 
Against this backdrop, not only macro-corporatism but also meso-corporatism will be 
included in this research. In South Africa, trade unions conduct collective bargaining at 
industry level rather than company level. South Korea seems to have expanded the scope for 
discussion not only at the national level, but also at regional levels and at various sectoral 
levels, which are regarded as relatively competitive in the international market (KTC, 2011).  
 
I exclude the micro-level in constructing the theoretical framework for the cases of South 
Africa and South Korea.
10
 In the case of South Africa, trade unions are based on industries, 
and industrial unions are merged to form large affiliated unions such as COSATU. In South 
Korea, even though trade unions are organised at enterprise level, in that way, complying with 
the conditions for micro-corporatism, many individual unions realised the necessity to 
                                                     
10
 There are some prerequisite conditions for micro-corporatism. According to Moore and Booth (1989:9), the 
inclusion of micro-corporatism implies that when a firm-state relation is established and the relations are 
formalised; the firm should be given powers and resources to implement defined goals and the firm must be 
accountable to the state agencies. In the case of South Korea, regarding wage negotiations, it is often possible to 
observe that the government agencies are directly involved with certain firms. It is also possible to observe that 
during the authoritarian eras, political exchanges took place between the state and individual firms, directly 
exercising monopolistic power in the market. 
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organise themselves at industrial level, in order to have bargaining power and thus, moved 
onto industrial unionism. Also, the KCTU and the FKTU, South Korea’s two largest umbrella 
organisations for trade unions, represent labour at the KTC. Despite the fact that negotiations 
between business and labour, and labour and state are still underway, whenever the state or 
business faces serious resistance from labour, negotiations at micro-level are likely to take 
place. These, however, simply patch up the relationship, thereby not solving the fundamental 
problems. All in all, the predominant focus in this research will be based on macro-
corporatism, which is expected to result in a more realistic understanding of corporatism in 
both South Africa and South Korea. 
 
2-3-4. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF CORPORATISM IN EUROPE IN THE 1990s AND 
LATER  
 
Corporatism prevailed in many European countries until the 1970s. The development of 
European society was coupled with Fordism and the post-Fordist accumulation regime in 
succession. As discussed in 2-3-1, the most significant feature in a Fordist society is the role 
of the state in orchestrating various demands from societal actors, especially labour. In 
addition, the state has the responsibility to encourage cooperation among them and to manage 
the economy to pursue the common goods. However, this tendency has declined along with 
the wave of neo-liberalism, which emphasises the deregulation towards business, the 
privatisation of state enterprises, and unrestrained competition among others. Under these 
circumstances, a state cannot play the same role as it used to do in the past (McDonough, 
2010:9).  
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According to Jessop (1990:269), the state has become “hollowed out”. Therefore, corporatism 
is regarded as doomed; however, scholars such as Baccaro (2006, 2008) and Molina (2002) 
argue that corporatism has evolved and become flexible in order to adapt to the post-Fordist 
environment. Jessop (1990:140) claims that: “the crisis of Fordism has produced a crisis in 
corporatism”. The implications of the shift to post-Fordist production have been numerous, 
particularly for labour. For example, due to the new technologies, new patterns of production 
have emerged. Flexible production systems have emerged in place of the mass production of 
standardised products, which was based on low skills and low wages. New concepts such as 
multi-skilling, job rotation, teams, quality management, flexibility and outsourcing, have 
emerged and the existing relations between state, business and labour have undergone 
restructuring. The transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism was marked by an increase in 
work intensity and insecurity (Holland, 2005).  
 
There are several trends in the corporatist literature in the 1990s and afterwards. First of all, in 
the past, corporatist literature used to distinguish between two different types of corporatism, 
that is: state corporatism and societal corporatism. In the 1990s, corporatist structure evolved 
and re-appeared as “concertation”, “social pact”, “social dialogue” and “social partnership”. 
Corporatism in the 1970s was associated with a system of representation, but the new 
concepts mentioned above focus on the policy-making process. Despite the difference, the 
bottom line is the same: all these concepts can work where the same preconditions exist, that 
make corporatism function (Baccaro, 2003:685). 
 
Recent studies reveal external and internal conditions for corporatism (Avdagic, 2010; 
Baccaro and Simoni, 2008). In the case of Europe, the introduction of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) is considered as an external factor, which led to the re-emergence of 
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corporatism. In order to enter the EMU, countries were required to satisfy the Maastricht 
convergence criteria including inflation rates, exchange rates, long-term interest rates, and 
annual government deficit and government debt. Governments faced difficulty in 
orchestrating these alone; therefore, the inclusion of the major societal forces, such as 
business and labour, was inevitable. 
 
In addition, some scholars now turn their attention to power relations among participants and 
point out that an electorally weak government is likely to adopt a corporatist structure 
(Woldendorp, 2011; Hassel, 2009). Baccaro and Simoni (2008:1339), on the other hand argue 
that, if the state is strong, it can pursue policies unilaterally, citing the examples of the United 
Kingdom and Austria in the 2000s. Both governments were strong, holding majorities in 
Parliaments, which ultimately led them to move away from corporatism. Therefore, a 
moderate and less powerful state, has been pointed to as one of the prerequisites for 
corporatism. This was already highlighted in 2-3-1, where there was a discussion of a balance 
of actors at the corporatist institution. Avdagic (2010:646) also argues that electorally weak 
governments and intermediate or weak labour are combined, the possibility to establish a 
corporatist institution is much higher.  
 
The scope of the discussion of corporatism has become wider. Baccaro and Simoni (2008) 
and Hassel (2009:15) argue that in the past, wage policy was at the centre of the corporatism 
discussion; nowadays, job creation and labour’s participation in the formation of policies 
about the labour market and social security, are included. These aspects are regarded as new 
social economic functions of corporatism. Hassel (2009) also argues that the subject of the 
discussions is not only organised labour but also temporary and part-time employment. It will 
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be interesting to see how this argument applies to the South African or South Korean context, 
which will be furtehr discussed in Chapters 3 and Chapter 4. 
 
All in all, the fundamental reason for the re-introduction of corporatism does not differ from 
the reasons given in the past. The state adopts a corporatist structure creating the channel with 
labour and business, with the aim of resolving economic problems. The reason for the 
adoption of solutions has not changed; however, the environment has changed, therefore the 
solution should also change. In this process, corporatist structure reshaped itself into a process 
of policy making or a system of policy making. One thing that should not be overlooked, is 
the role of the state in drawing social partners into a responsible agreement. This is still 
significant, even though, state power has weakened in the wake of globalisation (Ebbinghaus 
and Hassel, 2000:59-60).  
 
2-4. CONCLUSION  
 
In this chapter, the theories of corporatism were discussed. First of all, a comparison was 
made between corporatism and other theories, such as pluralism and Marxism, that provide 
explanations regarding state-society relations in capitalist states. Each theory has similarities 
to, as well as differences from the others. For example, corporatism and pluralism focus on 
the importance of interest groups in the policy-making process. However, while pluralism 
allows the dispersion of power among many interest groups, corporatism focuses only on 
selected groups, which enjoy a monopoly in exchange for accepting state control. In terms of 
the comparison between Marxism and corporatism, Marxists do not pay special attention to 
the state and interest groups, furthermore the relationship between interest groups and the 
state is described as antagonistic. Rather, Marxists focus on the conflictual aspect between 
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classes and see the state as an instrument of the dominant class. Both pluralists and Marxists 
treat the state as a mere responder to pressure from capital and are likely to overlook the fact 
that the state plays a significant role in coordinating various demands from society. In 
addition, the stateworks to achieve a common good through the harmony that exists in the 
society.  
 
In this chapter a brief history of the emergence of corporatism in Europe was given. 
Corporatism started developing in earnest along with industrialisation. Its rise and fall is 
closely related to economic ups and downs like the Great Depression, World War I and II and 
globalisation. In the face of economic crisis, the state is likely to mobilise and aggregate 
societal actors in the name of overcoming the crisis and for purposes national development.  
 
Through the corporatist institution, the states in Europe committed to maintaining full-
employment and wage increases. This is somewhat similar to the Keynesian welfare state in 
which the state manages the wage relations and welfare programmes. This naturally affected 
overall productivity and led to economic growth. This pattern shows the virtuous cycle of 
corporatism. Since all participants in the corporatist institution had equal power, labour also 
played an important role in redistribution. Many European countries could achieve economic 
prosperity and social harmony based on the environment created by corporatism.  
 
One of the greatest benefits of corporatism is its capacity to reduce tensions between the state 
and societal actors by way of negotiations and trade-offs. In the Netherlands, which retains 
the most ideal types of corporatist institutions among Western European countries, it can be 
observed that successful corporatism has contributed to stabilising the labour market system. 
In the past, the Netherlands experienced one of the most severe labour market crises in 
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Western Europe, when unemployment reached 15.4 per cent in 1984. At that time, the Dutch 
Social and Economic Council initiated successful labour market reform, including labour-
approved wage moderation, and in return, the state contributed by institutionalising various 
training and job enrichment programmes for low-skilled workers. Considered to have boosted 
labour market participation, the reform provided social security for low income workers via 
tax breaks or reduced taxes and by creating both part time and temporary jobs. As a result, 
labour productivity in the Netherlands has maintained some of the highest levels across 
Europe. In retrospect, during the labour market crisis, corporatist institutions functioned 
successfully by inducing equilibrium in the power balance between societal actors in those 
institutions and the state. This is one of the positive aspects of corporatism and the equally 
distributed power relations between the state and societal actors determine the success of 
corporatism. In South Africa and South Korea, corporatism was adopted in the hope that the 
outcomes would be similar to those in the Netherlands and other European countries. 
 
In this chapter, corporatism in Latin America was also examined. Since corporatism was part 
of Latin America’s legacy from Spain and Portugal, it also inherited some of the 
characteristics of patrimonial and authoritarian features through colonialism. However, 
corporatism in Latin America developed its own traits. One of the main characteristics was 
that societal actors such as landowners, commercial farmers and business elites were 
relatively strong. Corporatism in Latin America was often regarded as state corporatism; 
however, the dominant position of the state was not as strong as under state corporatism in 
Facist countries because of these societal actors. Also, labour in Latin America differed from 
labour in European countries. Unlike the perception that labour is the agent of liberal 
democracy, in several cases, labour in Latin America was backed by authoritarian 
governments and enjoyed high status. Since globalisation contributed to labour market 
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segmentation, labour has faced a problem with regard to representation, in other words the 
question is asked whether labour represents only its members. Labour has faced criticsm from 
those who have become excluded from unions. This criticism also applys in the case of South 
Africa and South Korea (see 3-2-4 and 4-2-4). 
 
In addition to corporatism in Latin America, corporatism in Asia and Africa was briefly 
discussed. In these regions, labour played an important role in the fight against authoritarian 
governments and in the sequential fight for independence. In South Africa and South Korea, 
labour showed its mobilisation power and successfully joined the corporatist institution as a 
partner. In this way, South Africa and South Korea differ from other African and Asian 
countries where labour was not strong enough to organise itself and is unable to challenge the 
state.  
 
Corporatism in the 1990s and onwards was also discussed and two main trends appeared. 
First of all, macro-corporatism, which deals with agendas at the national level; and meso-
corporatism, where the focus is on the sectoral and regional-level. Recently, the main focus in 
the theory of corporatism has changed. Corporatism no longer deals with a representation 
system, but a policy-making process. Therefore, the focus will be on the policy-making 
process in corporatist institutions in South Africa and South Korea. In the cases of South 
Africa and South Korea, the voice of labour has not been fully incorporated in the policy-
making process over time. The imbalance of power among actors has negatively impacted on 
the corporatism. Against this background, the dynamics of the relations between the state, 
business and labour will be explored in this study. 
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CHAPTER III. CORPORATISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3-1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter the corporatist institution, NEDLAC, in South Africa will be examined. The 
focus is on the relations between the state and other South African societal actors, business 
and labour, within the corporatist framework. After that, I will analyse NEDLAC, the 
institution itself and its policies. This will be done with the hope of gaining a better 
understanding of the corporatist institution, NEDLAC, in South Africa.  
 
The term “labour relations” usually refers to the relationship between the employer and 
employee; the state is only involved on a “secondary” level (Ferreira, 2005:418). 
Nevertheless, in the South African context, the state should be treated as important as 
business and labour in labour relations. First of all, the state and the parastatals together, can 
be seen as the largest employer of labour. Secondly, in the corporatist institution, labour 
relations are treated as one of the most important agendas and the state plays an important role 
in their implementation. This conceptualisation of “labour relations” will apply to the case of 
South Korea as well.  
 
In this chapter, there is firstly a brief discussion of the history of corporatism in South Africa. 
The corporatist arrangement existed in South Africa during the apartheid era. At that time, the 
participants of the corporatist alliance were the apartheid state, business and labour dominated 
by white trade unions, which held high-skilled jobs. So even though South Africa had a form 
of corporatism even before democratisation, during this earlier period, business and labour 
represented only the interests of a certain racial group, the white group. This legacy has 
largely influenced the characteristics of current labour relations in South Africa. The 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
78 
 
corporatist feature during the apartheid period resulted in economic growth in a certain period 
only, but the negative tradition, which only included a certain group (unionised workers, put 
differently, whites under apartheid and only unionised members in the post-apartheid era), is 
still lingering on in the current labour market structure in South Africa. One of the most 
prominent examples is that the apartheid system had a significant effect on the production of 
unskilled black labour. Together with the high rate of unemployment, the shortage of skilled 
labour is one of the main challenges that South Africa has to address urgently. 
 
In the next section the evolution of the labour movement under the apartheid system will be 
highlighted. The power of the labour movement increased in parallel with that of the 
liberation movement, and it is possible to observe that at the same time the labour system 
gradually expanded to include coloureds and Indians. There are several reasons for this. 
Firstly, the South African state had to, as a result of international pressure, ease the rigid 
constitutional structure by incorporating other races. Secondly, domestic actors, especially 
business, also realised the importance of incorporating the black majority into the political 
and economic mainstream for further economic growth. Lastly, black labour was the most 
efficient and organised societal actor against the apartheid government and it still has great 
influence in politics. The state cannot simply disregard the growing power of black labour. 
Since the focus of this section is on the black labour movement and how it has gained 
recognition and power as an equal partner during the democratisation process, the scope 
should be limited to certain events, which directly influenced this, rather than discussing the 
whole period of South African labour relations. Throughout this process, it will be possible to 
observe how the power of labour increased as time went by, how it became a driving force to 
end apartheid, and how it led to the establishment of NEDLAC in South Africa.  
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In 3-2, an analysis of the institutional aspects of NEDLAC, such as its structure and functions 
will be further discussed. After the analysis of the institutional features of NEDLAC, the 
focus will shift to its policies and how labour’s demands were incorporated in the decision-
making process. This can be one of the ways with which we can gauge the power of labour 
vis á vis the state and business. The important role of corporatism is to provide policies 
linking wage-bargaining to common macro-economic targets. With regard to these, COSATU 
has contributed to a number of policies and legislative issues through NEDLAC. After 
democratisation, the RDP, GEAR, ASGISA and the NDP were crafted in order to redress the 
historical legacies and ensure the prosperity of the new South Africa. Thus, in this section 
there will be an analysis of how these programmes were formulated through negotiations 
between the state, business and labour. 
 
In the next section the current status of NEDLAC as a social dialogue mechanism will be 
discussed. In South Africa, the ETIA was effective from January 2014. As seen in the 
introduction to Chapter 1, the youth wage subsidy issue was stalled and the state finally 
bypassed NEDLAC. This resulted in great resistance from labour and this incident shows the 
reality that the corporatist institution in South Africa has faced. Reports of interviews with 
related stakeholders regarding the youth wage subsidy are analysed in this section. These 
reports are regarded as primary sources. 
After democratisation, labour was incorporated into the corporatist institution with the state 
and business, as an equal partner; this directly shows the growing power of labour compared 
to the past. However, when looking at the current situation, it is obvious that the corporatist 
institution was ignored by the state and other societal actors, and another question arises in 
tandem, “Why does this corporatist institution not work?” In order to answer the question, the 
balance of power between the actors in the decision-making process is discussed.  
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3-2. THE HISTORY OF CORPORATISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
In this section the corporatist history of South Africa under the authoritarian governments will 
be discussed. Then, how a series of historical events from apartheid to the present post-
apartheid era have influenced the power of labour and how this contributed to the 
incorporation of labour will be discussed. 
 
3-2-1. STATE CORPORATISM DURING APARTHEID  
 
South Africa has a long history of corporatism, which was strengthened during the apartheid 
era. The South African state was firmly in control of the workplace and society as a whole, 
structuring and regulating interest groups. With regard to this, it will be useful to look at 
Kohli’s (2004) analysis of state-society relations. Kohli (2004) shows close interaction 
between the state and society by focusing on an interesting trajectory of economic 
development in several developing countries. He shows that states vary in their effectiveness, 
based on their links to society. Kohli (2004) identifies three types of states: 1) cohesive-
capitalist states (South Korea and Brazil under military dictatorship) that are the most 
efficient type of state that could promote rapid industrialisation by creating consensus among 
the business elites, defining priorities and implementing strategies without major opposition; 
2) fragmented-multiclass states (India and democratic Brazil) where state authority is 
fragmented, and the power to pursue economic development is trumped by populist concerns; 
and 3) neo-patrimonial states (Nigeria), where elites routinely steal public resources for 
personal gain. A cohesive-capitalist state is a developmental state, characterised by 
concentrated state authority at the top and a narrow supporter base comprising of capitalists, 
who intensely interact with the state. These two groups use concentrated power to discipline 
the rest of society, including labour. Also, in the case of the cohesive-capitalist states of South 
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Africa and South Korea, nationalistic and anti-communist ideology was used by the state to 
unite the society and to restrict political participation by societal actors.  
 
During the apartheid period, the South African state successfully penetrated into society. The 
aim of apartheid was to maintain white domination while extending racial separation. 
Emphasising territorial separation and using police repression, the state achieved the initial 
goal (Waldmeir, 1998). With the enactment of apartheid laws in 1948, racial discrimination 
was institutionalised. The apartheid system segregated the whole of society according to skin 
colour, into white and non-white. A series of laws strengthened the effectiveness of the state. 
For example, the Population Registration Act classified South Africans as white, black, 
coloured and Indians. Furthermore, the Bantu Authorities Act which allowed the 
establishment of black homelands and regional authorities was enacted, which created and 
strengthened segregation with the aim of alienating and denationalising black South Africans 
(Waldmeir, 1998). 
 
This dual system, which was created under the authoritarian government, affected every 
aspect of society, with some aspects of it lingering even after its demise. The system heavily 
influenced not only non-white South Africans but also the labour market segmentation. 
African workers, unlike their white counterparts, were supressed and subjected to strict 
government control. For example, the apartheid government strictly regulated the flow of 
black workers from their rural homes in Bantustans or Homelands to jobs in urban areas. To 
this end, the industrial decentralisation policy was designed by the apartheid government to 
attract labour intensive industry to the homelands; in that way, it could limit the growth of the 
black population in the metropolitan areas. As can be seen from this example, African 
workers and their freedom of movement were heavily controlled. As a result, African workers 
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faced limited employment opportunities and had negligible bargaining power (Kingdon and 
Knight, 1999). While the labour market under apartheid was characterised by a lack of job 
protection and rights for black workers, white labourers actively protected their rights and 
interests, and lobbied to create favourable conditions to support their interests (Maree, 
2011:13).  
 
Then, what was the relationship between the state and business like? In order to answer this 
question, it will be useful to look at Lipton’s (1986) analysis of the relations between 
capitalism and apartheid. Lipton (1986) points out that until the 1970s, apartheid benefited 
capitalism, particularly the agricultural and mining sectors. During that period, it is noticeable 
that a close relationship existed between the apartheid government and businesses. In 
accordance with Lipton (1986), Yudelman (1983:7) also highlights the “symbiosis” between 
the state and the mining sector, which lies at the heart of the South African economy. In The 
Emergence of Modern South Africa, Yudelman continues: 
 
unlike the early situations of the advanced industrial states, neither the state nor capital could 
effectively dominate the other in South Africa. It also meant that neither peasants nor proletarians 
presented a serious threat to the state and capital, provided the latter two elements collaborated 
(Yudelman, 1983:7). 
 
In the late 19th century, it was the discovery of diamonds and gold that drove the country’s 
first wave of rapid economic growth and within twenty years, minerals accounted for two-
thirds of the country’s total exports (Wilson 2001:101). The historical development of mining 
as the cornerstone of South Africa’s economic rise to prominence, created influential 
privately-owned mining companies, which subsequently played a significant role in the 
architecture and implementation of apartheid (Handley, 2000). Anglo American (including De 
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Beers), Anglovaal, Gencor (formed through the merger of General Mining and Union 
Corporation), Goldfields, Johannesburg Consolidated Investments and Rand Mines are still 
prominent in South Africa (Segal 2000; Flynn 1992:312). Lipton (1986) argues that business 
could reap benefits by sustaining the apartheid system in the beginning. Big businesses 
especially exerted their influence on the state in order to maintain the favourable environment 
for themselves. However, this relationship has changed over time. When the international 
community started exerting pressure and imposing sanctions and isolation, business saw the 
rising cost, and started to oppose the system (Habib and Padayachee, 2000:247). 
 
Under the dual system of apartheid in South Africa, a form of corporatism existed between 
the state, business and labour. At that time, business and labour only represented the white 
minority, while the majority of the population were excluded. These close ties between the 
state and society meant that South Africa could mobilise its resources and function efficiently. 
However, one should not overlook the fact that this was possible at the expense of black 
South Africans. Even in the current era, it is possible to observe that the interests of the 
majority, for example the non-unionised poor, are always neglected during corporatist 
arrangements in South Africa. As this dissertation will show, this pattern is seen in both the 
case of South Africa and South Korea. 
 
At this juncture, it is imperative to look at the economic and social system in South Africa 
during apartheid. Desai and Habib (1997:502) label the economy during apartheid as “racial 
Fordism”, which is characterised as “mass production and mass consumption by and for 
white South Africans, with an underclass of low-paid blacks excluded from the benefits of the 
industrialized economy”. As Fordism suggests, employees under the apartheid government 
enjoyed full-time jobs and had job security. Under the apartheid system, the state was able to 
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establish a social welfare system. However, all these benefits were granted to white South 
Africans and were made possible by repressing other societal groups, predominantly black 
people.
11
 This corporatist form is, as Shaw (1994:248) says: “largely Anglo-centric 
corporatism, with its continued imperial elements, into Afrikaner state, capital and labour”. It 
is possible to identify that elements of corporatism during this period resemble those of state 
corporatism, which is regarded as having the characteristics of an authoritarian society. This 
implies that the state creates organisations, and state-society relations are largely regulated by 
the state. However, as the next section shows, the state’s capacity to do so eventually eroded.  
 
3-2-2. THE RISE OF LABOUR MOVEMENTS: TURNING POINT OF THE 
DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS AND CORPORATISM 
 
In South Africa, legislation was used to implement the segregation of the black population. 
This can for example be seen through collective bargaining legislation, namely the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1924 and its amendments in 1937 and 1956. However, this legislation 
guaranteed job reservation for whites only, while black South Africans were excluded from 
the benefits. This led to the growth of discontent among black South African workers. Finally, 
it led to the creation of the African Mine Workers Union in the early 1940s. This was the first 
time that black labourers gathered and mobilised and the discontent became the basis of the 
1946 Mine Workers Strike. The strike for higher wages is seen as having brought about 
profound implications for the relations between the state and the societal actor, which is, 
black labour. The 1946 Mine Workers Strike was the spark that ignited the anti-apartheid 
movement (Finnemore, 2002). 
                                                     
11
 South Africa’s industrialisation process, especially its manufacturing output, has grown at a rapid pace since 
the mid-1920s. However, the South African model of Fordism, extending industrialisation through mass 
consumption, was flawed as a result of the racial bias (Hirsch 2005). This has influenced South Africa’s 
manufacturing production capacity to date. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
85 
 
In fact, there was a high point in black workers’ resistance during the latter half of the 1920s. 
At that time the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union and the Communist Party of 
South Africa organised mass protests and strikes. The ANC, formed in 1912 was also 
politically active. African labour movements grew during the 1920s; however, they weakened 
during the 1930s due to the ineffectiveness of unions in the face of the powerful and 
unsympathetic state (Lewis, 1984). However, the 1946 Mine Workers Strike triggered the 
development of the labour movement in South Africa. The 1946 Mine Workers Strike is one 
of the most significant strikes in the country’s history. An estimated 70,000 black 
mineworkers went on strike for better wages and improved hostel conditions. As a result, 
approximately 1,000 strikers were arrested and nine people killed. The labour movement was 
severely suppressed. Nevertheless, the strike made people more aware not only of labour’s 
rights but also of the political thinking within the national liberation movement.  
 
During the 1960s and the 1970s, this industrialisation became one of the driving forces of the 
increasing power of black workers. This can be understood in the same context as the 
argument of Seidman (1994 cited in Van der Westhuizen, 2013:84), that: “manufacturing 
brings about labour militancy”. The Fordist production system of the time, based on large 
factories, helped a large number of workers interact and construct a shared consciousness; it 
helped black African workers to form trade unions. At that time, these workers demanded 
recognition from employers and the improvement of the workplace environments (Finnemore, 
2002). Van der Westhuizen (2013:84) notes:  
 
In South Africa, increased Black alienation coincided with the steady growth of trade union 
activism and the wide-scale formation of community movements constituting a similar broad front 
demanding democratization (Van der Westhuizen, 2013:84). 
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During the 1950s, the apartheid government faced strong resistance from black workers, and 
the state used declarations of emergency to suppress them at times of heightened resistance. 
The first State of Emergency was declared in 1960, right after the Sharpeville Massacre, when 
the ANC and Pan Africanist Congress were also declared illegal. In the wake of the 1976 
student uprising, the government widened police powers without a State of Emergency. By 
the mid-1980s, a popular uprising was underway, with militants calling for black communities 
to be made ungovernable, and a series of State of Emergency were declared throughout the 
country. The provisions of these State of Emergency were broader than those of previous 
ones, but anti-apartheid mobilisation continued. This reflects the power of black people 
starting to emerge and erode the control of the state (Finnemore, 2002). 
 
The discontent that had accumulated for several years finally erupted in the form of collective 
action in the Durban strikes in 1973 (Finnemore, 2002). The implications of the strikes were 
substantial and eroded the existing nature of state-society relations. The state realised that the 
African workers had potential that could bring about social change, despite their long 
marginalisation. At that time, the government saw the growing power of labour especially in 
the metal, mining, chemical, and textile sectors, which were regarded as the backbone of the 
South African economy; and saw this as a serious threat. Furthermore, the state was 
concerned that this confrontation would provide tremendous publicity to the struggle for 
freedom in South Africa, strengthen the anti-apartheid movements and negatively affect 
foreign investment (Kooy, et al. 1979:8). This is one of the similarities that was found during 
this comparative study of South Africa with South Korea. Labour in heavy industry, which 
was the cornerstone of the economic growth of South Korea in the 1970s and the 1980s, 
gained strong power, since strikes and their consequences were regarded as negatively 
affecting the country’s economic achievements (see 4-2-3). Furthermore, the struggles 
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became the root of “social movement unionism” based on community support. Seidman 
(1994) argues that the new union’s militancy against authoritarian governments and 
capitalism was successful in pressurising employers to allow workplace representation 
through trade unions. In the case of South Africa and South Korea, labour could attain a 
stronger position towards the authoritarian government, as well as businesses by forming a 
broad alliance with societal actors. 
 
As a result of the growing power of labour, the government started to seek to control labour in 
a different way. The Durban strikes in 1973 became the driving force for the establishment of 
the Wiehahn Commission of 1979. Meanwhile, in South Africa, several events also led to the 
establishment of the Wiehahn Commission. White, Indian and coloured workers were granted 
preferential trade union rights under the Industrial Conciliation Act. Workers from these 
racial groups were also encouraged to access principal industrial relations machinery, like the 
industrial councils and conciliation boards. On the other side, African workers were denied 
rights to form trade unions and to use industrial relations machinery, such as industrial 
councils and conciliation boards. All these government restrictions and discriminatory 
practices increased resistance and tension between the state and the African working class. 
State control and the prohibition of black unions through suppression and intervention in 
industrial relations contributed to the establishment of the Wiehahn Commission. The 
Commission legitimised the existence of black trade unions by deracialising unfair labour 
practices in the work place. The Commission is seen as a turning point that led to the 
expansion of the definition of employee to include African workers and acknowledged 
African workers as a permanent part of the economy (Kooy, et.al. 1979). 
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Following the Wiehahn Commission’s recommendations, the government legalised African 
trade unions. Even though some critics say that the Wiehahn Commission only tried to bring 
labour militancy under control (Price, 1991), this became the thrust for the establishment of 
COSATU in 1985 and was an important part of the democratisation process. Simultaneously, 
the emergence of a new social force, like labour federations, such as South African Congress 
of Trade Unions (SACTU), Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) and 
COSATU played an important role in the process of democratisation.
12
 These labour 
federations brought together many smaller trade unions and strengthened their power. Ferreira 
(2005:422) describes the situation as: “the power and status of a trade union in the workplace 
is enhanced through such a federation. It is therefore possible for trade unions to be a major 
influence in terms of political and economic issues”. This new alliance of social forces 
undoubtedly became the driving force in achieving democratisation and building post-
apartheid South Africa. 
 
The most noticeable aspect is that the decision-making environment was changed through the 
incorporation of various societal actors. During the transition period, the country faced a new 
set of institutions supporting capitalist accumulation that was expected to reinvigorate its 
economy (Marais, 2010). To this end, there were questions about how the state would 
mobilise society in a different setting.  
 
According to Martin (2013), South Africa was among the fastest growing industrial 
economies in the 1960s. However, as Table 3. 1. shows, the annual economic growth rates 
                                                     
12
 SACTU founded in 1955, was the first non-racial federation and it was in the forefront of political struggle, 
especially as SACTU was aligned with the ANC. In 1979, FOSATU was founded. FOSATU was the first South 
African trade union federation that was organised by mainly black workers. Compared to other federations, 
FOSATU adopted the “tight federation” policy, where affiliates have common regulations and resources in order 
to build a stronger organisation. The big difference between SACTU and FOSATU is that the former was 
aligned with the ANC, while the latter pursued “political independence from national liberation organisations” 
(Emery, 2006:8). Even though FOSATU maintained its stance not to be involved in the liberation movement, it 
was subsumed by COSATU and became the biggest component of COSATU in 1985 (Emery, 2006:9). 
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slowed down in the 1970s and the 1980s because of declining gold revenues, rising oil import 
prices and increased international competition in other traditional export commodities. A 
series of sanctions from the international community negatively affected the country’s 
economy, which ultimately pressured the apartheid government to end apartheid. 
 
Table 3. 1. Economic Growth Rates in South Africa from 1946 to 2000 
 
Time Period Annual Growth Rates (%) 
1946-1950 4.2 
1951-1960 4.5 
1961-1970 5.7 
1971-1980 3.4 
1981-1990 1.6 
1991-2000 1.7 
 
Source: Dollery, 2003. p6. 
 
The economic situation of South Africa in the transition period was characterised as: 
“stagnation, high levels of unemployment and an uncompetitive level of productivity” 
(Maree, 1993). Under these circumstances, it was inevitable that the state sought collaboration 
with societal actors; thus, preventing the deterioration of the economy.  
 
Facing various political and socio-economic challenges, the new government had to choose 
corporatism in order to bolster the economy. Van der Walt (1997) states that a number of 
preconditions for corporatism existed in South Africa after democratisation. South Africa 
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experienced significant social conflict, which could have led to crisis. Maree (1993) and 
Desai and Habib (1997) see the changing economic environment as a crisis, suggesting the 
necessity for the adoption of corporatism. Economic stagnation and international pressure 
added to the burden. In this regard, Shaw (1994) argues that when South Africa underwent the 
transition; the state, as well as other actors, was placed at the crossroads between cooperation 
and conflict. Shaw (1994) asserts that cooperation was expected and it was crucial to: 
“constitute a long-term structural transformation”, through corporatism (Shaw, 1994:244). 
Furthermore, after democratisation in South Africa, political and economic elites recognised 
that their neo-liberal economic programme was bound to provoke massive discontent and 
protest. In order to achieve social peace, these elites adopted corporatism emphasising social 
unity and reconciliation aggregating societal actors (Desai and Habib, 1997:499). Desai and 
Habib (1997) are of the opinion that it was inevitable that the state would adopt corporatism 
when facing political turmoil and economic crisis.  
 
Shaw (1994) suggests that being inside the corporatist institution was beneficial for actors. 
Corporatism is a mode of interest intermediation that has been successful in negotiating social 
and economic policy reforms in some welfare states. Scott (2007) points out that there was a 
“reform coalition” between incoming political actors and big business and as time went by the 
ANC departed from ideological positions based on the Freedom Charter, taking a 
reconciliatory approach towards big business.
13
  
 
                                                     
13
 In the case of Ireland, it is useful to look at the National Agreement Programme for National Recovery of 1987 
as an example (McGrath, 2006:13). The state and the social partners participated in the negotiation process, 
which involved wage restraints as trade-offs for tax reduction, social benefits such as the reduction of 
inequalities, and policies for the low-paid. This agreement has been assessed as providing a stable labour 
relations climate and establishing a tradition of virtuous cycle of corporatism in Ireland (McGarth, 2006). The 
successful corporatist experiences mainly in European countries supported the rationale that South Africa should 
adopt corporatism. 
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Furthermore, business and labour also needed to be organised vis á vis the state. In the South 
African context, these two groups were fragmented according to race and political ideology, 
among others. In the case of labour, many divisions also existed along racial and ethnic lines. 
Van der Walt (1997) argues that these actors were willing to merge into large organisations in 
order to exert more influence over others. Regardless of the various rationales behind the 
establishment of corporatism, the corporatist institution was officially established in 1994.  
 
3-3. THE CREATION OF NEDLAC AS A CASE STUDY  
 
In the previous section, the history of the labour movement, which shows the increasing 
power of labour in South Africa, and the reasons for the establishment of NEDLAC were 
discussed. In this section, the background and the institutional aspects of NEDLAC will be 
examined. Then, as one leg of the case study in this research, a series of macro-economic 
programmes will be scrutinised. Also, the analysis of the interaction among the actors in the 
decision-making process of the ETIA at the corporatist institution will be provided.  
 
3-3-1. BACKGROUND 
 
NEDLAC was the successor of the National Economic Forum (NEF) which had been created 
in 1992. The Consultative Business Movement, a voluntary grouping of the more progressive 
elements from the business sector, was behind the establishment of the NEF. The NEF dealt 
with both the short-term and long term economic issues; however, due to the lack of capacity 
of the government in the transition period, it focused more on short-term issues (Shapiro and 
Kahreen, 2011). This required the creation of another platform that could manage more long-
term issues. Parsons (2007:7) states:  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
92 
 
The creation of the NEF in 1992 had been seen as the result of a needs-driven voluntary process 
mainly initiated in its early stages by labour and business, reflecting a political will to make it 
work and deliver. It was not a statutory body, yet bound its key players to important agreements 
(Parsons, 2007:7). 
 
The National Manpower Commission (NMC)
14
 and the NEF were integrated into NEDLAC 
by Act of Parliament 35 of 1994.
15
 At that time, there was on the one hand, intense political 
negotiation throughout the democratisation process; while on the other hand, the necessity for 
creating a social dialogue including societal actors was raised. Considering that labour and 
business in particular had been antagonistic towards each other, the role of the state as referee 
was expected to bring about a peaceful solution to industrial relations and also result in 
mutual gains aimed at economic development (Lundahl and Petersson, 1996:13). 
 
Lundahl and Petersson (1996:32-34) argue that labour, namely the three major labour 
affiliations, COSATU, NACTU
16
 and FEDUSA
17
 have been successful in strengthening their 
own organisations by making up the labour grouping represented in NEDLAC. Each 
                                                     
14
 After the Wiehahn Commission recommended the legalisation of black unions, the government recognised 
black unions in 1979 and granted them limited collective bargaining rights. In the same year, the government 
established a National Manpower Commission (NMC), with representatives from labour, business, and 
government, to advise policy makers on labour issues. According to Schreiner (1994), it was boycotted 
throughout the 1980s by COSATU and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), due to its 
unrepresentative structure. However, in the end, this became one of institutional bodies of NEDLAC with the 
NEF. 
15
 NEDLAC was established by the NEDLAC Act 35 of 1994 for the purpose of: 1) promoting the goals of 
economic growth, participation in economic decision-making and social equity; 2) reaching consensus and 
concluding agreements on matters pertaining to social and economic policy; 3) encouraging and promoting the 
formulation of co-ordinated policy on social and economic matters; 4) considering all proposed labour 
legislation relating to labour market policy before it is introduced in Parliament; and 5) considering all 
significant changes to social and economic policy before they are implemented or introduced in Parliament 
(NEDLAC, 2012). 
16
 NACTU is a merger between two trade unions: the Azanian Confederate of Trade Unions and the Council of 
Unions of South Africa. It now has 17 trade union members and has an estimated 397,000 registered members 
consisting of miners, construction workers, workers in hospitality, finance, insurance businesses, education, 
media, health, and farm workers as well (NACTU Website, 2013). 
17
 The Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA) was established in 1997 with more than 500,000 
members. Most of the members of FEDUSA are educated and skilled workers like doctors, engineers, nurses, 
teachers, and office workers (FEDUSA Website, 2013). 
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affiliation tried to find common ground, which could further strengthen the power of labour as 
a whole.  
 
Within the corporatist institution, labour was able to act as an equal player vis á vis the state 
and business in the new South Africa (Bhorat, 2001:6; Baskin, 1991:26). Labour was the 
driving power behind a series of legislative developments in South Africa after 
democratisation. As a result, a series of key labour laws such as the Labour Relations Act of 
1995, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997, and the Employment Equity Act of 
1998, among others, were introduced. They can be seen as significant products of NEDLAC 
as well. 
 
Table 3. 2. Coverage of South African Labour Legislation 
Name of Act Key Aims Coverage 
Labour Relations 
Act (1995) 
 
• Orderly collective bargaining 
• Workplace democracy 
• Effective labour dispute resolution (Provision for the 
Council for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration) 
• All workers except the defence 
force, secret services and 
essential services 
 
  
Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act  
(1997) 
• Improve minimum rights for all workers 
• Conditions Commission to advise the Minister on 
minimum wages in “vulnerable” sectors 
• All workers except the defence 
force, secret services and 
essential services 
  
  
Employment Equity 
Act (1998) 
• Eliminate unfair discrimination 
• Ensure implementation of affirmative action 
• Employees in designated 
companies 
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Skills Development 
Act (1998) 
• Devise and implement national, sector and workplace 
strategies to improve skills of the workforce 
• Designated employers and 
sectors 
 
Source: Leibbrandt et al., 2010. p28. 
 
As seen above, the significance of the establishment of NEDLAC, which highlights the 
participation of social actors as equal players at the discussion table, can be found in its 
Annual Report. 
 
NEDLAC is about securing the commitment and active participation of all social partners in those 
areas identified for prioritised action in ways that build on lessons learnt from development 
programmes. NEDLAC remains a contested terrain of ideas and recognises that no social partner 
has the monopoly of solutions. Inherent in real social dialogue is that it takes time for it to produce 
meaningful consensus that ultimately leads to real partnership (NEDLAC Annual Report, 
2009/2010). 
 
NEDLAC sees itself as a contributor towards establishing social dialogue as: “an acceptable 
and invaluable part of the country’s policy making process” (NEDLAC, 2012). This is the 
central idea leading to the adoption of corporatism, as it manifests in many Western European 
countries. In the corporatist institution, each actor is expected to make a number of 
concessions. The state is expected to promote the interests of the other two actors and to 
endorse their demands.  
 
NEDLAC is made up of representatives from various sectors. There are representatives from 
organised business, and BUSA represents this sector. COSATU, FEDUSA and NACTU 
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represent the interests of organised labour. Government delegates are from the key economic 
departments, namely, Labour, Trade and Industry, and Treasury and Public Works. 
Representatives from other government departments participate on an ad hoc basis. A number 
of organisations make up the Community representation, including the Women’s National 
Coalition; the South African National Civics Organisation; the South African Youth Council; 
Disabled People of South Africa; the South African National Apex Cooperatives and the 
Financial Sector Campaign Coalition (NEDLAC, 2012). 
 
In terms of the incorporation of the community constituency, there is criticism of the way 
these societal actors, especially, the community constituency were incorporated. Lundahl and 
Petersson (1996:17) argue that the criteria that the community constituency had to meet were 
too stringent and as a result, they were mostly chosen by the government. It is doubtful 
whether the community members chosen by the government, can represent the “community’s 
interests” (Lundahl and Petersson, 1996:17). The lack of representation from the community 
constituency at NEDLAC could influence the reflection of interests of societal groups.
18
 
 
3-3-2. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS 
 
At NEDLAC negotiations are conducted under four distinct policy areas or Chambers; the 
Public Finance and Monetary Policy Chamber; the Trade and Industry Chamber; the Labour 
Market Chamber; and the Development Chamber (see Figure 3.1.). The outcome of work 
done in the Task Teams is submitted to the Chamber for consideration and ratification. Once 
                                                     
18
 The organisations comprising the community constituency at NEDLAC are: The South African Youth Council 
(SAYC), the Disabled People South Africa (DPSA), the Women's National Coalition (WNC), the Financial 
Sector Campaign Coalition (FSCC), the South African National Apex Cooperatives (SANAC), and the South 
African National Civic Organization (SANCO) (NEDLAC, 2012).  
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the Task Team report is signed off by the Chamber, it is then tabled at the Management 
Committee for final consideration and signed off (NEDLAC, 2012). 
 
Figure 3. 1. Structure of NEDLAC 
 
 
 
Source: NEDLAC, 2012.  
 
Firstly, the Public Finance and Monetary Policy Chamber works on issues relating to the 
framework within which financial, fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies are formulated. 
It aims to enhance the coordination of fiscal and monetary policy and related elements of 
macro-economic policy, as well as the institution of delivery (NEDLAC, 2012). Secondly, the 
Development Chamber focuses on social and economic policy, as well as developmental 
programmes. Issues currently on the agenda of the Development Chamber include: a national 
youth development agency strategy, land reforms, public transport, immigration policy, rental 
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housing amendment bill, higher education and training laws, local government, public 
transport, national disability policy and the guidelines for implementation (NEDLAC 2012).  
 
Thirdly, the Labour Market Chamber considers all proposed labour legislation relating to the 
labour market policy before it is introduced in Parliament. Issues currently on the agenda of 
the Labour Market Chamber include: Bargaining Councils Demarcation disputes/applications, 
Decent Work Country Programme, Insolvency Bill, Growth and Development Summit 
Agreement relating to Employment Equity and Skills Development, Labour Market Policy 
Review, Merchant Shipping Act, Immigration Act, and Monitoring Labour Market 
Institutional Trends (NEDLAC, 2012). Lastly, the Trade and Industry Chamber seeks to reach 
consensus and make agreements on matters pertaining to the economic and social dimensions 
of trade, as well as industrial, mining, agricultural and services policies, and the associated 
institutions of delivery (NEDLAC, 2012).  
 
The Chambers are the formal negotiating structures of NEDLAC and discuss different aspects 
of social and economic policy (Gostner and Joffe, 1998). Sub-committees and task groups of 
the Chambers are formed to deal with specific issues. The Chambers report to a Management 
Committee, which oversees the work programme and administrative issues (NEDLAC, 2012). 
 
NEDLAC’s national annual summit is attended by 300 delegates and the NEDLAC Executive 
Council convenes a meeting. The seats are shared equally among the four constituencies. This 
is the highest decision-making structure of NEDLAC (NEDLAC, 2012). NEDLAC’s 
operations are governed by its constitution and it is funded from the Department of Labour’s 
budget. None of the four social partners has veto power. NEDLAC is managed by 
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representatives such as the Management Committee and the Executive Council. The 
NEDLAC Secretariat administers all processes (NEDLAC, 2012). 
 
The NEDLAC process is guided by the protocol for tabling and considering issues at 
NEDLAC. There may be instances where the intervention of the relevant Ministers may be 
required. In the event that the government indicates that giving effect to policy requires 
legislation, then the government tables the draft Bill at NEDLAC for consideration. 
Otherwise, once the process of engagement on policy has been finalised, a NEDLAC report is 
prepared for ratification by the Management Committee and Executive Council. Once the 
report has been signed off it is then sent to the relevant Minister who then tables it in 
parliament. NEDLAC recognises the sovereignty of parliament; hence, it upholds its 
supremacy in the process of law making. NEDLAC protocol stipulates that participants will 
not re-open issues for debate at the parliamentary level if they have reached consensus on 
such issues at NEDLAC. However, participants have the right to raise issues on which there 
has been no agreement in parliament. Parliament, as the sovereign law-making body, has the 
ultimate say in making legislation, subject to the Constitution (NEDLAC, 2012).  
 
NEDLAC provides space for discussion between the state, business and labour. As can be 
seen from the table below, one of the fruitful outcomes is a series of legislation that has a high 
degree of legitimacy (Leibbrandt et al. 2010).  
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Table 3. 3. Levels of Bargaining in South Africa under the Labour Relations Act 
 
Governed 
by statute 
Functions and Powers Registration 
Bargaining 
Councils 
Make and enforce collective 
agreements; Prevent and resolve labour 
disputes; Establish and manage a 
dispute resolution fund; Promote and 
establish training and education 
schemes; Establish and manage 
schemes or funds to benefit its parties 
or members; Make and submit 
proposals on policies and laws that 
affect a sector or area. 
May be formed by one or more registered trade 
unions and one or more registered employers’ 
organisations, given that these parties are 
sufficiently representative. 
 
NEDLAC is assigned the task of determining their 
scope and area of jurisdiction. 
  
Statutory 
Councils 
Resolve labour disputes; Promote and 
manage education and training 
schemes; Form and manage schemes or 
funds for the benefits of its parties or 
members; Make collective agreements; 
May perform any other bargaining 
council functions. 
May be formed by a registered trade union or 
employers’ organisation which does not boast 
sufficient membership to meet the representivity 
requirements to form a bargaining council. Thus, 
registration is unilateral. 
Outside of 
statute 
Functions and Powers Description 
   
Plant or firm 
level 
bargaining 
 
Bargain over issues otherwise covered 
by Bargaining or Statutory Councils. 
 
Collective bargaining between an individual 
employer and the trade union(s) representing the 
employees of that particular employer. 
 
Workplace  Workplace forums may be formed when there are 
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forums 
 
They promote the workers’ interests by 
consulting and making joint decisions. 
Employers must provide relevant 
information to workplace forums. A 
workplace forum has the right to be 
consulted by the employer on: 
restructuring and new work methods; 
partial or total plant closure; mergers 
and ownership transfer; retrenching 
workers; job grading; criteria for merits 
and bonuses; education and training; 
product development plans; export 
promotion; health and safety measures 
more than 100 workers by applying to the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA). 
 
  
Source: Department of Labour, 2012. 
 
At NEDLAC, some successes were achieved. Most interviewees confirmed that, labour 
related regulations are prominent examples of what NEDLAC has achieved (see 3-1-1). It is 
noticeable that these regulations were made right after democratisation when labour could 
exert itself vis-à-vis the state and business, in other words, the actors’ influence at NEDLAC 
was relatively balanced. How this pattern manifested will be discussed in the next section 
through the analysis of macro-economic programmes and the ETIA.   
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3-3-3. THE ANALYSIS OF POLICIES AT NEDLAC  
 
This section is one leg of a case study for this research. The focus will be laid on the RDP, 
GEAR, ASGISA and the NDP. These macro-economic programmes were introduced after 
democratisation, in order to ensure economic growth and development. How each actor was 
involved and interacted with other actors in the decision-making process of each macro-
economic programme mentioned above, will be examined. When analysing the RDP through 
to the NDP, it is possible to observe that societal actors sometimes participate in the decision-
making process of macro-economic policies in a cooperative manner, and at other times resist 
the state or other actor’s decisions. This dynamic can be seen during the introduction and the 
implementation of the RDP, GEAR, ASGISA and the NDP.   
 
3-3-3-1 THE RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (RDP): 
AN AMBITIOUS PLAN THAT FAILED 
 
The RDP was the primary socio-economic development blueprint of the first democratic 
government in South Africa. It clarified the economic and social agenda for the first five years 
after democratisation. The Development Chamber at NEDLAC was the main driver of the 
RDP. The Development Chamber focuses on: “all matters pertaining to the development of 
both urban and rural implementation strategies, financing of development programmes, 
campaigns to mobilise the nation behind the RDP and associated institutions of delivery” 
(Gostner and Joffe, 2000:5).  
 
The RDP was a plan to address the many social and economic problems and was introduced 
to rectify inequality through redistribution and fulfilment of basic needs; in other words, to 
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rectify the wrongs of the apartheid era and at the same time to consolidate democracy in the 
new South Africa. When it was first introduced, the RDP was deemed as “innovative” and 
“people-centred”; furthermore, the programme highlighted the democratic relationship 
between the state and society (Turok, 2008:89; Lundahl and Petersson, 1996:26).
19
 Following 
discussions with diverse constituencies, a draft White Paper for Social Welfare was published 
in 1995, which emphasised the concept of developmental social welfare highlighting “people-
centred” values (Visser, 2004).  
 
After democratisation in 1994, South Africa sought various tools to overcome socio-economic 
problems. South Africa emulated the developmental state model, which led to many East 
Asian countries, including South Korea’s remarkable economic growth. Nattrass (1994:347) 
notes that the ANC’s economic policy was largely influenced by the South Korean model, 
where the state had strong control over business, and where state intervention was 
highlighted. Thus, a series of macro-economic policies of South Africa entail essence of the 
developmental state that is committed to social transformation, and that formulates and 
implements appropriate policies and programmes that have a significant impact on well-being 
(Madumo, 2012).  
 
The RDP was initiated based on the premise that: “economic reconstruction and social 
development should be mutually reinforcing” (Lodge 2002: 54). There was an attempt to 
improve infrastructure and service delivery, and at the same time enhance training and 
education. This was expected to increase South Africa’s competitiveness. Schmidt (2003) 
                                                     
19
 There were five key objectives associated with the RDP: 1) meeting basic needs such as jobs, land reform, 
housing, water, electricity and other forms of social services such as telecommunication and health care; 2) 
developing human resources, that is education; 3) building the economy mainly through the export of minerals; 4) 
democratising the state and society; and 5) implementing (RDP White Paper, 1994). 
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argues that the influence of COSATU on the ANC was strong when the RDP was adopted and 
the ANC and COSATU worked out a comprehensive economic and social programme. 
 
At that time, what the South African government faced and urgently had to deal with was 
high unemployment. Even though the RDP and later GEAR, ASGISA and the NDP 
represented different approaches, the fundamental goal was to resolve the unemployment 
issue. In order to do so, the government introduced the National Public Works Programme in 
May 1994 as one of the mechanisms for implementing the goals of the RDP. However, this 
programme did not achieve any significant success since the programme provided low wages, 
which were not attractive to the unemployed. Even though the aim of this programme was 
praiseworthy, in reality the cost of implementation was bigger than the benefits (Turok, 
1995).  
 
While experiencing socio-economic transition, lacking any remarkable success, South Africa 
also had to open its markets to the international community. Lundahl and Petersson (1996:27-
28) emphasise the importance of Trade and Industry policy for further development. The 
industrial policy was supposed to be designed to increase capacity for export, ensuring more 
equitable ownership as well as creating jobs.
20
 However, South Africa’s level of human 
capital and technology was low; in fact, production costs in South Africa were high, and 
South African businesses would be unable to survive in the face of international competition. 
It was crucial that the state should allocate and facilitate investment and improve productivity 
in such a way as to gain the trust of potential investors. This is the only way to ensure 
continuous investment and furthermore, job creation. However, it was beyond the capacity of 
                                                     
20
 The industrial policy was intended to support and strengthen internationally competitive industries, meeting 
the needs of reconstruction, and raising capacity. The ultimate purpose was still to resolve the unemployment 
issue. 
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the newly elected ANC to rectify all these issues within a short period; furthermore, the 
domestic and international pressure or expectations were too high. As Kohli (2004) points out 
in the case of fragmented-multiclass states, which have a larger set of goals and want to 
satisfy a broader range of people within the country; the South African state was under 
pressure, in that it had to deal with too many conflicting goals at the same time. Visser 
(2004:7) also states: the RDP did not spell out a detailed programme for attaining its main 
aims. It was too broadly formulated and ended up as a wish-list for too many people (Visser, 
2004:7). In accordance with the above, Adelzadeh and Padayachee (1994) analyse the White 
Paper arguing that it neither provides concrete goals, nor timeframes for the achievement of 
the RDP objectives.  
 
All in all, the RDP survived for only two years. There are several reasons for this. Many 
projects under the RDP could also not succeed, and were criticised because they were 
designed without consideration of the long term effects. Most commentators point to the lack 
of the institutional capacity of the RDP (Turok, 2008; Lundahl and Petersson, 1996). Lundahl 
and Petersson (1996:96) point to the lack of administrative capacity of the government when 
allocating budgets and to the lack of efficient implementation. When the RDP was 
implemented at provincial and local levels right after democratisation, administrations were 
not fully set up. Although Jay Naidoo, part of the leadership that led COSATU into an 
alliance with the ANC and the SACP, became a Cabinet Minister without Portfolio, tasked 
with the implementation of the RDP, but he could not exert his power in terms of its 
implementation (African Business, 1 May 1996). Related to this, Michie and Padayachee 
(1998:630) point out that there was a clash between the RDP office and key departments in 
the process of implementation, which shows a lack of coordination between stakeholders. It 
also shows that the policies that were generated by NEDLAC could not draw consensus from 
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the state, business, and labour. It is possible to observe that NEDLAC was bypassed by the 
state from the very beginning. Visser (2004)’s Shifting RDP into GEAR: the ANC 
Government’s Dilemma in Providing an Equitable System of Social Security for the “New” 
South Africa highlights the ANC’s unilateral acceptance of GEAR and how this led to conflict 
with labour (and another tripartite partner, the SACP). 
 
Another problem is that South Africa did not have enough funding to implement the RDP. 
Funding came from various sources. The main source was the government budget, from 
which, R 2.5 billion were allocated to the RDP Fund in the 1994/1995 financial year. This 
amount was supposed to increase to R 5 billion in 1995/1996 and would progressively 
increase to R 10 billion in 1997/1998 and R 12.5 billion thereafter (RDP White Paper, 1994). 
There were several additional sources, such as interest on amounts invested; taxation, 
especially on gambling and lotteries; the sale of state assets; and local government (Corder, 
1997). Considering that the cost of the RDP was estimated at approximately R 3.5 billion 
(Swatuk and Black, 1995:6), it seems that the RDP was achievable; however, in order to 
implement it, the government had to finance the RDP through the mobilisation of new funds 
from foreign donors (Bond, 2003). This is partially due to the R 200 million debt that the 
ANC inherited (Swatuk and Black, 1995:6). This fiscal crisis led to suspicions regarding the 
success of the programme, which ultimately deterred international investment.   
 
Lundahl and Petersson (1996:26) point out that it was uncertain how effective the RDP would 
be and how long the country would need to implement it. This uncertainty instilled little 
confidence in investors and consequently negatively affected the delivery. Even though the 
RDP office planned to carry out the programme in a rapid manner, the process lagged due to 
the various aspects already mentioned above (Lundahl and Petersson, 1996:97). In order to 
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realise the RDP, growth and related conditions for the further progress such as improvement 
of productivity were required. However, these conditions were not easily met in such a short 
period.  
 
Lundahl and Petersson (1996:98-99) argue that the RDP itself had the potential to succeed by 
attracting large foreign investment to South Africa, and that its spill-over effect could have 
resulted in growth. However, Lundahl and Petersson (1996) are of the opinion that the 
business sector hindered the success of the programme. What South African business wanted, 
was to lessen the state’s intervention and reduce the government’s spending on social welfare. 
The business sector believed that it would be possible to increase the competitiveness of the 
country in this way. This belief was based on neo-liberalism, highlighting mainly reduced 
social spending, the privatisation of state assets and low inflation. This resulted in heated 
debates with business emphasising growth, and labour and from the left economic stance 
stressing redistribution.  
 
In this situation, it is possible to see that NEDLAC did not play the role it was expected to 
play. According to Jayendra Naidoo, former Executive Director of NEDLAC, from the 
beginning there was no communication at NEDLAC. 
 
NEDLAC existed nowhere. There was no champion for it. I was a pretty lonely figure at times. 
There was a fear that the alternative channels would prove to be stronger, or a fear that one of the 
parties would withdraw. There would have been a really bad chain of consequences if that had 
happened… The macro-economic discourse has been poor … and we haven't reached a full scale 
economic vision - the difference between dialogue and partnership… (November 1998). 
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This opinion was expressed during an interview conducted in 1998, when the state and 
business had already eagerly pushed forward GEAR, discarding the RDP. It seems that from 
the very beginning, NEDLAC suffered from several limitations. At this juncture, a question 
arises: What was the reason that NEDLAC continued to exist?; however, from the beginning 
it failed to provide space for the state and other societal actors to participate equally in macro-
economic programmes. The motivation of each actor that wanted to uphold corporatism will 
be further discussed throughout the next sections.  
 
3-3-3-2. TRANSITION FROM THE RDP TO GEAR 
 
Michie and Padayachee (1998:625-626) analysed the South African economy from the RDP 
period to the period when GEAR was adopted. At this point, it will be essential to look at the 
Freedom Charter. The Charter still has substantial implications in South African politics. One 
of the contributions that the Charter has made so far was to advocate a number of state‐
initiated programmes aimed at unprivileged social groups, especially the black majority, by 
highlighting redistribution. This became the basis of the ANC policy and the underpinning of 
the RDP. In terms of policy implementation, it acknowledged the significance of trade unions 
in policy implementation.  
 
Nevertheless, the RDP office and the RDP Fund were abolished in June 1996 and the 
government’s Department of Finance unveiled GEAR. GEAR was criticised because it does 
not reflect what the Charter states; in other words, the characteristics of a strong 
interventionist state were erased.  
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According to Michie and Padayachee (1998:625-626), during the first two years after the 
implementation of the RDP there were already some characteristics of neo-liberalism in the 
government’s macro-economic policy. Williams and Taylor (2000:31) also argue that the 
RDP had some elements that: “compromise to the neo-liberal trickle down policy preferences 
of the old regime”. 21  Michie and Padayachee (1998:625) state that the new government 
inherited the economic policies of the apartheid government and that the National Party (NP), 
in the mid-1980s, tried to introduce neo-liberal elements in its own economic policies (Habib 
and Padayachee, 2000:248). Also, the South African economy has for a long time been 
influenced by the global economy. The mining sector, for example, has since the discovery of 
gold and diamonds, had sustained relations with European countries especially the United 
Kingdom, in terms of ownership and sector control (Goldstein and Prichard, 2009). Under 
these circumstances, it was difficult for the new state to steer the economy in the radical 
direction of the RDP, due to the pressure of domestic and international businesses, as well as 
international financial institutions.  
 
Finally, as the state adopted GEAR, which was explicitly based on a neo-liberal programme, 
the ANC faced resistance from many societal actors, particularly labour (Michie and 
Padayachee, 1998:626). When the RDP was replaced with GEAR, there was resistance from 
labour, and NEDLAC was under strain. Parsons (2007:12) argues that at that time, the state 
unilaterally pushed forward GEAR within the NEDLAC framework and there was no room 
for negotiations with other actors, especially labour. 
 
                                                     
21
 As a prominent example, Williams and Taylor (2000:31) highlight nationalisation which is one of the core 
elements of the Freedom Charter. Nationalisation of resources has been the subject of heated debate in South 
Africa, however, nationalism has been criticised for several reasons. First of all, research on the issue has shown 
that nationalisation of platinum mines, for instance, where the government has total ownership or majority 
control of the company, will not create sustainable employment in South Africa. On top of this, nationalisation 
of mines will isolate South Africa from external capital because private investors have been reluctant to invest 
when mining companies were nationalised (Seke, 2013). 
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In addition to its unilateral attitude, the state, which was supposed to aggregate all the 
participants’ interests at NEDLAC, was also criticised because it seemed to lose control and 
to be overwhelmed by the conflict between business and labour. The South African 
Foundation (SAF), which represented South African big business, announced its unilateral 
growth strategy. In other words, business argued that economic growth can be most 
effectively created by lowering barriers and by allowing greater flexibility by reducing 
regulations. Labour also announced its own strategy, which highlighted job creation and 
social equity (Lundahl and Petersson, 1996:55). These two actors’ unilateral and conflicting 
perspectives, with regard to the growth path, have contributed to dividing South Africa, and 
rendering the state’s role as limited. This lack of consensus still continues until today.  
 
As was the case with the RDP, there was active participation of societal actors in the debate 
on the adoption of GEAR; however it was unilaterally adopted and this resulted in social 
struggles between actors which became more confrontational. Since the RDP could not 
achieve any significant success and was terminated after a short period, the introduction of 
GEAR was justified with the idea that a new strategy was required for South Africa. This 
became the driving force behind GEAR. According to Le monde diplomatique (March 
2009)
22
, South Africa was forced to adopt GEAR under pressure from South Africa’s leading 
companies. The problem is that the process was completed without consultation with not only 
the broader ANC but also alliance partners, namely, COSATU and the SACP. 
 
The transition from the RDP to GEAR can be seen as the country’s focus had moved from 
“development” to “macro-economic stabilisation”, and a new “macro-economic management” 
base on neo-liberalism was highlighted (Turok, 2008:117). Even though the state claims that 
                                                     
22
 This article was written before the third parliamentary elections in 2009 and criticises the internal politics of 
the ANC. 
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it did not mean to replace the RDP with GEAR (Turok, 2008:75, 248), the implications were 
significant, since the programme was heavily inclined towards neo-liberalism.  
 
Regarding GEAR, business and labour held contradictory views. This can be seen in the 
documents that these two sides introduced. First of all, SAF drafted Growth for All, which 
describes five pillars to promote market economy. It especially highlights labour market 
flexibility arguing that it is difficult to create jobs with economic growth only. Central to this 
is that business perceived labour’s collective bargaining as an impediment to further 
economic growth. Also, the business sector argued that minimum wage legislation must be 
avoided. These were seen as leading to inefficiency (Nattrass, 1996:32).  
 
Labour responded by publishing Social Equity and Job Creation, in which the approach to 
economic growth and development of South Africa differed completely from that of big 
business (Lundahl and Petersson, 1996:100). Unlike business, labour highlighted state 
intervention. Labour argued that the state should take the initiative to create jobs. 
Furthermore, labour insisted on increasing the taxation of business and the high-income 
group. Labour urged that the government should adopt a more interventionist stand and 
actively support redistribution, by promoting the interests of workers and pursuing training 
and other policies. Labour argued that this in turn would improve productivity and expand 
domestic demand and thereby induce an expansion in output. Investment would rise in 
response, thus adding further to the growth of output and employment (Nattrass, 1996:32). 
 
According to Nattrass (1997:264), all actors highlighted the importance of productivity, 
growth and the role of the state and its intervention. However, labour on the one hand, and the 
state and business on the other, favour different approaches to achieve the same goal. Lundahl 
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and Petersson (1996:15) point out that the pressure from both business and labour prevented 
the state from confidently pushing forward with macro-economic policies. The problem is 
that both labour and business had their own logic in terms of economic growth and social 
development; however, neither side was sure how investors would respond (Nattrass, 
1996:33).  
 
From these two documents drafted by business and labour respectively, it is possible to see 
the different stances of these societal actors. In the beginning, the state was against Growth 
for All, which was the initiative of business. As soon as Growth for All was published in 1996, 
the ANC released a press statement containing its criticism in terms of fiscal policy, labour 
market policy, and privatisation programmes amongst others. However, it is possible to 
observe that the government later drew closer to the SAF approach. The government started 
pursuing the stability of the economy which was suggested as one of the prerequisites for 
employment, as well as redistribution (Lundahl and Petersson, 1996:56). Since the state is the 
actor which can formulate and implement policies, the state’s new attitude toward Growth for 
All brought about policies advantageous to business. The fact that the state took the side of 
business negatively impacted on the balance of power among the state, business and labour, 
putting especially labour at a disadvantage 
 
3-3-3-3. AN ASSESSMENT OF GEAR 
 
The termination of the RDP and the adoption of GEAR have been seen as an inevitable option 
for South Africa. The GEAR strategy was aimed at job creation and economic growth. 
However, has South Africa been successful in attracting foreign investment since the adoption 
of GEAR? Under these circumstances, it is interesting to pay attention to Lesufi’s (2005) 
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research, seeking to assess “whose interests” have been served through GEAR. The author 
analyses the dynamics of social relations within such macro-economic policy frameworks. 
Stated straightforwardly, GEAR emphasised the minimal role of the state in pushing forward 
economic development, whilst the private sector took the leading role. However, were these 
macro-economic targets achieved, as business expected? Proponents argue that GEAR was to 
some extent successful. According to the National Treasury (2008), the GEAR strategy did 
achieve macro-economic stability through the fiscal-monetary policies, for instance, inflation 
fell to lower levels than predicted. The National Treasury (2008) also argues that the 
development and implementation of fiscal policy through GEAR made a positive contribution 
to achieving faster and more balanced economic growth. However, in some other areas, most 
importantly, in terms of job creation, which has heavily affected labour, the policy was less 
successful. New jobs were not created, and it has been reported that the number of existing 
job was reduced (Lewis, 2001). 
 
After the introduction of GEAR, the South African government focused heavily on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) - driven growth, as it was still under pressure to create jobs. Even 
though FDI was increased, it was concentrated in the capital-intensive sector. It did not result 
in job creation; furthermore, a new pattern of employment, namely outsourcing, as a result of 
highlighting labour market flexibility, has increased (Lesufi, 2005:24-25).  
 
It is seen that the GEAR strategies could not achieve the initial goal. GEAR only achieved 
one objective, namely decreasing fiscal deficit. With regard to actual annual economic 
growth, Table 3.2. shows that from 1991 to 2000, the annual economic growth rates remained 
1.7 per cent. In addition, formal sector employment growth, and investment projections have 
not been achieved in line with GEAR estimations (Agholor and Obi, 2013).  
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Lehulere (1999:40) criticises GEAR, arguing that: “not only does the strategy fail to eradicate 
poverty, but it creates poverty. It is the redistribution of wealth from the poor to the rich”. 
Even though there are some achievements, these achievements are only in the interests of 
capital. Turok (2008:130) argues that the social objectives of GEAR were not achieved, 
which has again become an impediment to investment and economic growth. 
 
Streak (2004) introduces two different perspectives in terms of the outcome of GEAR. Even 
though proponents of GEAR acknowledge its failure in terms of job creation and the 
reduction of inequality, these advocates also argue that these stem from the external economic 
environment characterised by globalisation. Furthermore, they argue that without GEAR the 
socio-economic situation would have been worse, actually emphasising that GEAR managed 
to prevent the country from falling into the debt trap. On the other hand, opponents such as 
Streak (2004) and Nattrass (1996) argue that the logic underlying GEAR, that deficit 
reduction and low interest rates would bring about private investment, was based on mere 
expectation and that the outcome was uncertain. In Gambling on Investment: Competing 
Economic Strategies in South Africa, Nattrass (1996:39) argues that the radical change 
towards GEAR was “socio-economic experiments”. Streak (2004) further argues that 
economic growth does not have anything to do with poverty and inequality reduction, which 
South Africa urgently had to resolve. Streak (2004:273) also states that the GEAR document 
itself does not link to poverty reduction directly.  
 
Both the RDP and GEAR highlighted employment creation in order to bring about sustainable 
economic development. However, what was overlooked is that job creation alone cannot 
achieve poverty reduction; it should be supplemented by welfare. Following GEAR, a higher 
priority was put on debt reduction at the expense of social spending. Furthermore, no concern 
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was expressed for vulnerable segments of society such as women and the inhabitants of rural 
areas in the related documents of GEAR (Lundahl and Petersson, 1996:111). Already in 1998 
Michie and Padayachee (1998) argued that South Africa needed something different from 
GEAR. Nattrass (1996:36-37) pointed to the unrealistic targets of GEAR (see Table 3.4.):  
 
the GEAR model depends almost entirely on a wild guess as to how much investment is likely to 
be induced (from domestic and foreign sources) as a result of the implementation of the 
government’s new macro-economic strategy (Nattrass, 1996:36). 
 
However, Nattrass (1996:38) argued that labour’s proposal could not be the alternative either 
due to outdated and unrealistic policies suggested by them.  
 
Table 3.1. GEAR’s Base Scenario Projection 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth 
3.5 2.9 3.8 4.9 6.1 
Real non-gold 
export growth 
9.1 8 7 7.8 10.2 
Real export growth 
(manufacturing) 
10.3 12.2 8.3 10.5 12.8 
Non-agricultural formal 
employment growth 
1.3 3 2.7 3.5 4.3 
 
Source: Nattrass, 1996. 
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In addition to its disappointing outcomes, GEAR led to a split between the state and societal 
actors. The relationship between labour, the state and business worsened after the state 
adopted GEAR. One of the major criticisms of GEAR is that it was pushed forward without 
consultation with the partners, especially labour. Michie and Padayachee (1998) note, “it was 
completed without any consultation within the ANC alliance, or even with the head of the 
ANC Policy Department, the Labour Minister, Tito Mboweni” (Sunday Independent, 1 June 
1997). 
 
The relationship between the state and business in South Africa has often been described as 
cooperative. For example, under the apartheid government, there was a close relationship 
between white capital and the state. This tendency has continued during the post-apartheid 
era. However, Seekings and Nattrass (2011) argue that this cooperative relationship has not 
led to high growth or poverty reduction. This is in contrast to the close and personal 
relationship between the state and chaebols in South Korea, which contributed to the 
economy by reducing transaction costs. The coalition between the state and business in South 
Africa has not proved to be the foundation of further development. Seekings and Nattrass 
(2011:241) indicate several factors leading to this. On the one hand, the state’s suspicion of 
business has grown; the state considers business to be pursuing only its own short-term 
interests. On the other hand, business is suspicious of the lack of willingness of the state to 
discipline labour since these two actors have maintained a close relationship, as well as 
cooperating through the tripartite alliance. Iheduru (2008) points out that both the state 
(weaker in comparison to other societal actors than during the previous era) and business 
(fragmented along racial lines) have become weak and fragmented under globalisation. This 
has resulted in a weak strategic compliance between the two actors.  
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In this context, the perspectives towards NEDLAC have not been positive. Even though 
Houston et al. (2001:56) point out that at NEDLAC, labour has had “above-average” 
influence on labour policy-making, in 2001 the Human Sciences Research Council found that 
labour’s influence in terms of job creation, has largely diminished. As time went by after 
democratisation, NEDLAC seems to have failed to bring about an effective policy that could 
address South Africa’s urgent problem of employment. It can be seen that NEDLAC did not 
create an environment where the three actors could cooperate. As already discussed above, the 
unilateral attitude of the state that introduced the GEAR strategies without consultation, and 
business’s lack of interest in NEDLAC contributed to the weak outcomes attributed to 
NEDLAC. Bassett (2004:552) argues that in the NEDLAC framework, it has happened from 
time to time that the trade unions’ proposals were not even discussed and labour was treated 
as a barrier for the state to unilaterally push forward policies. 
 
Furthermore, Lundahl and Petersson (1996:108-109) also express doubts regarding the actors’ 
willingness at the NEDLAC table, and argue that it was required that all actors should bring 
something negotiable to the NEDLAC table, instead of agendas inclined to their own interest. 
According to Buthelezi (2002:5), NEDLAC is seen by labour and business as a formalistic 
discussion table, where participants are not willing to cooperate. The state also did not play a 
significant role in this context in order to enhance NEDLAC’s role once its moribund state 
became apparent.  
 
Buthelezi (2002:6-7) actually suggests two options for labour at the NEDLAC negotiation 
table. One is to build the “technical capacity” of labour, in order for labour to influence the 
decision-making process more effectively. However, considering that labour unions have lost 
members and members’ distrust of the top level leaders, this will not be easy. The other 
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option is creating a “popular alliance” with civil society. However, this strategy does not seem 
to have worked well. In reality, labour has chosen mass mobilisation among workers, which 
has become characterised as violent, and has only widened the gap between the state, 
business, and labour, as well as labour and other societal groups which can give broad support 
to labour. Mckinley (2013) points out the weakness and disconnection of labour-community 
alliances in post-apartheid South Africa. According to him, unions have failed to forge 
longer-term strategies to relate to, organise and support informal/casualised workers and the 
unemployed who dominate in community organisations. When those community 
organisations protest over a lack of basic public services, they, for the most part, do not see 
the public sector workers are also representing also their interests. 
 
3-3-3-4. FUTURE PROSPECTS - ACCELERATED AND SHARED GROWTH 
INITIATIVE FOR SOUTH AFRICA (ASGISA) AND THE NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN (NDP) 
 
ASGISA is another government initiative aimed at stimulating the economy and at addressing 
unemployment through infrastructural investment and development. The explicit aim was the 
acceleration of economic growth to an average of at least 4.5 per cent between 2005 and 2009 
and further to a sustainable 6per cent average annual rate between 2010 and 2014. Through 
this sustainable level of economic growth, ASGISA aims to halve unemployment and poverty 
by 2014. The programme prioritises government action and investment in six categories: 
infrastructure, interventions in the second (marginalised and underdeveloped) economy, 
sector strategies, education and skills, public administration issues, and macro-economic 
issues (Development Bank of Southern Africa, 2012).  
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According to Gelb (2006:5), most of ASGISA’s macro-economic approaches are similar to 
the characteristics of GEAR; however, it has tried to change its approach by incorporating 
broad-based support across various societal actors in the policy formulation process, which is 
expected to bring policy stability. However, since its introduction, ASGISA has been 
criticised for its unachievable goals. Even though COSATU has showed its support of 
ASGISA in principle, it is sceptical whether ASGISA will be able to tackle poverty and 
inequality (Mail and Guardian, 10 February 2006).
23
  
 
Over the past decade the South African government has come up with various development 
strategies to improve the economy’s performance. ASGISA is seen as an outgrowth of 
GEAR, which means that this programme is also largely based on neo-liberal economic 
policies (Mabhula, 2009). COSATU and the SACP have criticised this as another liberal 
capitalist economic programme which will perpetuate the widening gap between the rich and 
predicted that the poor and the large majority of citizens’ will still remain excluded from the 
mainstream economy. In addition to the division between the state, business and labour, the 
state has faced pressure. The state had to choose between the idea that strong state 
intervention is needed to achieve redistribution and the idea that the state’s role should be 
minimised and the role of private actors strengthened in order to increase competitiveness. 
Under the circumstances, the policy-making process has been politicised. 
 
In the context of a global and local recession, scepticism about the government’s ability to 
achieve growth is prevalent. Since the beginning of the global financial crisis in September 
                                                     
23
 ASGISA identified six ‘binding constraints’ which prevent South Africa from achieving the desired growth 
rate. They are 1) the relative volatility of the currency; 2) the cost, efficiency and capacity of the national 
logistics system; 3) Shortages of suitably skilled labour, and the spatial distortions of apartheid affecting low-
skilled labour costs; 4) Barriers to entry, limits to competition and limited new investment opportunities; 5) The 
regulatory environment and the burden on small and medium enterprises; and 6) Deficiencies in state 
organisation, capacity and leadership (South African Government Information, 2011). 
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2008, about one million jobs have been lost, and the official unemployment rate has risen 
from under 23 per cent to approximately 25 per cent (Statistics South Africa, 2014). Under 
these circumstances, it is likely that ASGISA will become just another wish-list for the 
government.  
 
Regarding the ANC’s macro-economic policies, a trade unionist states that: “it is a right wing 
agenda and has already failed globally, but the ANC government continues to faithfully and 
blindly follow it. This is for them and their business partners through BEE” (Interview with a 
trade unionist from the Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union, 12 March 
2012). ASGISA highlights social dialogue and partnership among actors (Parsons, 2007); 
however, the influence of labour in macro-economic programmes has already remarkably 
diminished since the state pushed forward GEAR and there is little hope that labour can 
regain influence in this extension of the neo-liberal economic programme.  
 
In 2012, the South African government introduced the NDP, which was intended to eliminate 
poverty and reduce inequality by 2030. Since the state adopted the RDP, GEAR and 
ASGISA, many problems such as an absence of broad partnerships were revealed (South 
African Government Information, 2013). It seems that the state now takes a slower but more 
comprehensive approach aiming to implement it over the next 17 years through the NDP. 
 
The NDP was also addressed by the NEDLAC Summit. According to NEDLAC’s Executive 
Director:  
 
The targets set out at the NDP can only be achieved if the social partners are prepared to commit to 
serious discussion around the structural challenges and inadequate investment in the South African 
economy (NEDLAC, 2012). 
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NEDLAC highlights the importance of social dialogue, cooperation and trust among social 
partners through the NDP.  
 
However, COSATU already shows its concern about several problems, such as its promise to 
create decent and sustainable jobs. Labour highlights that the NDP should be aligned with the 
broad ANC and its tripartite alliances, COSATU as well (COSATU, 2013). This reflects that 
the corporatist framework of South Africa still does not involve the voice of labour. 
 
The role of NEDLAC has diminished over time and it is possible to observe that the state and 
business unilaterally pushed forward macro-economic policies without consultating with 
labour. Against this background, in the next section, I would like to focus on one specific case 
that shows the interactions between the three actors at NEDLAC. Also, the decreasing 
influence of NEDLAC has affected the actors’ attitude and it is not being treated as an 
important mechanism by actors. In previous sections historical background and contextual 
information based on secondary sources was provided. The next section is based on primary 
sources such as interviews and statements. Thus, it will provide first-hand and direct evidence 
backing the argument of this dissertation, namely that the imbalance of power among actors 
impacted on corporatism. 
 
3-3-4. THE ANALYSIS OF THE EMPLOYMENT TAX INCENTIVE ACT 
 
The focus in this section will be on the issue of a youth wage subsidy, which has long been 
debated in South Africa. The debate intensified in 2012 when the government announced that 
it would accelerate the introduction of the youth wage subsidy. Since then labour has strongly 
opposed the proposal by Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. Despite the strong opposition 
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from labour, the bill was enacted in January 2014, and NEDLAC was bypassed by the state. 
In this section how each actor perceived and interacted at NEDLAC will be discussed as well 
as why NEDLAC could not function as a platform for social dialogue during this process. 
 
3-3-4-1. BACKGROUND OF THE ETIA  
 
On 19 March 2014, COSATU’s biggest affiliate, NUMSA, led rallies in Johannesburg, 
marched to the NEDLAC premises and handed over a memorandum of understanding to 
NEDLAC officials arguing that the ETIA had not been tabled for consideration at NEDLAC, 
and called for the repeal of the ETIA. Labour’s acrimonious action was caused by the 
illegality of the state bypassing NEDLAC and taking the ETIA directly to Parliament. At 
NEDLAC “insufficient consultation” during the policy-making process has been continuously 
pointed out (Colland, 2006:48), however, considering that the origins of NEDLAC lie in 
labour’s shared experience during the struggle and the influence of the economic and social 
policy, the enactment of ETIA is somewhat remarkable, striking.  
 
The ETIA, commonly known as the youth wage subsidy, came into effect on 1 January 2014. 
As early as 2010 President Jacob Zuma proposed a subsidy to employers to promote hiring 
the youth, and Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan, announced the plan of a youth wage 
subsidy in the 2011 budget speech in Parliament. According to Confronting Youth 
Unemployment: Policy Options for South Africa, a discussion paper for public comment 
published by the National Treasury, “the Act will encourage private employers to employ 
young workers by providing a tax incentive to employers, with government sharing the costs 
of such employment for a maximum of two years under certain conditions, a budget of R5 
billion for its implementation is allocated” (National Treasury, 2011).  
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The law is expected to subsidise 423,000 new jobs for the young and the less/un-skilled, aged 
between 18 and 29 years old, earning less than R 60,000 a year, the group with the highest 
unemployment rate. The majority of this group does not have work experience. This subsidy 
will lessen the employers’ burden if they hire inexperienced workers since the employers will 
receive a tax incentive through cost-sharing between the state and business. The Pay as You 
Earn (PAYE) system operated by the South African Revenue Service (SARS) will be 
involved and registered employers will receive the subsidy via credits on their PAYE 
accounts (National Treasury, 2011). In this way, it is expected that the ETIA will help lower 
the cost of hiring the youth and increase the demand for young workers. Also, it can 
encourage young people to enter the job market and acquire relevant skills for further 
individual development  
 
The Act is expected to create opportunities for the young. However, the Act was stalled 
because the state, business and labour disagreed on the subject. From the beginning labour 
argued that the youth wage subsidy cannot be the long term solution, and that it will create a 
two-tier labour market. Labour pointed out that employers who seek to maximise profit can 
abuse the situation and fire unsubsidised workers. However, the state unilaterally pushed 
forward the initiative emphasising acceleration, or fast tracking the implementation despite 
labour’s opposition. Since business hailed the ETIA from the beginning when the proposal 
was made, the enactment of the ETIA was seen to be in favour of business as it provided tax 
incentives. Labour however has been strongly against the Act. In the June/July 2011 the 
Shopsteward, the official magazine of COSATU, outlined its rationales for rejecting the 
proposal: 
 
It would entrench the already existing two-tier labour market. This subsidy might also drive 
wages down, leading to a race to the bottom in terms of workers’ earnings. A central 
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concern about subsidies is that firms may opt to hire new workers who meet the criteria for 
the subsidy and displace existing workers from their current jobs. This will have the result 
of further segmenting the working class (The Shopsteward, 2011:14-15). 
 
Against this background, there are several questions that arose in tandem. Despite the 
existence of the corporatist institution, why was there no proper consultation among actors? 
What are problems behind this? The focus in this section is on how actors interacted 
regarding the ETIA in the decision-making process at NEDLAC.  
 
3-3-4-2. SOUTH AFRICA’S UNEMPLOYMENT ISSUE AND THE ETIA 
 
The official rates of unemployment in South Africa have reached 24.1 per cent (Stats SA, 
2013). The country has one of the highest unemployment rates in the world for people 
between the ages of 15 and 24 (World Economic Forum Global Risk Report, 2014). Youth 
unemployment in South Africa is closely linked to low participation rates. According to the 
National Treasury (2011), only approximately 25 per cent of young people participate in the 
labour market. 
 
The global recession and South Africa’s slow economic growth have been pointed to as 
having led to the slow pace of job creation. On the other hand the high level of youth 
unemployment is also related to the economic structure (National Planning Commission, 
2012). South Africa’s economy has become capital-intensive. A capital-intensive economy 
does not generate as many jobs as labour-intensive economies do. Considering that South 
Africa is a resource rich country, it should focus on the extraction sector. However, forestry, 
agriculture, and manufacturing should also receive attention since these can generate jobs. 
Also, it is necessary to upgrade these labour-intensive sectors into much higher value added 
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industries so that jobs can be generated and workers can earn decent wages as well as 
improving their skills. All in all, this endeavour can contribute to the diversification of South 
Africa’s economy in the long term. Wages of particularly low-skilled workers have increased 
rapidly over time although productivity did not improve and this is pointed to by 
commentators as another problem in the labour market in South Africa (Lewis, 2001; 
Fedderke, 2006). This is closely related to the productivity issue of South Africa (see Figure 
3-4). 
 
In addition to this, the education and training system is pointed to as contributing to the 
unemployment issue in the country and requires urgent reform. For example, those who live 
in poor areas, in fact, a large number of the population, cannot access quality education and 
job training which possibly could afford them more opportunities to be hired or to become 
entrepreneurs (National Treasury, 2011:42). These causal relations are confirmed by a number 
of studies on the labour market. Yu (2013) who analyses the causes of youth unemployment 
and the labour market trends in South Africa, highlights the significance of education that can 
break the vicious cycle of unemployment in South Africa. As Yu (2013) argues, without the 
improvement of the quality of education, the new act will merely have a weak positive impact 
on youth employment and will not be successful in addressing the lack of skilled labourers, 
which has been pointed to as one of the biggest problems in South Africa.  
 
The state (2012) also highlights the importance of education and training as a long-term 
solution. Against this background, it is crucial that the state take the initiative and try to 
stimulate employment by encouraging employers to train their employees. The government’s 
rationale is that the ETIA will help absorb young people and give them work experience and 
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training since young people find it increasingly difficult to attain an initial foothold in the 
labour market (Burns, Edward and Pauw, 2013).  
 
The high levels of youth unemployment are linked to various social problems. The 
consequences of youth unemployment are the increased likelihood of unemployment at a later 
age and low earning potential. Besides these major problems there are high crime rates, 
violence, and poverty and these are likely to lead to political and social instability (Kingdon 
and Knight, 2005). 
 
The South African government has tried before to do something about the youth 
unemployment issue. It has looked for practical ways to educate the young and organise 
training systems for the unemployed. Similar programmes to the ETIA already exist, for 
example, in 2000 there was the learnership programme, a work-based learning programme, 
and the Public Works Programme of the Department of Social Development in 2004 (Burns, 
Edwards and Pauw, 2013; http://salearnership.co.za/, 2014). Despite the government’s 
attempts, the programmes turned out not to be effective. It seems that the ineffectiveness of 
previous programmes is related to the lack of implementation. Interestingly, one of the people 
interviewed also cited cases from other countries that adopted similar programmes but where 
the programmes failed, and argues: 
 
The R 5 billion can be used differently, there have been various incentive programmes 
related to job creation such as the community workers’ programme, however, these have not 
worked properly, in my constituency no single municipality has run the programme, so why 
not use something we already have instead of the new controversial act (Interview with a 
former labour unionist incorporated into the government, 25 March 2014).  
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
126 
 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of an employment tax incentive was first announced by the 
President in his 2010 State of the Nation Address. In 2010, the National Treasury tabled a 
youth employment incentive for consideration by Parliament. In February 2011 the National 
Treasury released a paper. In the paper it is argued that resolving the youth unemployment 
issues needs short- as well as long-term measures such as improving education and skills, and 
labour market interventions that improve the employability of young people. As one of these 
measures, the youth employment subsidy was suggested (National Treasury, 2011).
24
 The 
National Treasury fully acknowledged that the youth employment subsidy will not be the only 
solution. However, it highlights the benefits of the initiative: 
 
A youth employment subsidy will not, in itself, solve unemployment among young South 
Africans. It is, however, a useful measure that will assist young, inexperienced workers to 
gain work experience, to access decent jobs in the formal sector and to improve their 
employment prospects in the long run (National Treasury, 2011:10). 
 
Stakeholders responded differently to the idea of ETIA. BUSA regards the policy as “one of 
the better short term job creation solutions”. The Black Business Council responded similarly 
and described it as “an intervention aimed at encouraging people to employ young people. 
The youth wage subsidy should be welcomed. We therefore welcome the youth wage 
subsidy” (SOWETAN, 25 May 2012).25 On the contrary, COSATU has rejected the proposal 
saying “it will enable the private sector to hire cheap labour and will result in jobs losses since 
                                                     
24
 In addition to the youth employment subsidy, several strategies were mentioned in the paper. They are 
reviewing the legislative environment, direct public employment opportunities, improving education 
performance and skills development, learnership opportunities through coordination with business, and 
improving the public employment services available to the youth and entrepreneurship schemes (National 
Treasury, 2011). 
25
 The law was hailed by other actors as well. For example, all opposition parties including the DA voted in 
favour of the Bill in October 2013. It is revealed by DA’s finance spokesperson, Tim Harris’s statement, “while 
this Bill was stuck at NEDLAC, 218,000 young job seekers joined the ranks of the unemployed. That is the price 
of [COSATU’s] delay”. The youth wage subsidy issue was highly politicised and created a dispute between the 
DA and COSATU (COSATU and the ANC as well), however, in this section, the focus is only on the interaction 
between the state, business and labour at NEDLAC, thus political disputes with other actors will  not be included.  
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firms will release older people to hire less expensive labour” (SOWETAN, 25 May 2012). 
Another argument from COSATU is that “the youth wage subsidy offers no prospects for 
training and skills development. This means that young workers will always be subject to low 
wages and poor working conditions with no prospects of upward mobility” (Congress 
Countdown, 2012). 
 
Regarding these perspectives, the state highlighted that it would ensure that conditions are 
met. For example, employers would be penalised if workers were not paid the stipulated 
minimum wages, one of the conditions attached to receiving the incentive. However, senior 
officials from COSATU and NUMSA argue that “history and experience show that firms are 
more than willing to fire workers in order to hire subsidised workers” (Interviews were held 
on 1 April 2014). It is seen that there is dissatisfaction with and distrust of the government, 
especially the Labour Department in terms of implementation.  
 
If companies use the incentive, they will attract people to those jobs. However, there will be 
retrenchment of older workers. We know this from history. Employers don’t get fines if 
they break the law, or the courts just give them a slap on the wrist (Interview with a senior 
official from NUMSA, 1 April 2014). 
 
The conflictual situation became intense in 2013. In June 2013, President Jacob Zuma 
highlighted the importance of employment incentives and announced in the State of the 
Nation Address: 
 
Last May I asked constituencies at NEDLAC to discuss youth employment incentives. I am 
pleased that discussions have been concluded and that agreement has been reached on key 
principles. The parties will sign the Accord later this month. The incentives will add to what 
Government is already doing to empower the youth (Presidency, 4 June 2013).  
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Regarding this statement, COSATU’s response is somewhat outrageous: 
 
We note that Treasury has indicated that the Bill is intended to implement commitments 
made under the ‘Youth Employment Accord’. This is despite the fact that the Accord 
requires that any incentives be ‘approved by all constituencies’. It would be incorrect to 
state that the proposals in the Bill have in fact been approved by all constituencies 
(COSATU, 2013). 
 
How can the two actors be in conflict with each other regarding consensus on the issue? The 
National Treasury’s initial proposal was obviously discussed in NEDLAC where no 
agreement was reached. In February 2013, a Youth Employment Accord was signed at 
NEDLAC which explicitly excluded the wage subsidy plan. According to the COSATU’s 
statement, “the youth wage subsidy was not in the accord in its pure form but the allowance 
for ‘incentives’ left the door open” (Alliance Wars: The Return of the Youth Wage Subsidy 
Poser, 20 October 2013).  
 
During an interview with Treasury Deputy Director General, Ismail Momoniat, with media 
the unilateral drive by the state was defended as follows: “Parliament is the only supreme 
body and it approves or rejects or amends bills… legally government did not even have to 
table the bill at NEDLAC”. He further says “It’s a money bill... therefore we were not 
compelled to take it to NEDLAC but we have taken the idea to NEDLAC… you don’t always 
reach consensus [at NEDLAC], but it doesn’t mean government is not allowed to come up 
with a proposal and put it to Parliament” (Times, 22 October 2013). This was seen as unfair 
by labour since labour was expecting further discussions at NEDLAC (SABC News, 2 January 
2014).  
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While the state and labour opposed each other, BUSA has repeatedly welcomed the youth 
wage subsidy proposals. According to Draft BUSA Position Paper regarding Wage Subsidies 
which was published in 11 March 2009:  
 
BUSA supports the principle of introduction of wage subsidy as an element of the reform 
process. It is our assessment that wage subsidies can offset the costs of mandatory 
contributions to social security and are useful as an active labour market policy instrument. 
Overtime, the wage subsidy will promote employment creation and savings, as it is 
designed primarily to affect behaviour through incentives. However, the design and the 
implementation of wage subsidies must be carefully managed to maximise uptake and 
ensure optimal returns on initial funding. The implementation of the wage subsidy must 
also be in line with the budget balancing framework and be sustainable in the long run. 
 
It is our assessment that underinvestment in young people will gradually diminish South 
Africa’s long term competitiveness, as low productivity amongst this group will impact on 
future productivity of the country. Furthermore, it is also our view that high levels of youth 
unemployment reduce social cohesion over time, and tend to contribute to prevalent social 
ills, and if left unmanaged can undermine democratic gains. 
 
BUSA is of the opinion that the subsidy can contribute to making the labour market more 
flexible. In a statement on the 2013 Budget speech, this support was reiterated: “BUSA 
welcomes the emphasis in the Budget Speech on finalizing the youth employment subsidy 
scheme and hopes it will be implemented as soon as possible”. According to a media 
statement of BUSA (BUSA, 22 May 2013): 
 
There are many other developing countries, where special interventions are needed. BUSA 
therefore urges the implementation of the government’s youth wage subsidy scheme as soon 
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as possible… The scheme offers more advantages for youth employment than many other 
short-term job creation initiatives and could create over 400,000 jobs. 
 
It was emphasised by an interviewee from business that “in so far as the implicit assumption 
of a subsidy is that there is something wrong with the price of labour, it can be viewed as a 
pro-business measure… It is essentially a pro-youth measure more than anything else” 
(Interview with a former official from BUSA, 19 March 2014). According to BUSA, “similar 
schemes abroad have been successful and have been adapted to South African circumstances” 
(BUSA, 22 May 2013). Also, with regard to the concerns from labour regarding the 
replacement of old workers, one of the interviewees argues “in a nutshell it is hard to tell 
whether the Act will lead to displacement of workers. One must obviously be vigilant in this 
regard… the argument that businesses don’t readily replace people with experience is 
probably sound” (Interview with a media political commentator working on the youth wage 
subsidy issue, 19 March 2014).  
 
The conflict was heated in terms of the discussion of the overall impact of the Act. According 
to a recent study conducted by Burns, Edwards and Pauw (2013), these authors argue that the 
previous learnerships were not successful and did not generate a successful outcome, also 
companies did not see the incentive as sufficient. The subsidisation of wages can lead to the 
employment of people without experience, and the absorption of workers with skills below 
the minimum threshold. However there are limitations. Therefore, the promoters of the newly 
adopted programme should ensure that the subsidy is combined with long-term intervention. 
This perspective was also highlighted by the interviewees from the government (Department 
of Labour) (Interview, 25 March 2014).  
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Whether the law was favoured by labour or not, one of the problems that was raised by 
COSATU is that the agenda was not discussed at NEDLAC even though “the NEDLAC Act 
of 1994 requires the government to seek to reach consensus and conclude agreements with its 
social partners on all matters relating to social and economic policy” and failure to do so is 
seen as “dishonesty on the part of government”. In this conflictual situation in which the state, 
business and labour disagree with each other, it is noticeable that NEDLAC could not play 
any significant role to mediate and coordinate various stakeholders’ perspectives in the 
process of decision-making. Rather, what really happened is that the government bypassed 
NEDLAC and NEDLAC is paralysed. NEDLAC is seen as a mere battleground for the state, 
business and labour.  
 
3-3-4-3. THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS OF NEDLAC 
 
With regard to the weakened status of NEDLAC, several causes have been identified. First of 
all, there is the dynamics of the relations among actors. To begin with, it is possible to see the 
wedge between the state and COSATU. The on-going tension within the alliance has been 
discernible since 2000 (Colland, 2006).  
 
After democratisation, labour gained through legislation that protects the right to form unions, 
guarantees the right to strike, and guarantees minimum conditions of employment and also 
redress for historical inequality of opportunity, and in addition, finances some skills 
development and training institutions. NEDLAC played a vital role with regard to these 
achievements and this was confirmed by most of the interviewees. 
 
Social dialogue in South Africa has clearly brought major benefits to the country. It has 
facilitated the transitions that took place between 1994 and 2000. NEDLAC contributed to 
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improvement in legislation and regulations related to labour issues, also, it helped improve 
policy responsiveness and reduced policy conflict… However, it is often portrayed as a 
failure because it hasn’t led to the big social pact that will reduce workplace and social 
conflict while ensuring more rapid growth and employment creation (Interview with a 
government official, 25 March 2014). 
 
However, as time went by, the distance between members of the alliance became wider. 
According to Pillay, “President Mbeki drove a wedge between the alliance partners and the 
Presidency very early on, to the growing unhappiness of leftist elements in the ANC, as well 
as the SACP and COSATU” (Pillay, date unknown). One of the interviewees, a former labour 
unionist incorporated into the government, agrees that “the ANC does not represent workers 
despite workers having remained strong and dominant in civil society” (Interview, 25 March 
2014). This can be seen at the NUMSA Congress in December 2013, where one of the main 
items on the agenda was to call on COSATU to break with the alliance and establish a new 
United Front (NUMSA News, March 2014). The interviewee further says: “Workers have 
become politically conscious and their patience reaches limits, there is no fundamental change 
in the society. Nevertheless at the moment, there is no alternative institution that can represent 
workers in this country” (Interview, 25 March 2014). On the other hand, the characteristics of 
government have changed as well. A considerable number of labour unionists were 
incorporated into the government, however, as soon as they joined the government, they were 
expected to toe the party line (some of them are still outspoken though).  
 
It is seen that as soon as unionists are incorporated, they are tamed and not able to represent 
labour, the situation is described as the party puts you in a position therefore you have to 
abide by the ANC ‘ticket’ and their rules. Only the brave criticise (Interview with a senior 
official from NUMSA, 1 April 2014).   
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Also, technocrats do not necessarily reflect the alliance relationship between the ANC and 
labour (Interview with a government official, 25 March 2014). This might have affected the 
government’s rationale, that is, the government and Parliament should not be constrained by 
an obligation to reach consensus with labour. It should be noted that the characteristics of the 
government have shifted from idealistic to pragmatic, in other words, pro-business. “The 
participants including secretariats at NEDLAC are also pro-business. In this context, it is 
difficult to make a law conducive to labour. There are continuous disagreements among the 
actors, NEDLAC does not seem fair to labour” (Interview with a former labour unionist 
incorporated into the government, 25 March 2014). It is said that after democratisation the 
economy provided the state and business with an “important new lever” (CDE, 2000:51).   
 
Secondly, NEDLAC has faced various problems. Some of the organisational problems have 
been pointed out. It was also pointed out that NEDLAC should reposition itself as a 
corporatist mechanism. An interviewee from the government and also a former official of 
NEDALC highlighted the significance of coming up with agendas that can address the 
fundamental problems of South Africa, such as poverty and inequality. 
 
NEDLAC has been expected to bring about a more equitable economy in terms of 
employment and incomes. However, in reality, deep inequalities have persisted, workers 
and poor communities are becoming disillusioned with the basic compromise, and this has 
led to rising workplace and community protest – and concerns from business about property 
rights… if it fails with regard to fundamental issues of South Africa such as poverty and 
inequality, NEDLAC has become irrelevant (Interviewee with a former coordinator at 
NEDLAC, 29 April 2014).  
 
Currently, NEDLAC is facing persistent disagreement on how to bring about a more equitable 
society. Under the circumstances, it seems that the state has played a leading role in 
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coordinating agendas. Agendas are driven largely by government policy and drafts, these do 
not necessarily represent labour’s perspective. From the early 2000s, it was pointed out that 
not NEDLAC but the government is the main driver of the policy-making process (Interviews 
with a former coordinator at NEDLAC, 29 April 2014). 
 
There are various actors involved that can influence policy such as the National Treasury, the 
Presidency and the Department of Economic Development and other departments. Organised 
labour and organised business including SMEs and the public through the agency of the press, 
are other partners in the decision-making process. From the government side, it seems that the 
National Treasury is one of the most important stakeholders since they design economic 
policy and they will be responsible for allocating the funding once the policy is implemented. 
The Minister of Finance is another actor since he announced the possible implementation of a 
youth wage subsidy in his Budget Speech, so he has an interest in its implementation. The 
Presidency coordinates and ensures coherence in policy development and implementation. 
The ETIA is the outcome of direct and indirect collaboration with various inter- and intra- 
departmental committees including a relatively high level of government officials such as the 
Ministers, Directors and Directors General of the National Treasury, Economic Policy, 
Labour and Finance. Their coordination or bargaining power seems much higher than that of 
labour which opposes the Act. 
 
There has been scepticism with regard to NEDLAC’s influence on policy (CDE, 2000:48). 
CDE (2000:48) provides detail with regard to the policy-making process, and describes the 
place of NEDLAC in the government’s policy-making process. NEDLAC’s influence is 
confined to the first stages of “initiatives, investigation, expert proposals, cabinet approval of 
green papers, public comment, drafts of the official position, cabinet approval, and 
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consideration at NEDLAC”. However after these procedures, NEDLAC has no impact on, 
“state law adviser processes, Parliament portfolio committees, Parliament, departmental 
stages (preparation for implementation) and promulgation”. It should be noted that even 
though the government took the initiative in the case of the ETIA, , the implementation of the 
policy requires broader consultation across a number of other societal actors and NELDAC 
was supposed to play a role in the process, but this aspect was ignored by the government.  
 
Also, the incapacity of NEDLAC during the negotiation process such as its lack of facilitation 
skills when identifying and removing obstacles at the chamber level, was pointed out. In the 
same context, interviewees point to various issues ranging from the necessity to strengthen the 
position of the secretariat, to shortcomings in the management committee’s administration 
including delays in convening meetings, the non-sharing of minutes, and insufficient 
information gathering. Furthermore, it was suggested that NEDLAC itself should increase its 
negotiation capacity vis-à-vis actors at government level (Interview with a former coordinator 
at NEDLAC, 29 April 2014) 
 
Another problem is that the implementation of agreements outside of legislation remains 
questionable (Interview with a former coordinator at NEDLAC, 29 April 2014). As 
mentioned earlier, there is consensus on NEDLAC’s contribution in the first five years from 
1995 to 2000, however, poor implementation is pointed to as an aspect that negatively affects 
NEDLAC’s credibility.  
 
At NEDLAC Chambers, there are detailed discussions of policies and legislation and these 
have led to visible improvement in many laws, however, these efforts have been 
overshadowed by poor implementation… agreements are reached every 3-5 years, and are 
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often either vague or not on a requisite scale, and mostly poorly implemented (Interview 
with a senior COSATU official, 1 April 2014).  
 
On the other hand from the perspective of NEDLAC, the attitude of the other actors is also 
problematic. The ambiguous attitude of the government could already be seen when the 
minister of finance, Trevor Manuel, introduced the GEAR strategy in 1996. “The agendas and 
outcomes cannot satisfy all actors. Participants need to understand this, if they come to 
NELDAC, they should understand they have to negotiate” (Interview with a government 
official, 25 March 2014). In terms of agenda, the state and business feel that labour is not 
realistic and labour feels that business undermines the corporatist institution by lobbying 
separately.  
 
The reality is that while the state and business dominate at NEDLAC, labour is placed in an 
inferior position. This imbalance has negatively affected the dynamics of the relations among 
them. It is seen that business has been increasing its power at the negotiation table, based on 
its organisational capacity. Business has exercised its influence on policies through various 
institutions. After democratisation, advisers and think tanks continuously influenced 
presidents. Compared to labour and the government, it is seen that business has technical 
expertise including (committed) leadership, knowledge of the economy, and experience. 
However, business has also faced internal problems such as growing cynicism amongst the 
members. Also there are divisions between sectors. These have fragmented the organisation 
itself and often weaken mandates, some major constituents would prefer to lobby separately 
(Interviews with a government official, 25 March 2014). 
 
With regard to the government, representatives from government have “technical depth, 
dedicated policy capacity, and legitimacy” (Interviewee with a former senior coordinator at 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
137 
 
NEDLAC, 29 April 2014). Based on this it has dominated at the negotiation process. 
However, it also has several weaknesses. Government technocrats lack negotiation training 
and are not motivated for engagement, for example, representatives lack clarity about why 
they have to engage. In addition to this, there is no common strategy toward other societal 
partners, in other words various department are not always in agreement internally 
(Interviewee with a former senior coordinator at NEDLAC, 29 April 2014).  
 
On the other hand labour has a relatively clear goal and perspective based on centralised 
organisation. However, it has faced growing cynicism and militancy amongst its members. 
The fragmentation of labour along with ideological differences and strategies has been 
pointed to as one of the biggest problems that labour should overcome. With regard to the 
ETIA directly, waiting for clarity of the general secretary issue is aggravating uncertainty at 
the moment (see Footnote 29), thus there is no internal coordination. One of the major 
problems that was identified during the interviews is that labour lacks a clear strategy toward 
business and sometimes government. “Labour does not see policy as its core function. Among 
labour there is often no clarity about what they can compromise on. Under the circumstances, 
it is easier for labour to say no since government will go forward anyway” (Interview with a 
former labour unionist incorporated into the government, 25 March 2014). This reactive 
attitude was already pointed out by Gostner and Joffe (1998:144-146), arguing that labour 
representatives have not succeeded in moving from a reactive mode of operation into a 
proactive mode. 
 
Furthermore, lack of capacity of labour at the negotiation process is criticised. “Labour should 
send more senior and experienced people that can represent its interest” (Interview with a 
former labour unionist incorporated into the government, 25 March 2014). “All COSATU 
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people in parliament need to speak with one voice but it’s not like that now” (Interview with a 
senior NUMSA official, 1 April 2014). Even though the influence of NEDLAC has 
decreased, labour still wants to use NEDLAC to further its interest and to benefit from social 
dialogue. However, it seems that there is no coordination from the labour side in the first 
place. This prevents them from representing labour’s interest vis-à-vis the state and 
government.   
 
As discussed above, each actor has strengths, it can also be seen that all of them have 
weaknesses in common, they are lack of capacity for engagement, and lack of the ability to 
sell compromises to their members. It seems that these shortcomings have made discussion 
itself difficult. In the end, the deficiencies have raised the transaction costs of social dialogue 
for the actors. 
The enactment of the ETIA and conflict between the state, business and labour are a reflection 
of the current dwindling status of the corporatist institution of South Africa and it seems that 
there are also underlying problems at NEDLAC. With regard to the Act, COSATU has argued 
that older workers will be retrenched as a result of employers opting to employ young 
workers in order to benefit from the incentive, also that the Act itself cannot be a fundamental 
solution of the unemployment issue of South Africa. According to the state and business, 
labour’s argument is based on no evidence and they contend that not all workers are 
replaceable. Proponents of the Act argue that labour wants to protect only its own members. 
They accuse labour of not seeing the broader picture and issues related to communities and 
the political environment. Colland (2006) describes the unfeasibility of the reversal of act 
saying “once a decision or a policy view is published, it is hard to get a substantial reversal”, 
the ETIA is now out in the street whether labour agrees or not, and each actor is waiting to see 
how it will manifest.  
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While looking at interaction between the actors and exploring each actor’s perspective on the 
corporatist institution, it seems that first and foremost, in the South African context, 
NEDLAC can only work if it also helps overcome inequalities in the workplace as well as in 
society overall. Also, even though each actor possesses weaknesses, if there is genuine 
discussion on a certain issue and proper implementation, NEDLAC can be a platform that is 
conducive to the welfare of labour and furthermore the entire working class. The corporatist 
institution was able to shape and influence ‘products’ of the system in the past. However, at 
present the resurrection of NEDLAC seems a daunting task. From the perspective of labour, 
its opinion was not incorporated during the ETIA decision-making process, NEDLAC was 
deliberately bypassed by the state. This imbalanced relationship between the actors has 
impacted on corporatism in South Africa, and the future prospects are not bright.  
 
3-4. THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE STATE, LABOUR 
AND BUSINESS 
 
The two issues comprising the case study of this research project show that NEDLAC has not 
functioned properly as a social dialogue mechanism. During the decision-making process of 
macro-economic programmes and the ETIA, it was seen that labour’s perspective was not 
incorporated and that the state pushed agendas forward unilaterally. It was also seen that 
business benefitted from this. Along with NEDLAC’s own institutional capacity, the 
imbalance of power among the actors negatively affected the corporatist institution in South 
Africa. In this section, the focus is on the factors that, together with globalisation, impacted 
on the imbalance in the context of the labour movement in South Africa. Also, there is an 
attempt to explain why corporatism still exists even though it does not work.  
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3-4-1. OVERVIEW OF LABOUR MOVEMENTS AFTER DEMOCRATISATION  
 
Democratisation involved changes in the relation between the state and societal actors. Under 
the apartheid system, the state was the only actor that was able to mobilise societal actors; this 
became the driving force of the economic growth of South Africa, and it was done by 
suppressing labour. However, after democratisation, the state, which used to have exclusive 
power, had to incorporate labour and the interests of labour had to be considered. South 
African labour gained considerable political influence through the tripartite alliance with the 
ANC and the SACP right after democratisation. This stands in contrast to what happened in 
South Korea, where it took more than a decade for labour to form a political party after 
democratisation and where its influence in politics is still insignificant compared to that of 
COSATU (see Chapter 4). One of the prominent examples indicating the power of COSATU 
was the presidential election in 2007. At that time, then Deputy President Jacob Zuma 
received considerable support from COSATU and this largely helped Zuma come into power. 
There were a number of matters to take into consideration when choosing between Mbeki and 
Zuma, especially the fact that Zuma faced corruption charges, which put him at a 
disadvantage in the presidential bid. Also, “the need for continuity in the policy process and 
machinery of government created under Mbeki” made some who wanted stable policies, 
inclined to Mbeki (Butler, 2007:48). However, some commentators including Butler (2007) 
note that Mbeki fell out of favour with COSATU and this played a significant role when 
Zuma was elected in the place of Mbeki as president of the ANC.  
 
South African trade unions are considered to be highly politicised. COSATU, the biggest 
affiliation, having 2.2 million members (by 2012), has played a significant role in elections 
since democratisation and this has become a source of power for labour (COSATU, 2013). 
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However, this relationship has not produced any visible policy outcomes. Structural 
unemployment, widespread poverty, and gross inequality still persist in the country. 
Therefore, the close relationship between the state and labour is seen as only a temporary 
contract with the ruling party aiming to win elections. Labour’s influence in terms of policy-
making does not seem significant.  
 
Figure 3.2. Strict and Broad Rates of Unemployment
26
 2000-2007 (%) 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey September, 2007; Statistics South Africa, 2007.      
 
Also, looking inwardly, it is possible to observe that labour itself has become fragmented and 
this does not help strengthen its power. The so-called Marikana crisis is the prominent 
example of this. The town of Marikana in the North West Province in South Africa made 
international headlines in August, 2012. The Marikana mine owned by Lonmin is the third 
                                                     
26
 The broad-sense unemployment rate takes those desiring work but not looking for a job into consideration. 
The strict-sense unemployment rate takes the percentage or number of people who are involuntarily unemployed, 
into consideration. Since 1998, Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) has adopted the ‘strict' measure of 
unemployment as the official measure for South Africa to be counted, an unemployed person must have “taken 
active steps to look for work or to start some form of self-employment” (Stats SA, 1998: 1). 
Broad Rate 
Strict Rate 
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biggest platinum mine in South Africa. When police opened fire on members of the National 
Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and killed 34 miners engaged in a strike action, the incident 
sparked both domestic and international outrage and a national commission of enquiry was set 
up to investigate. The incident has become known as the Marikana massacre (Mail and 
Guardian, 14 August 2012). 
 
In addition to the cruelty and brutality of the state’s use of police power to repress workers, it 
was revealed that the rivalry between NUM and the Association of Mineworkers and 
Construction Union (AMCU) underlie the incident. After the incident, there has been on-
going violence in the area, with clashes between the two rival unions manifesting at the mine. 
It has been alleged that NUM, which used to represent workers’ interest has been co-opted 
and compromised. Workers see the union as captured by management. In other words, as 
trade unions grow bigger, they become closer to articulating the interests of management and 
at the same time drift away from the interests of their membership. AMCU saw this as a great 
opportunity to make a breakthrough to expand their power base since it is difficult for new 
unions to make an impact in the workplace, because labour regulations protect hegemonic 
trade unions (Mail and Guardian, 14 August 2012). This is in line with COSATU’s principle 
of “one industry, one union, one country, and one federation”. This was aimed at preventing 
unnecessary competition between unions by gathering them under one big umbrella union. 
However, according to Bhorat and Oosthuizen (2012), the Marikana incident highlights the 
shortcomings of NUM. NUM failed to represent its membership and this resulted in the 
growth of the AMCU, a non-COSATU affiliate, an independent union. The mine workers’ 
concerns and demands easily came to be channelled through this new union and this led to 
conflict between the old and the new unions. This contributed to the fragmentation of labour 
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power, which again negatively affected the influence of labour at the negotiation table vis á 
vis the state and business.  
 
Another problem that has weakened the power of labour is related to the use of casual 
workers (Bhorat and Oosthuizen, 2012). Mining companies in particular are increasingly 
using subcontractors, as they attempt to reduce the number of permanent staff and reduce 
costs. The sector has suffered from under-investment as rising costs, political and policy 
uncertainty and most recently talk of nationalising the mines, has made the mining industry in 
South Africa a less favourable investment destination. As a result, miners are hired as 
temporary or casual labour. In this situation, it is hard for workers to push for their rights in 
the face of the possibility of losing their jobs. This has affected the unions’ ability to organise 
members and as a result it has become difficult to build workers’ collective solidarity. Not 
having any means to improve their working conditions, workers turn to violence in order to 
forge workers’ collective solidarity. 
 
With regard to the tragic event of Marikana, the ILO (2012) asserted that NEDLAC should 
have played a significant role (ILO, 1 October 2012). However, despite the wide news 
coverage of the event, NEDLAC does not seem to have paid much attention. This directly 
reflects the lack of capacity of the corporatist institution of South Africa, which was supposed 
to create a space for discussion among all the related actors and encourage them to reach 
consensus.  
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3-4-2. THE WANING POWER OF LABOUR AND THE CONSEQUENCES  
 
After democratisation, labour’s diminished power is clear. The high unemployment rate and 
the growing number of casual workers is an indication of this. As can be seen below, the 
unemployment rate has not improved since democratisation (see Table. 3.5.). The higher the 
unemployment rate, the lower the workers’ bargaining power, since many workers stay 
outside jobs and unions. 
 
Table 3. 2. Unemployment Rate in South Africa 
 
Narrow definition Broad 
definition Male Female Total 
1993 11.9 15.8 13.6 31.2 
1997 17.3 26.5 20.5 36.1 
2001 25.3 33.3 28.9 40.8 
2005 22.2 31.3 26.4 38.3 
2008 17.1 30.1 23.4 28.9 
 
Source: Leibbrandt et al., 2010. p10. 
 
Also most workers live on poverty wages; therefore they are likely to use the labour 
movements to advance their immediate interests. During my interview with unionised petrol 
attendants ahead of nation-wide strikes in September 2013, one of them reluctantly gave his 
reason for joining as “if you not join them, you do not gain anything” (Interview with petrol 
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attendants affiliated with the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa. 17 September 
2013).
27
 
 
Labour’s strong collective power has been often misused and furthermore it has had a 
negative effect on the South African economy. Unions in South Africa are strong in terms of 
strikes capacity and they are able to negotiate higher wages. However, it has been pointed out 
that this is not always accompanied by higher productivity and an increased skill level. 
According to South African Reserve Bank (SARB) (2000:13), between 1995 and 1999, labour 
productivity increased by a total of 18.4 per cent, whereas unit labour costs increased from 
100 to 128.5 over the same period. South African real unit labour costs are much higher than 
those of OECD member countries and the gap has become wide.
28
 This has led to foreign 
investors preferring other countries such as China and Southeast Asian countries that can 
provide cheaper and relatively well educated labour. Also, it is noticeable that the main 
concern of foreign investors is a strong labour union and low labour productivity, which deter 
investment. This has created a negative image of South Africa as an investment destination.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
27
 The interview with these petrol attendants was conducted in the Stellenbosch area. 17 September, 2013. The 
interview was non-structured and was initially meant to be brief. However, one of the informants introduced his 
colleagues and it was possible to schedule another interview with them which helped the researcher to receive in-
depth information about the background of the strike, their perspectives towards union leadership and 
relationship between labour and the ruling party ANC.  
28
 OECD member countries are mostly developed countries; however, there are several countries that have a 
similar political economic status as South Africa at the global level. For example, Mexico and Turkey are often 
seen as emerging economies, like South Africa.  
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Figure 3.3. Real Unit Labour Costs Comparison with OECD 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OECD 
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Figure 3.4. Wages and Labour Productivity of South Africa 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 2012.  
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According to Figure 3. 3. and Figure 3. 4., labour productivity has been falling since 1995, 
whereas real wages have been rising. These two factors together explain why employment has 
been falling in the private sector.  
 
There is another feature that weakens the power of labour in South Africa. Webster and 
Buhlungu (2004:41) point out that although there are large numbers of unions and union 
federations in South Africa, these federations are highly decentralised and fragmented 
according to race, occupation and political affiliation (Maree, 2011:20). Under these 
circumstances, it is hard for them to aggregate collective power and play as one united actor.  
However, labour is strong when it comes to mobilising strikes, which can become destructive 
and has influence on the ANC; however, it fails to set an agenda and to gain benefits for 
labour as a whole. In the successful corporatist experience of some Western European 
countries, the equilibrium among actors is one of the important factors that make corporatism 
work. However, labour itself in South Africa has lost power due to internal reasons, such as a 
decrease in membership (see 3-4-4 and Table 3.8.) and the decentralisation of unions.  
 
Membership of COSATU reached to 2.2 million in 2012 (COSATU, 2013). From 1994-1997 
COSATU grew by 43 per cent as a result of the affiliation of 3 new affiliates namely 
POPCRU, DENOSA and SASBO during this period. However, from 2000-2003 COSATU 
lost 5 per cent of its affiliates’ membership, this was during a period of massive job losses 
when many affiliates suffered losses. Until 2006, COSATU’s growth rate was 4-7 per cent 
and from 2009 COSATU grew by 11 per cent. This is due to the growth of public sector 
unions even though there were significant shifts in the composition of COSATU membership 
due to retrenchments in the private sector. The remarkable growth of the public sector could 
maintain a certain level of membership (State of COSATU Affiliates Report, 2012). 
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Despite the increase in membership due to the growing number of unions in the public sector, 
union density has begun to decline steadily. Even though union density is still relatively high 
in South Africa, it is low compared to in the 1990s when it reached more than 50 per cent. For 
example, union density reached 57.5 per cent in the private, non-agricultural sectors of the 
economy in 1996 (Maree 2009:4). 
Table 3. 6. Union Membership 
 1991-94 1994-97 1997-2000 2000-03 2003-06 2006-09 2009-12 
COSATU 1,252,000 1,791,000 1,869,000 1,768,000 1,841,400 1,974,074 2,191,016 
 
Source: COSATU, 2013. 
 
Table. 3.7. Proportion of sectors in COSATU 
 
Year Manufacturing (%) Services (%) Public (%) 
1991 78% 16 6 
1994 66 16 18 
1997 52 17 31 
2000 43 16 40 
2003 42 16 42 
2006 42 18 41 
2009 40 18 43 
2012 41 17 42 
 
Source: COSATU, 2014. 
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Table.3. 8. Union Density 
 
Year South Africa South Korea 
1988 - 17.8 
2001 
30.6%  
70.1% (public sector) 
12 
2005 
30.1% 
68.4% (public sector) 
9.9 
2006 29 10 
2009 30 10 
2010 
26.3 
74.6% (public sector) 
9.7 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Labour Force Surveys (2001, 2005), Quarterly Labour 
Force Surveys (2010, 2013), Bezuidenhout (2000) and OECD. 
 
Related to this, the South African labour market has been characterised by “externalisation, 
informalisation and casualisation” and these affect the weakness of collective bargaining 
(Maree, 2011:12). Under these circumstances, many commentators such as Buhlungu 
(2008:37) question the representativeness of COSATU, saying that labour is isolated from the 
unemployed, which make up the majority. Furthermore, trade unions are criticised for 
pursuing only their own interests. The lack of democratisation inside labour has been pointed 
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out as another problem. All in all, labour has faced internal and external challenges that have 
weakened its power vis-à-vis the state and business.  
 
Lacking a proper medium, labour has chosen another option to exercise its power. In other 
words, labour pushed forward its interest by using the tripartite alliance. This has in turn 
weakened the status of NEDLAC. Furthermore, the influence of labour within the tripartite 
alliance is not regarded as equal. According to Plaut (2010:208) the tripartite alliance is seen 
as an “ANC-led alliance”, and COSATU and the SACP have been outpaced by the ANC. The 
ideological differences among them have widened, especially since President Mbeki pushed 
forward neo-liberalism. Political commentator, Tim Cohen foresees that COSATU will 
continue to grow weaker in its relationship with the ANC. At the time of writing in 2013, the 
scandal involving the COSATU leader, Zwelinzima Vavi, is likely to aggravate this (Business 
Day, 6 May 2013).
29
  
 
Along with the scandal above, which negatively affected the external credibility of labour, 
labour has had internal problems between its leadership and shop floor members. Hirschsohn 
(2011) argues that “the control of the union” has moved from shop floor members to their 
officials. Shop floor members feel that the leaders are remote, which is linked to 
dissatisfaction with their political representatives. A trade union member at shop floor level 
also stated during the interview:  
 
                                                     
29
 The General Secretary of COSATU, Zwelinzima Vavi, has been suspended after being involved in a sex 
scandal. He has already been accused of corruption related to the sale of COSATU’s old premises. This will 
decrease labour’s credibility, furthermore it could create a leadership void until COSATU elects a new leader 
and settles internal conflicts between Vavi’s opposition and his supporters. 
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As soon as they become high level, they are far away from us, also they buy a new house and a 
new car within a few months, they used to be our neighbours. But not any more… (Interview with 
a member of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa).
30
  
 
This tendency was also highlighted by Bezuidenhout in Union Leaders and Social 
Distance: NUM and NUMSA Compared (Presentation at Stellenbosch University, 6 
March 2012). The figure below shows the rampant corruption in unions. 
 
Figure 3.5. Members’ Perception and Experiences of Corruption 
 
Source: COSATU Workers’ Survey, 2012.  
 
Emery (2006:6) argues that after democratisation labour could gain “collective bargaining 
rights”, “political inclusion” and “formal racial equality”. The achievement of these rights can 
be seen as triumph for labour; however, this is only half of the picture. Despite the political 
influence gained after democratisation, labour has not been able to achieve full-fledged 
“social justice” and “racial equality”; socio-economic inequality lingers on. Labour’s political 
                                                     
30
 This interview was conducted in Bellville, Western Cape. 15 March 2012.  
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power has not led to economic policies that have brought about more tangible benefits for 
workers. Under the circumstances, labour has lost internal credibility and experienced 
fragmentation.  
 
3-4-3. GLOBALISATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR LABOUR 
 
Corporatism has not functioned in South Africa. Labour’s perspective has not been 
incorporated; other actors, especially business, have shown unwillingness to cooperate and 
the state has taken a unilateral attitude in terms of introducing and implementing macro-
economic programmes and the ETIA. The question remains: why does the corporatist 
institution still exist?  
 
In the case of post-apartheid South Africa, the fact that the state incorporated labour and 
business in the framework of corporatism can be seen as establishing a new institution, in 
order to resolve problems that the newly-elected government encountered. Within a 
corporatist institutional framework, it was expected that the state and other two major societal 
actors would discuss the problems that the new South Africa faces within the corporatist 
institutional framework and seek the solutions together. It was also expected that the state and 
societal actors would empower each other after democratisation. However, the situation 
manifested differently. After democratisation, business has increased its influence and 
dominated various issue areas. Their arena has become wider since they incorporated the new 
black middle class and black business. Related to industrial relations, it might mean 
transforming workplace practices and working toward equity, and furthermore, efficiency, 
and productivity. However, the state reincorporated the old dominant group and business 
encroached on the arena of the state. This heavily affected the other societal group, labour.  
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The globalisation of South African businesses has had a great deal of impact on the workplace 
and ultimately the labour movement. Retrenchments which are derived from competitive 
pressures in domestic and global markets have led to growing unemployment. Also, 
globalisation has restructured the form of work ranging from full-time workers to casualised, 
externalised and informal workers. This has greatly influenced the labour movement since the 
ability to sustain membership levels has been threatened by the unions’ inability to organise 
these marginalised workers. This has become one of the reasons for the labour movement’s 
decline (Von Holdt and Webster, 2008:335). 
 
Table 3. 9. Big Businesses in Africa 
 
Rank Company name Country Industry 
Value  
(Millions US$) 
1 BHP Billiton South Africa Mining and Metals 71,595 
2 Anglo American South Africa Mining and Metals 54,351 
3 SABMiller South Africa Consumer Goods  35,051 
4 Sasol South Africa Oil and Gas 32,019 
5 MTN Group South Africa Telecom 29,518 
6 Kumba Iron Ore South Africa Mining and Metals 19,412 
7 Standard Bank Group South Africa Banks and Financial 16,407 
8 
Angola American 
Platinum 
South Africa Mining and Metals 14,299 
9 FirstRand South Africa Banks and Financial 14,021 
10 Itissalat Al Maghrib Morocco Telecom 13,834 
11 Naspers South Africa Media 13,816 
12 Absa Group South Africa Banks and Financial 11,365 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
155 
 
13 Anglogold Ashanti South Africa Mining and Metals 11,281 
14 Impala Platinum South Africa Mining and Metals 11,043 
15 Dangote Cement Nigeria Construction  10,565 
16 Sanlam South Africa Insurance 9,885 
17 Shoprite Holdings South Africa Retail  9,164 
18 Old Mutual South Africa Insurance 8,094 
19 Attijariwafa Bank Morocco Banks and Financial 7,804 
20 Gold Fields South Africa Mining and Metals 7,580 
 
Source: African Business, 2012. 
 
Table 3.9. above lists the biggest businesses on the African continent. Most of them are South 
African. It can be seen that these businesses have been operating since the apartheid period 
and have maintained their top positions to date. In other words, the old dominant societal 
actors still have a strong influence on the South African economy. 
 
Nearly two decades after the corporatist institution was adopted, it is necessary to evaluate 
whether it has delivered on what it was expected to bring about. At the time of writing in 
2014, the corporatist institution in South Africa is under pressure and many question the 
relevance and effectiveness of NEDLAC as a social dialogue forum (Business Day, 12 
October 2012). According to Bassett (2004:554), NEDLAC faced demise in 1996 and it 
gained driving force in 2003 along with a Growth and Development Summit asking all 
societal actors to commit to rebuilding the economy. However, it does not seem to be playing 
a significant role at the time of writing in 2013.  
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As many scholars have pointed out, the corporatist institution in South Africa was established 
to achieve political stability during the transition period (Handley, 2000:235). South Africa 
was at a crossroads between cooperation and conflict, especially, during the transition period. 
The economy was stagnant; corporatism was one of the few viable options for the state, 
business and labour in order to bring about socio-economic stability by means of the 
cooperation of these three actors. Labour was expected to become an equal partner vis á vis 
the state and business. However, the corporatist institution in South Africa did not provide 
labour with a platform to discuss related issues and find a way to, together with other actors 
resolve various social issues. Nattrass and Seekings (2001) argue that labour played an 
important role in the democratisation period, it has nevertheless become side-lined. The most 
prominent example is the adoption of GEAR without any consultation with labour and the 
lack of capacity in bringing about reform through NEDLAC (Nattrass and Seekings, 
2001:495). This tendency to marginalise labour at NEDLAC, is again seen during the 
negotiations around the ETIA.  
 
3-5. AN ASSESSMENT OF CORPORATISM IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE ISSUE OF 
LEGITIMACY  
 
In spite of the initial enthusiasm following its establishment, NEDLAC is now considered not 
to have achieved what it was intended to, namely aggregating the state and societal actors’ 
interests, promoting democracy in South Africa, and developing the socio-economic 
conditions of the country. The interest of labour particularly, has not been fulfilled. The state-
society relations of South Africa have not transformed fundamentally. In this situation, the 
corporatist institution has lost ground gradually.  
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In 2012, the Department of Labour argues that a “serious and intensive broader policy debate” 
is needed amongst the social partners on the “continued relevance” of NEDLAC. According 
to Alistair Smith, NEDLAC’s Executive Director, there exists criticism that NEDLAC should 
be abolished. However, he argues that it should be repositioned, adding that: “factors that 
impact on NEDLAC’s performance include the commitment by partners to social dialogue, 
tensions among partners, as well as the capacity of the institution”. He also emphasises the 
importance of consensus of all participants “agreeing on the rules of engagement in the 
interest of accountability” (Business Day, 12 October 2012). The necessity of the 
repositioning of NEDLAC was also suggested by interviewees.  
 
The main question raised during this dissertation is why NEDLAC has not functioned 
properly. The imbalance between the state, business and labour seems to have a large 
influence on this. To some extent, labour had an influence on labour policy; however, it is 
assessed as limited. Furthermore, macro-economic programmes have not achieved their goals. 
This begs the question: why do state and societal actors continue to maintain the corporatist 
institution?  
 
First of all, one of the most significant direct results which the state gained is connected to 
“legitimacy” of its actions. The newly created government under Mandela, in particular, 
needed to have legitimacy from inside and outside the country. Many were concerned about 
the future of South Africa right after democratisation, because in many other African 
countries there had been dramatic upheavals right after social transition and they were 
concerned that South Africa would follow the same path. Through corporatism, the state 
could gain domestic legitimacy furthermore increase its effectiveness in the implementation 
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policies. In other words, the state could maintain social control over other societal groups 
indirectly through the corporatist institution (Lundahl and Petersson, 1996).  
 
Secondly, for societal actors such as business and labour, the fact that they could have access 
to the decision-making process, and finally affect the outcomes of the policies was the biggest 
motivation to participate. Furthermore, these two actors could increase their power by being 
recognised, since this would increase their membership, which would in turn strengthen their 
own institutional power (Lundahl and Petersson, 1996). However, as mentioned earlier, the 
participants were suspicious, and this influenced the way they positioned themselves at the 
negotiation table, which consequently prevented them from discussing various agendas in an 
in-depth manner and from reaching substantive agreements.  
 
Nevertheless, Lundahl and Petersson (1996) realise that all participants are in the learning 
process and they need time to learn how to reach compromises. Lundahl and Petersson 
(1996:37) highlight that this will be the most significant contribution of NEDLAC. However, 
Lundahl and Petersson (1996:38) argue that when corporatism represents the majority of the 
population, it has positive consequences; in that aspect, NEDLAC has failed. Also, 
interviewees point out that as long as issues like poverty, inequality and unemployment are 
not resolved through NEDLAC, it will be difficult to maintain legitimacy. 
 
It can be observed that there are several factors that lead to NEDLAC not being functional. 
First and foremost, there is no balance between the actors, labour in particular has not been 
treated as an equal partner. Even though it has gained some benefits through wage bargaining, 
the limited number of labourers that belong to unions, means that large numbers of the 
population have been excluded from the limited benefits that labour achieved from NEDLAC.  
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Bassett (2004:551) points out that there is lack of political support towards NEDLAC saying 
that: “the ANC government never saw NEDLAC as an institution to develop policy or even to 
influence it significantly, but, rather as a means to generate support for the government’s 
programme”. Through this statement, it is possible to see that NEDLAC’s recommendations 
were probably never going to be regarded as serious. Bassett (2004:545) argues that: 
“NEDLAC has been marginalised from most policy-making processes”. In terms of the 
macro-economic framework, NEDLAC was not endowed to play a role in the monetary 
policy because the South African Reserve Bank and Trevor Manuel, who have significant 
influence, are not interested in NEDLAC. As a result of this indifference on behalf of the 
state, labour relations were entirely handed over to business and labour (Bassett, 2004:551). 
Bassett (2004:547) argues that business was not interested in negotiation with labour after the 
adoption of GEAR by the state. From the point of view of labour, the situation is that the state 
is not interested in a discussion with labour and that business feels that there is no need. This 
has resulted in labour choosing to resolve the problem, not through this corporatist institution, 
but through the tripartite alliance, as well as through resorting to violence. 
 
Secondly, NEDLAC itself has faced challenges at an organisational level and it seems to have 
failed as a social dialogue mechanism. NEDLAC has also experienced corruption and 
problems at an organisational level. There are several internal problems at NEDLAC, as well 
and this may have affected the lack of willingness amongst the three actors. According to the 
Executive Director of NEDLAC, Mr Alistair Smith, it might be short-sighted to close 
NEDLAC; however, NEDLAC should rather recommit itself to its founding values and foster 
strong social dialogue (Sunday Independent, 9 September 2012). With this institutional 
feature, it is difficult for NEDLAC to reflect the reality of South Africa.  
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3-6. CONCLUSION  
 
Right after democratisation, South Africa has adopted corporatism, which is a form of social 
partnership. The state-societal actors’ relations were seen as “collaborative” and with a 
“development-oriented focus” (Ballard et al. 2005). However, the corporatist institution in 
South Africa fell short of this expectation as time went by. Turok (2008:80-88) argues that, in 
the process of achieving democratisation, the role of labour was significant; however, the 
state had to later incorporate the demands of numerous actors such as: the Development Bank 
of South Africa, the Consultative Business Movement, and the South African Chamber of 
Commerce from the business sector, and furthermore, international actors such as the World 
Bank. Along with globalisation and in order to attract foreign investors for job creation and 
poverty eradication and to achieve economic growth, it was imperative for the state to 
incorporate these actors’ demands and their prescriptions into the policy. As a result, GEAR 
was introduced and the RDP discarded. The logic of GEAR was to boost investment by 
cutting government expenditure on social welfare. However, cutting government spending did 
not result in investment as was expected, instead the results were negative.  
 
From RDP through GEAR, ASGISA to the NDP, labour’s position has been marginalised in 
terms of the policy-making process. Since GEAR highlighted the flexibility of the labour 
market, many workers have become casual workers, and it has been difficult to organise these 
workers into a union. Furthermore, various projects on job creation could not play any 
significant role in reducing the unemployment rate. At this juncture, it is notable that labour 
did not use NEDLAC as a discussion channel with the state and business; rather, it uses the 
channel of the tripartite alliance comprising the ANC, the SACP and COSATU. Labour uses 
its power to influence the ANC and create favourable conditions for themselves. Even though 
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labour was influential at NEDLAC to some extent, in terms of labour market policy-making, 
the state is the final decision-maker and the key player in implementation; therefore, the 
perspective of labour is not fully reflected.  
 
All in all, the corporatist institution in South Africa seems to have been adopted to manage 
political and economic crises during the transition period. Despite the optimistic expectations, 
NEDLAC has failed to promote the developmental goals set out for it and seems to have lost 
credibility as an arbiter of social dialogue. Corporatism in South Africa has failed for the 
following key reasons:  
 
 The balance of power among actors has become asymmetrical and this has negatively 
affected corporatism in South Africa. Labour’s demands were not incorporated, 
especially demands with regard to policies that can affect labour. This could be seen 
from the beginning, when the state discarded the RDP and adopted the neo-liberal 
GEAR without any consultation with labour. Recently, the enactment of the ETIA 
shows that NEDLAC was bypassed by the state and business despite labour’s outcry. 
 The influence of labour was largely affected by neo-liberal economic policies, 
especially the highlighting of a flexible labour market. Due to this, labour unions have 
lost a significant number of members. Furthermore, labour itself has faced internal 
problems such as corruption and fragmentation, which negatively influenced its 
credibility. 
 NEDLAC itself has its own problems as an organisation. It has been accused of a lack 
of institutional capacity and accountability. In this context, it is difficult for NEDLAC 
to play the role of a social dialogue institution in South Africa.  
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CHAPTER IV. CORPORATISM IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
4-1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter the corporatist institution, the KTC in South Korea will be examined. The main 
focus is the relation between the state, business and labour within the corporatist framework. 
Firstly, the history of corporatism in South Korea will be discussed. In South Korea, 
corporatism emerged in the early 20th century, along with the increase in the number of wage 
workers as a result of industrialisation. There have been attempts by the state under 
colonialism and the authoritarian governments, to establish corporatist institutions which 
would incorporate labour. However, these efforts were made in order to maintain national 
productivity. The corporatist institution under the authoritarian governments was state 
corporatism. The financial crisis in 1997 and the IMF bailout programme, which required 
South Korea to undertake extensive structural adjustment programmes, accelerated the 
establishment of the corporatist institution.  
 
Secondly, the institutional aspects of the KTC will be examined. The KTC was welcomed by 
some scholars, policy makers and labour. Facing the economic crisis, South Korea followed 
suit after its European counterparts. The state, business and labour have their own interests at 
heart with respect to the establishment and maintenance of the KTC. Bearing this in mind, the 
structure, functions and outcome of the KTC will be discussed. One of the agendas that was 
discussed at the KTC will also be examined as a case study. South Korea experienced issues 
regarding non-regular workers and this led to growing segmentation between regular and non-
regular workers, further aggravating social problems including inequality. The KTC 
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attempted to treat the issue in a serious manner. Thus, how the state, business and labour 
interacted in the consultation process at the KTC will receive special attention.   
 
Thirdly, the shifting balance of power between the state and societal actors will be discussed. 
The state mostly overshadows the other societal actors; however, labour has had two major 
opportunities to hold a dominant position vis-à-vis the state and business, firstly, during the 
transitional period immediately after democratisation and secondly, after the financial crisis. 
Labour could not use these opportunities to its full advantage or exert its influence and has 
become subordinated especially to the state. This is the most significant reason why the KTC 
could not work. In this context, the reasons why labour could not make better use of these two 
significant periods will be examined in this section. In conclusion, an overall assessment of 
the KTC will be provided.  
 
4-2. THE HISTORY OF CORPORATISM IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
In this section, the main focus is on the tradition of corporatism in South Korea. A form of 
state-corporatism existed before democratisation and the current societal-corporatism was 
adopted afterwards. In this context, it is also possible to observe the power of labour over 
time. 
 
4-2-1. THE BURGEONING OF THE CORPORATIST STATE DURING THE 
COLONIAL PERIOD 
 
Although the formal corporatist institution was established only in the late 1990s, a form of 
corporatism existed under Japanese colonial rule from 1910 onwards. South Korea, which 
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was an agrarian society, experienced social change during the colonial period. The Korean 
economy faced a series of reforms regarding land, currency, and the banking system among 
others. Industrialisation was one of the reforms that took place simultaneously with the 
modernisation programme undertaken by Japan (Kohli, 2004).  
 
The Japanese colonial influence on South Korea made a significant impact on the South 
Korean high-growth path to development. Japanese colonialism, based on extensive use of 
state power for its own economic development, transformed South Korea in a short period 
and led to an advanced level of industrialisation (Kohli, 1994:1270). Japans’ initial goal was 
to industrialise South Korea so that the country could add to the further development of 
Japanese capitalism. For this reason, the mining, transport and maritime industries in South 
Korea were developed. During this process, a large number of landless peasants were 
employed. By 1928, daily-wage workers comprised 57.5 per cent (653,552) of all wage 
workers, with construction and related workers comprising 37.2 per cent (422,543) of the total 
workforce. In the 1930s, in order to support the Japanese weaponry industries, South Korean 
manufacturing was rapidly expanded, and the workforce employed by these sectors 
continuously expanded (Cho Young-geon, 1984: 6-20; Kim Kyung-il, 1992: 45; Yang Sang-
hyeon, 1986: 219-220). 
 
As seen from the above, the introduction of industrialisation by the Japanese involved the 
emergence of wage workers and eventually workers’ organisations, mainly in the mining and 
transport sectors. At that time, some of the labourers were engaged in underground activities, 
strongly influenced by communism and nationalism. Later, they became part of the national 
liberation movement; the March 1st Movement in 1919 is one of the significant revolts in 
which labour was actively involved directly and indirectly (Kang Man-kil, 2004).  
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Workers’ organisations were established for the first time at the national level in the 1920s, as 
a result of the excessive exploitation and oppression by the Japanese and their associates. 
Thus, the South Korean labour movement became involved in violence, including 
demonstrations and workplace sabotage. This tendency has been seen throughout South 
Korea’s history, where labourers did not have the means to access labour laws and policies 
that could protect them. They saw strikes or demonstrations as a relatively easy way to make 
their voices heard (Kang Man-kil, 2004). 
 
The development of trade unions gave rise to an increasing number of protests against low 
wages, poor working conditions and racial discrimination favouring Japanese workers. The 
number of strikes had increased from 81 involving 4,599 workers in 1920 to 1,608 involving 
18,972 workers in 1930 (Kim Kyung-il, 1992: 309). Table 4.1. shows the extent of trade 
union expansion in Korea in the 1920s. Furthermore, Koo (2001:25) notes that the number of 
labour disputes in the 1930s was higher than that of the 1960s and the 1970s. As the influence 
of labour became stronger, the colonial government reacted more harshly. As a result, the 
labour movement went underground. 
 
Table 4. 1. Number of Trade Unions and Unionists 1920-1935 (Selected Years)
31
 
Year 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1929 1932 1933 1934 1935 
Union 33 81 91 182 488 473 402 334 250 207 
Unionist na na na na 67,220 61,730 52,988 41,836 34,460 28,211 
 
Source: Kim Kyung-il, 1992. p83. 
                                                     
31
 After 1933, the numbers of unions and unionists declined as the suppression by the Japanese colonial 
government became stronger (Kim Kyung-il, 1992:83). 
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4-2-2. STATE CORPORATISM AFTER 1945: SOUTH KOREA’S BURGEONING 
LABOUR MOVEMENT 
 
When Japanese rule ended in 1945, the Korean Peninsula was strongly influenced by the 
Soviet Union and the United States. In accordance with the agreement made at the Yalta 
Conference in 1945, the United States army occupied South Korea, while the Soviets 
occupied North Korea until the Korean War broke out in 1950. After 1953 when the two 
Koreas reached an agreement on an armistice, the South Korean state struggled to come to 
grips with post-war reconstruction. The first president of the newly-formed Republic of South 
Korea, Rhee Syng-man (1948-1960) was anti-communist and his governing style became 
authoritarian (Rowley and Yoo, 2004). He managed to take advantage of popular fears and 
anxieties about a communist takeover, in order to justify his authoritarian rule, which helped 
the state to effectively mobilise the population. Minns (2001) argues that war is a “state-run” 
activity: thus, throughout the war the state could strengthen its position. The post-war setting 
helped the state to maintain strong autonomy. Before democratisation, the successive leaders 
used the confrontation situation between North and South Korea to justify their authoritarian 
governing style. The existence of the threat, North Korea, was the historical origin of the 
strong state of South Korea (Kang, 2002).  
 
During this period, capitalism began to grow within the newly born nation state of South 
Korea, but business and labour were not mature enough to follow suit and organise 
themselves (Minns, 2001). Business however enjoyed many benefits. Businesses were given 
powerful incentives to export, including preferential treatment when obtaining low-interest 
bank loans, import privileges, permission to borrow from foreign sources, and tax benefits. 
During this period, it is noticeable that monopolies were formed. Big businesses, so called 
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chaebols that inherited the assets of Japanese firms, had become significant players in the 
political economy of the 1950s. Many of these businesses received special favours from the 
state as mentioned above. The cosy and collusive relations between the state and business 
started in earnest under President Park (Kang, 2002). South Korea’s economy grew rapidly 
under President Park, and the Economic Planning Board established in 1961 became the 
driving force. The series of five-year economic developmental plans were developed under 
the auspices of this state bureaucracy pilot agency and became crucial to South Korea’s 
transformation. 
 
In South Korea, wages used to be entirely determined by employers; thus, labour was always 
subjected to exploitation by employers (Kim Dong-won, 1993:143). The agrarian Korean 
economy was far behind that of industrialised countries, and wage workers made up only a 
rough 10 per cent of the work force. Under those circumstances, it was difficult to develop 
class consciousness, which negatively affected the labour movement (Gang Shin-joon, 
2002:203).  
 
In the 1950s, the labour movement was still at the nascent level and South Korea remained an 
agricultural state. Korea National Council of Trade Unions was established in 1945 and the 
right-wing KLFIP was created in 1946 (Rowley and Yoo, 2004). At that time, labour 
movements in general experienced oppression by the state. However, the KLFIP enjoyed 
monopoly status by cooperating with the state. Unlike the KLFIP, unions’ political activities 
were banned and there was strong government intervention in labour disputes (Chang Dae-
oup, 2006). Under the first republic with Rhee as president, a series of labour regulations were 
introduced in 1953, including the Trade Union Act, the Labour Dispute Act, the Labour 
Relations Commission Act, and the Labour Standards Act. Labour had to be organised on the 
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basis of these laws. However, due to their regulatory characteristics, these laws prevented 
labourers from forming broad-based organisations (Kim Hwang-jo, 2007). Because of these 
legal frameworks, the state could control labour. Furthermore, the state and employers 
publically categorised unions as a danger to social stability and economic growth, whenever 
firms and factories were disturbed by labour disputes. During the political confrontation 
between South Korea and North Korea, economic growth was considered top priority and 
necessary to protect the country. In these circumstances union leaders were often labelled as 
spies from North Korea. Public perceptions of trade unions were also hostile. Unlike the state 
and business, which started forming coalitions, labour did not have the capacity either to form 
coalitions or to mobilise itself vis-à-vis the state and business.  
 
After independence, the so-called April Revolution or the April 19 Revolution in 1960 which 
was named after the date when it took place, can be seen as the first of many popular 
movements that demanded freedom, equality and political reform. The Revolution was led by 
labour and students. After President Rhee took power, South Korean society experienced a 
decade of mismanagement and corruption. His government failed to make any significant 
improvement in either the economy or social development. The foreign aid from the United 
States aggravated this economic dependency. In addition to these problems, Rhee tried to 
extend his presidency and in this process, the government became repressive towards those 
that requested free and fair elections, whilst, electoral corruption by the Rhee administration 
took place. This led to nationwide demonstrations, which continued until Rhee finally had to 
step down in 1960 (Chang, Dae-oup, 2006). South Korea inherited authoritarian legacies from 
colonial times and these continued after independence. However, the April Revolution shows 
that the influence of societal actors was growing. According to activist Kim Gun-tae (quoted 
in Katsiaficas, 2012:138): “since 1960, street protests became a tradition in Korea politics”. 
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This eventually became a formidable challenge to the state. The April 19 Revolution, 
heralded the beginning of the democratisation movement in South Korea. For the reasons, 
Kim Ho-Ki (1993:4) points out that South Korea underwent profound social changes due to 
the sudden urbanisation after the Korean War. The urban population increased from 3.47 
million before the Korean War to 5.28 million as of 1955. Along with urbanisation, several 
social changes took place such as an expansion of education, in other words, the number of 
students entering elementary school increased. Also, the increase in the basic educational 
level of the population contributed to labourers realising that they had rights, criticising their 
working conditions, and spreading public dissatisfaction and criticism of the dictatorial 
regime.  
 
Gang Shin-joon (2002:213-226) points out that the number of labour organisations increased 
in the 1960s. In addition to the number, their characteristics also changed. More labour 
organisations serving the workers at small and medium sized businesses were established and 
white-collar workers from the banking sector and the media started organising themselves. 
Also, the demands from labour became more varied and included the guaranteeing of 
collective bargaining rights, the establishment of minimum wages, the improvement of 
working conditions including reinstatement, and the easing of labour regulations regarding 
walkouts and layoffs. It is also observable that walkouts or strikes manifested nation-wide and 
individual labour organisations collaborated to enhance their influence. 
 
Nevertheless, Gang Shin-joon (2002:227-228) notes that there were reasons why labour could 
not become a formidable force during this period. Even though each labour organisation 
understood the need for solidarity among unions, ideological differences and militancy 
strategies prevented this from taking place. This still has an influence on the labour movement 
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in South Korea today. The labour movement in South Korea is largely divided between the 
FKTU and the KCTU; the KCTU pursues militant activism and the FKTU has a more 
conciliatory stance towards the state and business.
32
 The FKTU prioritises the notion of the 
national economic interest whilst, the KCTU is guided by a socialistic ideology and places 
greater emphasis on mass mobilisation and struggle. The divide has even influenced trade 
unions at the local level; in both groups branches are suspicious and hostile towards one 
another.  
 
Table 4. 2. The organisational differences between the FKTU and the KCTU 
 
FKTU KCTU 
The point of 
view 
approaching 
labour 
relations 
Used to compromise and collusion, 
respecting the management 
prerogatives, cooperative and 
compromising industrial relations 
based on collective bargaining 
Compromising/uncompromising, 
challenging management prerogatives, 
emphasizing resolution through 
strikes/negotiation, labour management 
relations in conflict 
Power in the 
workplace 
Weak unions, stronger management 
Strong union power over workplaces at 
large firms 
The size of 
company 
which 
participates 
Mostly small and medium-sized 
enterprise 
Large enterprises in the mainstream 
                                                     
32
 The state established a new trade union confederation, the FKTU in 1961. The FKTU was the sole legal trade 
union in South Korea until the KCTU finally attained legal status in November, 1999. The FKTU was placed 
under the guidance of the military authorities and is often described as a puppet organisation (Gang Shin-joon, 
2002:227-228). 
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Attitude 
towards the 
KTC 
Political Compromise and 
institutional improvements through 
participation 
No participation in the KTC, but 
insistence on direct negotiation with 
the government 
 
Source: Gang Shin-joon, 2002. 
 
The table above shows the different perspectives of the FKTU and the KCTU in terms of 
labour relations. Also, Table 4. 3. provides the brief organisational comparison between the 
two union umbrellas. These emerged during my interviews with trade unionist from each of 
the unions. They seem to agree on the necessity of being united but they are suspicious of 
their counterparts’ motivation. They see each other as competitors rather than partners in the 
advancement of the interests of the working class as a whole (Interviews with senior officials 
of the KCTU and the FKTU in December, 2012).
33
 The FKTU was initially labelled pro-
government, but it has tried to cut the link with the government. This was highlighted when I 
conducted an interview with a senior official of the FKTU. 
 
Table 4. 3. The Organisational Comparison between the FKTU and the KCTU 
 FKTU KCTU 
Year 
Industrial 
Federations 
No. of 
Unions 
Membership 
Industrial 
Federations 
No. of 
Unions 
Membership 
1995 20 5874 1,208,052 6 862 418,154 
1996 20 5616 1,159,906 6 828 479,218 
1997 22 3216 1,015,766 20 1147 525,325 
1998 24 4185 886,696 17 1283 535,203 
                                                     
33
 The interviews were conducted in Seoul, South Korea. 11-13 December, 2012.  
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
172 
 
1999 27 4501 888,503 16 1256 564,774 
2000 28 3754 872,113 15 1362 614,951 
2001 28 3940 877,828 14 1513 643,506 
 
Source: Gang Shin-joon, 2002. 
 
The April Revolution of 1960, one of the most formidable and the first social movement after 
independence, contributed to the successful mobilising of labourers to campaign for better 
policies, which would impact their lives directly. However, compared to the democratisation 
movement in 1987, it did not fully succeed in improving labour conditions. Right after the 
Revolution, Park Chung-hee led a successful coup d'état in 1961, and the momentum of 
labour movements decreased rapidly under Park’s military dictatorship (Kim Sang-gon, 
1995). 
 
When looking at the relations between the state, business and labour during this period, it is 
possible to observe that South Korea has been a corporatist state since independence. 
Seemingly, it met conditions for corporatism in terms of the participation of single peak 
encompassing organisation from business and labour. The right to organise labour unions was 
guaranteed, however, this was a strategy by which the state sought to control labour (Yang 
Jae-jin, 2010:453). Nevertheless, this embryo in the 1960s became the cornerstone for the 
remarkable growth in labour movements in the 1980s. Similar dynamics can be seen in the 
case of South Africa, the 1976 Soweto uprising and many other similar incidents were 
eventually conducive to democratisation.  
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4-2-3. THE RISE OF LABOUR MOVEMENTS BEFORE THE GREAT WORKERS 
STRUGGLE: TURNING POINT OF THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS 
 
After 1960, Park Chung-hee ruled South Korea with an iron fist and the geopolitical 
circumstances confronting North Korea conferred legitimacy on the Park administration’s 
authoritarian rule. His government was based on a one-party system consisting of a small 
number of ruling and military elites (Kang, 2002). Under the Park Chung-hee government, the 
state pushed forward state-directed development, and economic programmes were based on a 
series of five-year plans (1962-1996). South Korea’s “catching-up” with the other advanced 
economies began and the state played a significant role in advocating for industrialisation 
(Shin Jang-sup and Chang Ha-joon, 2003:22). This is the period during which South Korea 
became a developmental state. In controlling civil society, the authoritarian government relied 
on several instruments: legal instruments such as the National Security Law, the Social Safety 
Law, and the Law Concerning Collective Demonstrations; and security and intelligence 
apparatus such as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, the National Defence Security 
Command, and the police. By virtue of these agencies and the legal framework, it was 
possible for the state to mobilise society efficiently. According to Kohli (2004:381), these are 
good examples of efficient state patterns to foster rapid industrialisation among late-late-
industrialising countries. Union activities were limited during the 1970s (Deyo, 1989). 
Nevertheless, the number of union members increased from 470,000 in 1970 to 1,100,000 in 
1979. This became the foundation of the labour movement (Kim Keum-soo, date unknown). 
 
In the course of the economic development of South Korea, the focus of the state was centred 
on big business. The state contributed to the growth of big businesses by channelling aid or 
international loans into the big businesses with the assistance of low-interest loans (Kwon 
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Seung-ho and O’Donnell, 2001). At the same time, the state controlled and subordinated 
labour. The state succeeded in taming and oppressing labour using police power. In this way, 
the country could maintain a cheap and abundant workforce (Watson, 1998:229). The state 
exerted control directly by banning or intervening in strikes, deregistering all existing unions 
and arresting many union leaders, and indirectly by means of labour laws (Watson, 
1998:232).  
 
Labour started showing more awareness of poor working conditions such as low wages, long 
working hours and industrial accidents. But it was the self-burning of a textile factory worker, 
Jeon Tae-il in 1970 that became the flash point of the struggle. This was followed by riots by 
heavy industrial workers, such as Hyundai Shipbuilding workers and Hyundai Construction 
workers (Kim Keum-soo, date unknown). Ironically, the industries strategically promoted by 
the state, such as the heavy chemical and automobile industries, became the driving force of 
the labour movement. Unlike the female-dominated textile or light manufacturing sectors, 
male-dominated unions in the heavy industry sector have taken a more aggressive and 
militant stance.
34
 In addition, their influence on the South Korean economy was more far-
reaching since these industries had become central to the economy (see Table 4.4). This can 
also be seen in the case of South Africa, where unions in the mining sector, the backbone of 
the South African economy, have exerted more power in the process of democratisation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
34
The heavy industry sector includes automobile, mining, petroleum, and steel industries which require large 
capital investment in weighty machinery and huge plants. The light manufacturing sector is less capital intensive 
than the heavy industry sector, and is more consumer-oriented. This sector is concerned with the manufacture of 
clothes, shoes, furniture and consumer electronics, amongst others. 
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Table 4. 4. Heavy and Light Industrial Production in South Korea, 1960-1990 (%) 
 
 
Heavy Light 
1962 28.6 71.4 
1965 31.4 68.6 
1970 38.1 61.9 
1975 45.9 54.1 
1980 51.2 48.8 
1985 56.7 43.3 
1990 59.3 40.7 
 
Source: Korea Development Institute, 1995. 
 
Since skilled male workers in petrochemicals, automobile manufacturing, shipbuilding and 
steel manufacturing made a substantial impact on the Korean economy, these workers’ 
industrial actions, such as work stoppage and strikes had considerable impact. Labour 
disputes increased based on increased union membership. Union membership reached 
850,000 in 1981 and 1,300,000 in 1987. This is attributed to the power of collective actions. 
Intellectual and religious communities also supported the struggle (Kim Keum-soo, date 
unknown). 
 
Despite the increasing power of the labour movement, labour continued to experience hard 
times after the second military coup by Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1987). The Chun government 
instituted a labour regime even more regressive than the one already in place. At that time, 
labour experienced a change of labour laws including a ban on multi-unionism, the 
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enforcement of company unionism, a ban on the third party mediation, and wage control. All 
unions had to affiliate with the FKTU; only one union was allowed per enterprise, no strikes 
were permitted and no union political activities allowed. In the first half of the 1980s, more 
than 2,000 labour leaders were imprisoned, while others who were friendlier to the Chun 
government were allowed to stay in their positions (Korea Labour News, 1998).  
 
Nevertheless, it is possible to observe the burgeoning of the working class movement as a 
political force. Declining real wages and collusive links between big businesses and 
politicians brought about discontent even though workers could gain moderate benefit from a 
booming economy. The workers perceived the situation as unfair. Faced with strong 
opposition by labour and other groups, the state had to obtain loyalty in order to maintain 
economic growth. Therefore, low wages and poor working conditions, which labour had been 
forced to accept, were to some extent amended. This was done in order to increase 
productivity, which was considered the key source of economic growth and competitiveness 
(Kim Dong-won, 1993:146). However, the series of amendments to labour laws were merely 
temporary solutions.  
 
The series of struggles gave rise to the establishment of new democratic unions independent 
of the government, and a new union leadership. The new leaders adopted a militant posture 
against inhumane labour conditions even if it meant breaking the law by violent means. This 
new militancy represented a sharp contrast to the conciliatory and subordinate attitudes of the 
FKTU. Discontent from labour increased and erupted during the Great Workers Struggle in 
1987. Labour movement has continuously developed in South Korea, which is closely 
associated with the great democracy movement. In 1987 the number of individuals 
participating in protest events reached an unprecedented 6 million. This high number of 
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protestors led to several new groups participating in the democracy movement, including 
citizens from the middle class (Shin Gi-wook, 2007). In addition, Catholics became pillars of 
the movement confronting the authoritarian state. For instance, the main Catholic church of 
South Korea, Myongdong Cathedral, provided accommodation for the KCTU leaders 
whenever these unionists were chased by police (Korea Herald, 2 December 1998). There 
were 3,749 labour disputes in 1987, and considering that the average number of disputes in 
the previous six years was 171, this had a considerable impact on the economy (Koo, 2001). 
In addition to the increasing number of labour disputes, the broad-based coalition of 
intellectuals and religious group with labour became conducive to the democratisation 
process.  
 
This became the cornerstone of the nation-wide democratic movement, also known as the 
June Democracy Movement or the June Uprising that generated mass protests from June 10 to 
June 29, 1987. These demonstrations forced the ruling government to hold elections and 
institute other democratic reforms. In this process, mass mobilisation through labour played 
an important role and led to the massive uprising (Watson, 1998). However, there were 
obstacles to labour becoming more politicised. Watson (1998) points out that labour was still 
precluded from engaging in political activity and could not fund campaigns. In South Korea, 
international and national corporations or organisations cannot donate funds to a political 
party. This negatively affected labour’s influence on politics, by making it difficult for a new 
labour party to obtain funds. Additionally, the state tended to link the labour movement to 
communism, which national security laws prohibited; thus, limiting labour’s appeal to the 
public (Kang, 2002). The conflict between the middle class and the working class will be 
further discussed in the section where the labour movement after the democratisation process 
of 1987 is examined. 
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Under the authoritarian governments, corporatism in South Korea was used as a means by 
which the state could suppress labour in order to push forward economic growth. Collective 
bargaining is an important regulatory institution of industrial relations; the labour laws 
introduced under the authoritarian governments led to the fragmentation of the bargaining 
system. The legacy lasted until 1997 when the state lifted the ban on labour’s political activity 
(Yang Jae-jin, 2010:454; Watson, 1998). As the state prevented labour from participating in 
political activity, the only solution was to create a party that could fight for the working class; 
the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) was created in 2000 against this background.
35
 In other 
words, before 2000, labour could not represent itself even though it had played an important 
role in the achievement of democratisation.  
 
4-2-4. CORPORATISM AFTER DEMOCRATISATION: FAÇADE OF 
GOVERNMENT CONTROL  
 
Right after democratisation in 1987, labour could at last gain political influence, and the state 
and business realised that they could no longer subdue labour; thus, they needed to find 
another way to control it. From 1985 to the early 1990s, labour experienced rapid 
development in terms of union density and the number of unions (see Table 4. 5.).  
                                                     
35
 In South Korea, the National Assembly has 300 members, elected for a four-year term, 244 members in single-
seat constituencies and 56 members by proportional representation. The main political parties in South Korea are 
the Democratic United Party, the Saenuri Party, the Unified Progressive Party (UPP), and the Liberty Forward 
Party (LFP) (2014). The conservative Saenuri Party and the more liberal Democrats are the dominant forces in 
South Korean politics. So far the presidents have belonged to the conservative party or the centrist-liberal parties. 
Even though these two parties are labelled as conservative and more liberal respectively, fundamentally, these 
two parties are based on the two regions (eastern part of South Korea 영남 and western part 호남), and there was 
little differences between the two parties before 2002 when President Roh Moo-hyun was elected and pushed 
forward redistribution and various social protection programmes urgently needed during the reconstruction 
period after the financial crisis. The socialist UPP (previously DLP) is aligned with labour unions and farmer 
groups. It has grown gradually, gaining 6 per cent of the votes. However, it is still perceived as too radical and is 
under suppression because the party is seen as having links with North Korea. On November 5, 2013, President 
Park Geun-hye’s administration sent a request to the Constitutional Court, calling for the UPP to be dissolved 
and for an interim order suspending the party’s political activities. It was alleged to have been involved in an 
armed plot against the government on behalf of North Korea. Since South Korea is technically at war with North 
Korea, this is seen as treason (연합뉴스, 5 November 2013). 
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Table 4.5. Union Density
36
, Number of Unions and Number of Disputes 
 
Year 
Union 
density 
Number of 
unions 
Number of 
disputes 
1985 12.4 2,551 265 
1986 12.3 2,675 276 
1987 13.8 4,103 3,749 
1988 17.8 6,164 1,873 
1989 18.6 7,883 1,616 
1990 17.2 7,698 322 
1991 15.8 7,656 234 
1992 14.9 7,527 2,235 
1993 14.1 7,174 144 
1994 13.5 7,025 121 
1995 12.6 6,606 88 
1996 12.2 6,424 85 
1997 11.2 5,733 78 
1998 11.5 5,560 129 
1999 11.8 5,637 198 
2000 11.6 5,698 250 
 
Source: Korea Labour Foundation, 2004. 
 
Wages and working conditions improved radically, and it was possible to reinstate dismissed 
workers (see Table 4.6.). In addition to wage increase, since the late 1980s, significant 
improvements have been made in working conditions and the industrial environment. 
                                                     
36
 Union density =  total number of union membership / total number of employees. 
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Accordingly, the industrial accident rate decreased to 0.68 per cent in 1998 from 3.6 per cent 
in 1984 (Korea Labour Foundation, 2004:7). 
 
Table 4.6. Minimum Wage from 1988 to 1993 (Won) 
Year Minimum Wage (per Hour) Minimum Wage (per Month) 
1988 487.5 117,000 
1989 600 144,000 
1990 690 165,000 
1991 820 192,700 
1992 925 209,050 
1993 1005 227,130 
1994 1085 245,210 
 
Source: Korea Labour Foundation, 2004. 
 
Workplaces became democratised, and the state tried to address social problems. Public 
spending on welfare increased, expanding to the coverage of employment insurance and 
industrial accident compensation insurance to all companies with fewer than five employees. 
Also, the national pension scheme was extended to cover all citizens aged between 18 and 60 
as of 1999; the state also sought to reduce household expenditure on health care, while at the 
same time attempting to elevate the health status of South Koreans, through the establishment 
of the National Health Insurance Corporation in 1997 (Park Yong-soo, 2008).  
 
Labour unions also changed their strategies. Previously, their struggle was characterised as 
sporadic and isolated, now the labour movement became coordinated and organised (Kim 
Keum-soo, date unknown). Labour experienced the expansion of unionised sectors including 
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white-collar workers. Watson (1998) and Kim Sung-ho (2007) point out that the influx of 
white collar workers from the financial and media sectors, helped labour attain the support of 
the middle class. Both labour and the middle class were interested in accomplishing political 
freedom. In addition to direct elections, they expected freedom of speech, the press, petition 
and assembly for all nationals as a result of democratisation.  
 
After democratisation, according to Lee Su-hoon (1993:357), the state’s power was weaker 
than that of previous governments. After 1987, the state yielded to labour’s demands on 
redistribution and welfare as seen in Table 4.6. Even though this reform was limited; in other 
words, the existing problems remained as well as the Roh Tae-woo government (1988-1993); 
Roh conceded that the economic boom he inherited had not filtered down to workers and his 
government was committed to rectifying this (Yang Jae-jin, 2010:455).  
 
Prior to the KTC, there already existed several similar forms of social concertation. Yang Jae-
jin (2007:46-47) sees the establishment of the Minimum Wage Committee in 1987 and the 
Central Labour Council in 1988, as part of the corporatist institution in South Korea. 
According to Yang Jae-jin (2007), the unions have also had formal and informal meetings 
with Korea Employer’s Federation (KEF) in order to discuss wages and other issues. Many 
commentators argue that these traditions played an important role in creating the KTC (Lee 
Byoung-hoon and Yoo Bum-sang, 1998:84-85). However, there were still limitations; these 
meetings excluded the KCTU and other labour organisations.  
 
The first civilian president Kim Young-sam (1993-1997) tried to reform the existing industrial 
relations (Kim Soo-haeng, 1994). The first official effort from the government was the wage 
pact in 1993, which guaranteed wage increase in a range of 4.5-8.7 per cent (Song, Ho-keun, 
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1996:274). Under Kim Young-sam the Studying committee of Labour Law and the 
Committee for Reformative Labour Relation were set up. Since then, the more formal 
structure of corporatism, consisting of representatives from business and labour, was formed 
(Yang Jae-jin, 2010:455). It gave unions the opportunity to demonstrate their demands vis-à-
vis business and the state. 
 
In the case of South Korea, internal pressure from labour as well as external pressure, 
contributed to socialising the state to meet global norm expectations with regard to industrial 
relations. International institutions, such as the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development) and the ILO, played a significant role in the improvement of 
industrial relations by pressurising the South Korean government to abide by the international 
regulations (Watson, 1998). Regarding South Korea’s joining of the OECD, other member 
countries were apprehensive about South Korea’s industrial relations being unfavourable 
towards labour. South Korea’s efforts to become a member of the OECD oriented Kim 
Young-sam’s government to revise labour laws in line with union demands (Watson, 
1998:244). While the OECD pressurised the country to amend its labour-related laws, the ILO 
also required the restructuring of labour relations in the same vein (Lee Byoung-hoon and 
Yoo Bum-sang, 1998). 
 
Despite internal and external pressure, since democratisation, the successive governments 
have failed to reform industrial relations and transform labour laws (Park, Sung-joon and Lee, 
Seung-kil, 2004; Hankuk Ilbo, 16 January 2013). Park, Sung-joon and Lee, Seung-kil (2004) 
argue that the introduction of various laws and the establishment of the corporatist institution 
were seen as mere tools, which can be used by the state in order to control labour. Also, South 
Korea tried to conform to international norms by establishing the corporatist institution. 
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However, this was closely linked to the creation of a positive image of South Korea as a 
country that experienced rapid economic growth after a destructive war, and became one of 
the developed countries in compliance with global standards. By establishing stable industrial 
relations, South Korea aimed to create a more favourable business environment for foreign 
investors.  
 
4-2-5. GLOBALISATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIETAL CORPORATISM 
 
South Korea has been actively embracing globalisation since the end of the 1990s. During the 
early 1990s there were in-depth debates involving academics and policy makers, who 
discussed how to cope with globalisation and what strategies the country needed to employ. 
Along with globalisation, the state and business aimed to achieve the deregulation of capital, 
the opening of the markets and flexibility of the labour market, in order to achieve national 
competitiveness. The state allowed business to relax the dismissal requirements after the 
financial crisis. In general, the new laws were unfavourable to labour, which in 1997 led to 
the two biggest labour union umbrellas, the KCTU and the FKTU to unite, in order to develop 
and to promote their common interest and show their collective power. The strike by these 
unions turned out to be one of the major strikes in history, as it was estimated that the Korean 
economy lost US$ 3 billion (Yang Jae-jin, 2010:456). Lee Yoon-kyung (2006:725) points out 
that the formerly pro-state FKTU tried to disengage itself from the state after 1997 and 
became militant. From time to time the FKTU and the KCTU worked together and took a 
militant stand towards state repression. Because of this vigorous labour movement, the state 
had to comply with labour’s demands to some extent.  
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
184 
 
In 1997, the government announced that it was seeking a loan from the IMF and the bailout 
programme included major structural reforms in the Korean economy, including the financial 
system, corporate governance reforms, and the introduction of tight monetary and fiscal 
policies.
37
 Under the circumstances, the state highlighted the crisis conditions and required 
societal actors to conform. This led to the formation of a social pact between the state and 
societal actors, that is, business and labour under the name of overcoming the economic crisis. 
However, in practice, the structural reforms made it possible for business to carry out massive 
layoffs since the bailout programme highlighted amendments to labour laws. In other words, 
the new labour law gave business the legal right to lay off workers and replace them with 
substitutes when the workers were on strike, which required a concession from the labour side 
(Shin Jang-sup and Chang Ha-joon, 2003: 34-41). On this occasion, the two labour 
organisations agreed to act in solidarity with each other. The crisis decisively spread the idea 
that corporatism should be introduced, as a medium to address antagonistic industrial 
relations (Lee Byoung-hoon and Yoo Bum-sang, 1998).
38
  
 
Since 1997, new business management strategies such as downsizing, flexibility, 
performance-based wage systems and workplace control, were introduced. In the process of 
pushing forward these new approaches within the framework of democracy, the state lost its 
sole domination of industrial issues, as it incorporated business and labour in the decision-
making process. It became necessary for the state to include labour in a peaceful manner. The 
KTC was supported by Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) who took office at the height of the 
                                                     
37
 When the financial crisis hit South Korea in 1997, the South Korean won began to weaken. South Korea 
requested IMF aid. The IMF approved a US$ 57 billion bailout package to South Korea, the largest in history. 
The World Bank also released an emergency loan of US$ 3 billion, part of a US$ 10 billion support package, to 
South Korea to help salvage its economy. Officials from South Korea met with international bankers in an effort 
to restructure the country’s short-term debt (Chang, 2013). 
38
 The country experienced a sharp increase in the unemployment rate from 3.1 per cent in December, 1997 to 
8.5 per cent in January 1999. As a means of economic restructuring, the five biggest businesses including 
Samsung, Hyundai and LG had to lay off more than 80,000 employees, which was one of the preconditions of 
the IMF in 1998, and this also negatively affected the increase in the unemployment rate (Kwon Sung-ho, 
2001:27). 
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economic crisis. In order to overcome the crisis, his government highlighted that business and 
labour should share the burden of the crisis (Lee Byoung-hoon and Yoo Bum-sang, 1998).  
 
In this section, the main focus was on the history of corporatism in South Korea. Throughout 
the colonial period, the period of development, the democratisation period and afterwards, the 
state retained its authoritarian characteristics. Since South Korea experienced industrialisation 
relatively late, corporatism emerged only after the Korean War (1950-1953). At that time, 
corporatism was controlled by the state; and while the state and business formed coalitions 
through exchange, including bribery and favouritism, labour was suppressed by them. Even 
though the FKTU was created, its role and scope of activities were restricted to advocating the 
state interest, rather than protecting labour or improving working conditions. However, 
industrialisation and economic development enhanced the power of labour. Since the Korean 
economy was largely dependent on exports, a series of strikes and workplace disputes had a 
destructive impact on the economy. The increasing power of labour which was combined with 
student movements and the support of intellectuals became the driving force of 
democratisation. Labour succeeded in being recognised as an equal partner with the state and 
business in the decision-making process for the further growth of South Korea and for 
enhancing competitiveness. However, along with globalisation, the position of labour in the 
labour market deteriorated. Even though the KTC was established, it was established at the 
height of the economic crisis, and therefore it is seen as one of the tools adopted by the state, 
to overcome the crisis and maintain labour productivity and national competitiveness. In the 
following section, the background of the KTC and its role, structure, functions and operating 
procedure will be addressed. Also, how the actors at the KTC interacted regarding a certain 
issue will be examined 
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4-3. THE CREATION OF THE KTC AS A CASE STUDY 
 
In this section, the structure, function and outcomes of the KTC will be discussed. In the 
process, it will be possible to examine the interaction between the state, business and labour. 
The focus will be on how these actors at the KTC interacted with regard to the issue of the 
non-regular workers. 
 
4-3-1. BACKGROUND 
 
In order to comprehend the background, which led to the establishment of the KTC, it is 
significant to understand what South Korea was requested to do by the IMF (see Footnote 37 
and 38), and the external conditions which pressurised it to adopt corporatism. South Korea 
had already lost its competitive edge with regard to its main export items from the late 1980s, 
and the country experienced a stark decline in its balance of payment accounts. Vigorous 
export performance turned the country’s overall balance of payments deficit into a US$ 1.7 
billion surplus in 1986, which grew to US$ 12.1 billion in 1988. However, due to declining 
exports and rising imports the balance of payments showed a deficit of US$ 274 million in 
1990. At the end of 1998, when the country faced the financial crisis, South Korea had US$ 
20.2 billion in net outstanding loans (Corsine, Pesenti, and Roubini, 1998). The prices of 
South Korea’s major export items like semiconductors, chemicals, shipbuilding and steel 
products fell by as much as 30 per cent after the beginning of 1996 (Aiyer, 1999).  
 
In terms of the financial crisis of 1997, the state and business’s crony capitalism has been 
identified as a major cause. The state did not finance big businesses based on their 
performance/competitiveness or their ability to pay, but on so-called political funding that 
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was in fact bribery.
39
 In the process, the banking sector was burdened with non-performing 
loans. However, many businesses ultimately failed to make a profit. Eventually, excess debt 
led to major failures and takeovers. For example, South Korea’s third-largest car producer, 
Kia Motors, asked for emergency loans from the government. In the wake of the Asian 
market downturn, Moody’s lowered the credit rating of South Korea from A3 to Ba140 (The 
New York Times, 31 July 1997). 
 
South Korea’s overinvestment and stagnant productivity, associated with wage increases were 
also linked to weakened profitability and exerted pressure on the stock and currency markets, 
simultaneously slowing investment growth. Under the circumstances, the rigidity in the 
labour market was considered one of the biggest problems that needed urgent consideration 
(Imai, 1999). From 1988, when unemployment was in the low 2 per cent range, until 1996, 
the average annual growth rate was about 8 per cent. Due to the continued high growth, 
chaebols were able to absorb excess workers. At the same time, it was hard to fire workers 
once they were hired, because of the strong opposition of the labour unions. Before the 
economic crisis, the stagnation in worker skill improvement was concealed behind the wall of 
high growth, and did not seem to be a major problem. After the crisis; however, it was 
revealed as a serious obstacle. To survive the crisis, firms had to concentrate on worker 
selection (Imai, 1999). Labour strongly resisted this increasingly unfavourable labour market 
restructuring. Facing strong resistance from labour, the government chose to incorporate 
                                                     
39
 Kang (2002) provides details of the cosy relationship between political leaders and businesses in this regard. 
The first Political Funds Law of 1965 introduced the principle of some state funding for political parties. 
However, at that time this was intended to ensure that the money went to regime supporters. Since 1993 the cosy 
relationship between big businesses and the ruling party was thrown into disarray. The President of the Hyundai 
Corporation, Chung Ju-young, decided to run for the presidency by setting up his own party, the United National 
Party. Also, Kim Dae-jung, the 8th President of South Korea from 1998 to 2003, was elected without any major 
ties to business for the first time in history. 
40
 Moody’s rating provides investors with ratings showing the credit rating of each country. Moody uses nine 
symbols ranging from Aaa (highest) to C (lowest). Countries rated A are considered “upper-medium” grade and 
are subject to “low credit risk” and countries rated Ba are seen to have “speculative elements” and are subject to 
“substantial credit risk” (Moody’s Investors Service, 2009:8). 
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labour. The state decided to allow a limited space for labour in exchange for the possibility of 
restraining its power, which had become the driving force of the corporatist institution in 
South Korea (Bramble and Ollett, 2010:579).  
 
Table 4. 7. shows details of the macro-economic situation of South Korea. It is noticeable that 
the country’s economy deteriorated after 1997, setting a record high unemployment rate, 
inflation rate and negative economic growth rate.  
 
Table 4. 7. Macro-economic Indicators in South Korea 1994-1998 
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Real GDP Growth Rate (%) 8.6 8.9 7.1 5.5 -5.8 
Unemployment Rate (%) 2.4 2 2 2 7 
Inflation Rate (%) 6.2 4.5 4.9 4.5 7.5 
Foreign Debt 
(US$ in billions) 
89 120 164 158 154 
Won/Dollar Exchange Rate 789 775 884 1,415 1,215 
 
Source: Korean Development Institute, 2000.  
 
Initially, the KTC was created as an ad hoc consultative body. The KTC was established as a 
presidential advisory body and included representatives from the government, the KCTU and 
the FKTU, the KEF and the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) (Shin Jang-sup and Chang 
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Ha-joon, 2003). Each actor was expected to participate and the KTC was equivalent to a 
participatory democracy. Park Myung-joon (2009:13) describes the initial/inclusive 
atmosphere as follows: “the Ministerial and parliamentary actors were all engaged in the 
process of the corporatist policy‐making”. In May 1999, the Establishment and Operation of 
the Korea Tripartite Commission Act was enacted and promulgated, and became the prelude 
to corporatism in South Korea (KTC, 2013).  
 
At this juncture, it is important to comprehend the downside of the developmental state, 
which led to economic growth in South Korea. Authoritarian developmental states are defined 
as strong state regimes, engaged in facilitating fast capitalist growth (Johnson 1987: 159). 
Their political form is characterised by a centralised power structure and a strong drive to 
eliminate or subordinate societal actors. This has been largely overshadowed by remarkable 
economic growth statistics. In South Africa, there has been debate over whether the country 
should adopt this so-called developmental model in the 2000s. However, it is notable that in 
the case of South Korea, the model did not result in sustainable development that lasted for a 
long period. In addition, only a limited number of societal actors gain benefits. The 
implications for ordinary people are inexcusable. The cost of lacking any meaningful social 
safety net against economic fluctuations became evident, as massive unemployment instantly 
created a completely destitute population consisting of dismissed workers and their families 
(Chang Kyung-sup, 1999).  
 
In the case of South Korea, it is possible to observe that the external conditions, such as the 
pressure from the international institutions and the crisis, played a significant role in the 
creation of the societal form of corporatism. Lee Byoung-hoon and Yoo Bum-sang (1998:90) 
argue that there were high level officials who were eager to reform the nature of existing 
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industrial relations. This could have contributed to strengthening the institutional aspects for 
labour. In 1998, labour and civil society had high expectations from Kim Dae-jung and his 
government, due to his past fight for democracy and human rights (Guillen, 2000). For this 
reason, labour anticipated that the government could help create a better environment through 
the KTC.  
 
Each actor had its own reason for joining the KTC. Labour hoped that the new government 
would bring about meaningful change to industrial relations. Also, if labour did not 
participate in the corporatist institution, it was possible that the state would exclude the 
KCTU from major decision-making. In other words, labour could lose its legitimacy, by 
missing its opportunity to sit at the discussion table with the state and business. For the state, 
since the South Korean economy was rapidly integrated into the global economy, the state 
alone could not transform the industrial relations and business exerted its power. Big 
businesses also had no choice but to participate. The big businesses were criticised as the 
main culprits responsible for the economic crisis. They had to take part in the KTC in order to 
avoid criticism from the public and to show that they were willing to share the burden (Kim 
Young-cheol, 2010). Furthermore, one of the major outcomes of the KTC was the 
restructuring of the labour market, from which business could reap benefits. The bargaining 
power of labour declined as a result of mass layoffs and the hiring of atypical workers, so as 
to save on labour costs (Yang Jae-jin, 2010).
41
  
                                                     
41
 The terms: atypical workers and contingent, temporary and irregular workers are very often used 
interchangeably. Flexibility can be understood as the capacity to respond rapidly and efficiently to changing 
economic environments. In order to pursue efficiency, in many cases, companies tend to eliminate non-core 
production operations by outsourcing work and by employing temporary workers through labour brokers. In this 
way, the firm can maintain cost-saving strategies. According to Cho Soon-kyoung (2009:166), these workers 
actually work full time but are paid less than regular workers. Theoretically, atypical workers are entitled to 
social protection and to collective representation, however, the reality in South Korea is that these workers are 
often outside the scope of legal and social protection. This was briefly discussed in Chapter 3 as well in the case 
of South Africa. 
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In Korean academia, many scholars started to pay attention to the societal corporatist model, 
which had proved to be successful in the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries with small 
and open economic systems similar to that of South Korea (Lim Sang-hoon, 2009; Roh 
Joong-kee, 2008). Some scholars were also interested in the application of corporatism and 
how other developing countries, such as South Africa, had experienced it (Roh Joong-kee, 
1999:106). This growing interest in corporatism contributed to the establishment of the 
corporatist institution by creating a favourable environment for corporatism by drawing 
public and media attention. The adoption of corporatism was still debated in the 1990s and 
whether it was applicable to the situation in South Korea, which lacks a tradition of consensus 
between the state and societal actors (Kim Hwang-jo, 2007). Some further argued that even 
though the state institutionalises corporatism, this does not mean that corporatism is 
automatically embedded in the industrial relations (Roh Joon-kee, 1999). Nevertheless, there 
was common interest in adopting corporatism as a policy experiment in South Korea.  
 
Within the KTC, the First-Phase Tripartite Commission,
42
 was established in January, 1998 
and was expected to discuss a wide range of issues including labour-related policies with 
regard to job security, working conditions and other closely related matters, which 
significantly impact the national economy, as well as society as a whole. Until 6 February 
1999, the KTC adopted the Social Agreement for Overcoming the Economic Crisis and 90 
new items were agreed on and adopted (KTC, 2013). In the case of South Korea, the key goal 
of adopting corporatism was to absorb the major socio-economic shocks derived from the 
financial crisis, just as in South Africa, where it was also adopted as a crisis response. The 
crisis resulted in powerful aftershocks, such as massive unemployment. This posed a major 
                                                     
42
 The Second-Phase Tripartite Commission was launched in June 1998 and lasted until August 1999. The Third-
Phase Tripartite Commission was inaugurated in September 1999. In April 2007 the Fourth-Phase Tripartite 
Commission was launched, when the title was changed to the Economic and Social Development Commission 
(KTC, 2013). 
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challenge for the newly elected government. By adopting corporatism, the state tried to 
stabilise the society and gain legitimacy to reform the economy, based on consensus from 
business and labour.  
 
4-3-2. THE KTC: ITS FORMAL STRUCTURE, PROCEDURE AND FUNCTIONS 
 
The main objective of the KTC is to provide “a forum for frank consultation, dialogue, and 
compromise” among participants (KTC, 2013). It was initially expected to bring about socio-
economic development especially during the crisis situation. The establishment of the 
corporatist institution was considered as a prerequisite for healthy industrial relations in order 
to recover from the economic setbacks. South Korea has achieved democratic governments; 
however, without a functioning economic democracy, this is not sustainable. In the South 
Korean context, economic democracy means to provide economic empowerment for all 
citizens. Many South Koreans see the concentration of economic power in chaebols as wrong, 
since it has subverted mass political and economic empowerment. Many South Koreans feel 
that the concentration of economic power in chaebols should be prevented (Kyunghyung 
Sinmun, 24 September 2013). Democracy can be survived as it is able to protect the weak and 
the vulnerable, and in the end contribute to maintaining the social cohesion of various actors 
(Choi Jang-jip, 2012:8). With this regard, the KTC was also expected to realise participatory 
democracy by encouraging cooperation among all economic players. By these means, the 
KTC was expected to contribute to the achievement of social cohesion and the consolidation 
of democracy in South Korea (KTC, 2013).  
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Table 4. 8. Goals Negotiated between the Government and Organised Labour in 1998 
 
Main 
Agendas 
Labour’s Proposal Government’s Proposal Final Agreements 
Layoffs 
Request of institutional 
compensation 
No plans for institutional 
benefits regarding layoffs 
Agreed to discuss further 
how to prevent abuse of 
layoffs 
Reduction 
of working 
times 
40 hours per week from 
2000 
Suggested this issue to be 
discussed within the 
Tripartite Commission 
Agreed to reduce working 
hours to 40 per week from 
2000 
Job security 
agreements 
Request for concluding 
legal acts concerning job 
security in every industrial 
sector 
Neutralised the labour’s 
pressure by focusing on 
the possible problems 
caused by private firms 
firing workers illegally 
No agreement reached 
Illegal 
measures 
against 
workers 
Strict legal actions 
protecting workers needed 
Promised to prepare strict 
regulations and 
instructions for workers’ 
protection 
Agreed to launch a special 
subcommittee within the 
KTC 
 
Source: Kim Taek-yoon, 2008. 
 
Table 4. 8. above shows that it is not easy to draw consensus from all three partners within the 
corporatist framework. In terms of the reduction of working time and illegal measures against 
workers, the actors reached consensus or reached a certain point where there was a possibility 
of reaching consensus. However, in terms of layoffs and job security agreements, no 
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agreement was reached. Later, the unsatisfied KCTU withdrew from the KTC, whose absence 
raised the problem of the lack of representation from the labour side (Kim Taek-yoon, 2008). 
With regard to its structure and functions, the KTC consists of the Plenary Committee and 
Standing Committees and all members of committees may propose and submit agendas. The 
Standing Committee deliberates and reviews agendas. The Plenary Committee decides on the 
agenda after review and co-ordination by the Standing Committee (KTC, 2013). 
 
Figure 4.1. The Organisational Structure of the KTC 
 
 
Source: KTC, 2013. 
 
The KTC operates in the following way: first of all, any member of either of the KTC 
committees may propose that an item be placed on the agenda. The Chairman of the KTC 
shall submit the items proposed by its members for a review process. Agenda items are 
deliberated by sub-committees, which deal with matters entrusted to them by the Standing 
Committee or by Special Committees which deal with specific matters. The final decisions 
are taken by the Plenary Committee after review and coordination by the Standing 
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Committee. The decision shall require the consent of two-thirds of the members who are 
present (KTC, 2013).  
 
The Plenary Committee is composed of 19 representatives from labour, business and the state; 
there are also scholars in charge of representing civil society. These public interest groups 
consist of academics and NGOs appointed by the President. The Committee consists of a 
Chairman, Vice Chairman and the Secretary General of the KTC. From the labour side, there 
is the chairman of the unions, and from the business side, the chairman of KEF and the 
chairman of FKI. From government, there is the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of 
Finance and Economy, the Ministers from Labour, Commerce, Industry and Energy, Planning 
and Budget and the Chairman of the Financial Supervisory Commission. Finally, 
representatives from public interest groups are also included in the Plenary Committee (KTC, 
2013). 
 
The Standing Committee is composed of 25 representatives from labour, business, the state, 
and public interest groups. The basic structure of the Committee is similar to that of the 
Plenary Committee, but from the labour side, four chairpersons from industry-level trade 
unions participate, and from business, the vice chairmen from KEF, FKI, Korea Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, and Korea Federation of Small and Medium Businesses play a part. 
From the state, vice ministers from the same ministries as in the Plenary Committee 
participate (KTC, 2013). 
 
In terms of functions of committees, the sub-committees are assigned to review and 
coordinate the agenda items to be submitted to the Standing Committee. It is noticeable that 
Subcommittees on industrial relations, economic affairs and social affairs are all closely 
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linked to labourers’ livelihoods. The Subcommittee on Industrial Relations was established to 
discuss issues pertaining to the development of collective and individual labour-management 
relationships that are raised by business as well as labour. Basic labour rights of public 
servants and professors; labour law issues related to corporate restructuring; labour issues at 
essential public service sectors; the improvement of wages and retirement allowance systems; 
the process of organization and negotiation of trade unions; and the improvement of working 
conditions at transportation and loading sectors are main issue areas (KTC, 2013). Secondly, 
the Subcommittee on Economic Affairs was established to discuss economic policies 
pertaining to workers’ livelihood, employment policy, the development of human resources, 
wage policies, the earned income tax system, and the like. Lastly, the Subcommittee on Social 
Affairs is in charge of social security and welfare policies for workers such as the four major 
social insurances (occupational injury, health, old-age pension and unemployment) among 
others (KTC, 2013). 
 
Since the KTC has a presidential advisory body, it does not have legal binding force. The 
decisions of the Plenary Committee are carried out by the labour, business, and government 
sectors in accordance with their functions. In this process, the KTC has a mechanism of 
checking the implementation status of its agreements on a quarterly basis. In the event that the 
decisions made at the KTC are not carried out within a reasonable period of time, the 
Chairman of the KTC can request the relevant institutions to submit a report to clarify the 
situation (KTC, 2013). 
 
It is guaranteed that labour can participate with the state and business. However, unlike its 
two counterparts, labour, especially the KCTU, has repeatedly withdrawn from participation. 
This might be closely linked to its strategy to maximise gains by showing dissatisfaction; 
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however, this has created a negative image of labour as being uncooperative (KTC, 2013). 
During an interview with a senior official of the KCTU in 2012, this issue was raised by the 
researcher, and the interviewee responded, “The leadership of the KCTU is concerned about 
the issue and we are planning a strategy. However, the KCTU does not see the KTC as a 
viable option since the KTC is controlled by neo-liberalists. That’s why we do not participate 
in such a discussion which is fundamentally skewed” (13 December 2012).   
 
4-3-3. THE OUTCOMES OF THE KTC 
 
The KTC was established to achieve two goals: 1) to reinforce national competitiveness and 
2) to realise social integration. These two goals will be kept in mind when assessing the 
corporatist institution in South Korea.  
 
In terms of helping to increase competitiveness, the KTC has contributed to the restructuring 
of parastatals through agreements on the restructuring of the postal sector (August 2000), and 
on the restructuring of the railroad industry (December 2000) among others. Privatisation of 
state-owned companies took place on a wide basis. The state downsized its inefficient state-
owned enterprises which were performing poorly such as uncooperative, under-performing 
divisional managers with incurring extensive costs. In 1998, state-owned enterprises were 
targeted for management innovation and restructuring with the aim of drastically reducing 
their staff numbers. They included 19 parent state-owned enterprises, along with their 54 
subsidiaries, which consisted of 5 state-funded enterprises, 13 state-capitalised enterprises, 
and the Korea Appraisal Board (Kim Kwan-bo and Kim Pan-su, 2001). 
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At the same time, the restructuring of the private sector, particularly the chaebols, was also 
seen as urgent. This task was necessitated by market forces, and there was also a strong 
demand from the majority of the Korean public that are hostile to chaebols and their 
concentration of capital (Kyunghyung Sinmun, 24 September 2013). However, this large-scale 
restructuring involved massive layoffs. Moreover, now more than a decade after the state 
started restructuring the chaebols for the first time in history, the restructuring of the chaebols 
is still seen as the biggest challenge for the country. The family business structure still 
remains the dominant form of large firms in South Korea. Watson (1998) examines the 
reasons why family business persists in the era of globalisation. The chaebols have developed 
managerial hierarchies and the chaebols have mobilised managerial experts to support the 
group leaders. Furthermore, in order to keep their rights of control intact, they are more likely 
to borrow from banks than to issue equity for investment. This family business system was 
effective in establishing long-term relationships with corrupt bureaucrats and politicians, 
which made it difficult for the state to reform big businesses (Watson, 1998). 
 
One of the contributions of the KTC regarding labour is that many laws have been made to 
protect labour rights. In addition to enacting a series of labour-related laws, which can 
promote workers’ socio-economic rights 43 , the KTC decided on an Agreement on the 
amendment of regulations regarding political funds, which made it possible for trade unions 
to take part in political activities (September 1998) and for labour to enhance its political 
power (Watson, 1998).  
                                                     
43
 Agreement on strengthening the effectiveness of collective agreements between labour and management 
(December 2000), Agreement on the improvement of adjustment procedures for labour disputes and its practices 
(November 2002), Agreement on the improvement of the job training system (July 2001), Agreement on creating 
jobs for the young (July 2002), Agreement on procurement of financial resources for job training (November 
2002), Social Pact for Job Creation (February 2004) and Agreement on development of national standards for 
job/vocation competencies (March 2004). Furthermore, it enhanced the social security and welfare systems 
through the Workers’ management participation and the activation of employee stock ownership association 
(October 1998), Agreement on integration of health insurance systems (December 1998), Agreement to amend 
the National Pension Act (December 1998), Agreement to enact the Basic Worker's Welfare Act (October 2000), 
Agreement on measures for irregular workers (July 2002). 
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However, the KTC has been criticised by labour for being a tool of neo-liberalism (Kim Tae-
yon, 2003). From the 14
th
 of January to the 24
th
 of August in 1998 throughout the first and the 
second Commissions, the state, business and labour reached five agreements regarding mass 
layoffs and labour market flexibility. These two agendas were the most important issues for 
the state and business. It can be seen that the state and business have tried to strengthen their 
control over labour, which has been the biggest obstacle to the neo-liberal restructuring of 
South Korean society. To this end, they have repeatedly restructured the labour law, changing 
it into what it was before the great workers’ struggle in 1987. In 2006, the state succeeded in 
changing the labour law in favour of capital: the amendment of 2006 included articles 
preventing workers in the public sector from exercising the right to strike and banning 
multiple trade unions. All of these incentives were aimed at constraining workers’ freedom of 
association. In addition, the 2006 amendment, removed the article that punishes employers 
who illegally lay off workers. A number of labour related regulations were introduced and/or 
amended without consultation with labour. It seems that the KTC worked in favour of labour 
at first; however, the state appears to push forward various regulations unilaterally (Labour 
Today, May 18 2009). Kim Dong-won (2009) feels that it has rather functioned to decrease 
the power of labour with the interview with Labour Today (May 18 2009). The state has 
gained power over labour through the coalition with business and justified this by saying that 
the country should cope with the neo-liberal form of globalisation. Nevertheless, the KTC has 
survived, thus there must be reasons why the actors decided to keep it going.  
 
In this regard, Bae Dong-su (2002) and Roh Joong-kee (2010) argue that the KTC has 
actually played a role in drawing concessions from labour. Moreover, the state does not need 
to use coercive force as it used to do, since the KTC draws consent from labour. In that way, 
the state can reduce costs for example by not using the police force to suppress labour. The 
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state and big business want the KTC to continue functioning, as they reap benefits by binding 
labour in the name of corporatism.  
 
In summary, the KCTU and various academics are of the opinion that the KTC has been used 
as a tool to control labour; it has not functioned as a platform for social dialogue or as proper 
societal corporatism. What impacted on the KTC will be discussed through a detailed case 
study in the next section. The main focus is on the actors’ interaction at the KTC. 
 
4-3-4. AN ANALYSIS OF THE NON-REGULAR WORKERS PROTECTION ACT 
 
From the beginning, there was the criticism that the KTC was established in order for the state 
to control labour in a different way after democratisation, and there has been little meaningful 
interaction between the actors. In this context, it is difficult to expect the KTC to bring about 
successful outcomes as a platform for social dialogue. The enactment of Non-regular Workers 
Protection Act and related discussions among the actors illustrate the limitations of the KTC 
as a mechanism for social dialogue. In this section, how actors interacted at the KTC and how 
this attributed to the ineffectiveness of the KTC will be discussed.  
 
4-3-4-1. PROBLEMS RELATED TO NON-REGULAR WORKERS’ ISSUES IN 
SOUTH KOREA 
 
Prior to the analysis of the interaction between the actors at the KTC, it is necessary to 
introduce and conceptualise the issue of non-regular workers in South Korea. South Korea 
used to have a life-time employment system. The so-called permanent employees or regular 
employees enjoyed job security and benefits such as subsidised health care and paid leave. 
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The booming economy of South Korea made it possible for employers to maintain this 
protection system. However, right after the financial crisis in 1997, this system was 
challenged and came under pressure from the IMF and foreign investors who criticised the 
rigidity of the labour market in South Korea. For foreign investors, a flexible labour market 
was one of the prerequisites as it would enable them to move their productions easily. To 
accommodate their requirement, the South Korean government launched a series of structural 
reforms to liberalise and deregulate the labour market. Consequently, full-time contracts and 
long-term employment were eliminated or replaced by diverse forms of employment, 
including part-time and temporary employment (Chan, 2006).  
 
Labour market flexibility in South Korea came as a big shock to the generation that was used 
to enjoying the benefits of full employment. Non-regular workers do not receive the same 
wages as regular workers even though they work under similar conditions. For example, non-
regular workers’ wages are only 62.6 per cent of that of regular workers. In addition to this, 
non-regular workers are discriminated against in terms of benefits and protection such as 
bonuses and paid leave. In terms of job training, non-regular workers do not enjoy the same 
opportunities as regular workers do. Thus, they stand less chance of becoming regular 
workers through skill development. In reality, only 15 per cent of non-regular workers find 
regular jobs after a certain period of work as non-regular workers, and more than 20 per cent 
of non-regular workers move to the segment of “not economically active population” or 
unemployment (KTC Report on Economically Active People, 2005). Table 4. 9. shows that 
non-regular workers receive less social protection compared to regular workers in South 
Korea. The employment conditions of non-regular workers have negatively affected the living 
conditions of these workers and become one of the biggest social problems in South Korea. 
Since the proportion of those who are non-regular workers is growing, the polarisation of 
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society has accelerated. Many of those who used to be regular workers and became irregular 
workers could not cope with their deteriorating working and living conditions and, in severe 
cases, committed suicide. This had a severe impact on society.  
 
Table1 4. 9. Social Protection of Regular and Non-Regular Workers in Korea 
 
 Regular Workers Non-regular Workers 
2004 2008 2004 2008 
Employment Insurance 61.5% 65.8% 36.1% 39.2% 
Medical Insurance 73.8% 78.0% 40.1% 41.5% 
National Pension 72.5% 77.3% 37.5% 39.0% 
Severance Payment 67.4% 74.5% 31.3% 35.6% 
Overtime Work Payment 65.8% 53.5% 27.5% 28.0% 
Paid Vacations 55.8% 65.4% 22.2% 33.6% 
Bonuses 58.2% 71.2% 24.5% 27.9% 
 
Source: Lee Byung-Hoon, 2009 
 
Since the use of extensive numbers of non-regular workers only started at the time of the 
financial crisis, the South Korean government did not have any regulations concerning 
working hours, leave, allowances, and retirement pay that could protect non-regular workers 
under the new labour relations system. Realising this and in order to improve working 
conditions, the Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform was formed in May 
1996, however these discussions were all held at state level only, and societal actors were 
excluded.  
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The Labour Standards Act was revised and passed by Parliament in 1996 and went into effect 
in 1997. South Korea’s first Labour Standards Act was passed shortly after the Korean War in 
1953. However, it was modelled on legislation in other industrialised countries, and was 
criticised because of its unrealistic approach which was not appropriate to the South Korean 
situation. This led the revision of the Labour Standard Act in 1996/7 (Cooney et al., 2002). 
This reform had an unexpected result, that is, the reform bills gave employers freedom to lay 
off employees and this led to a considerable number of companies laying off employees on a 
scale which South Korea had never experienced before (see the case of chaebols’ massive 
layoff in 4-3-1).
44
  
 
Anticipating massive resistance from the opposition party and labour, the state and then the 
ruling party passed the Act unilaterally in the early morning.
45
 However, in return, the state 
also made a few concessions in the final round of labour law reform, as it strove to mitigate 
growing discontent among workers. The most prominent example is that the KCTU was 
legalised. Even though there was a form of political exchange between the state and labour, 
labour and business were not entirely satisfied with the reform. Labour had had to yield to 
layoffs due to the law in any case. From the businesses’ point of view, it was more difficult to 
terminate contracts due to the law and the legalisation of the KCTU, and labour’s militancy 
made it more difficult for businesses to terminate the employment of workers. However, in 
the end the series of reforms allowed businesses to use an increasing number of non-regular 
workers as well as laying off workers (Chan, 2006; Lee Won-duck and Lee Ju-hee, 2002).  
                                                     
44
 The Supreme Court allowed layoffs under strict requirements only. The Labour Standards Act only allows 
layoffs (1) if an emergent crisis of business exists; (2) if sincere efforts to avoid layoffs have been made (to take 
alternative measures) in advance; (3) if there is selection of employees according to reasonable and fair criteria; 
(4) or if there is sincere consultation and negotiation with labour unions or representatives of employees for no 
fewer than 60 days. The unions countered by saying that that this had the same meaning as the then existing law 
because these terms are subjective and can be misused since there are no strict standards. 
45
 In South Korea, whenever Parliament faces tension between the ruling party and the opposition and a certain 
bill is stalled for a while, one of the tactics that is used by the majority party is to pass the bill unilaterally. The 
majority intentionally chooses midnight or early morning without informing others and passes the bill. 
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In addition to the deteriorating working conditions, non-regular workers’ problems have 
several dimensions. One of them is related to migrant workers. The number of migrant 
workers in South Korea has risen remarkably since the late 1980s. By November 2007, about 
502,000 immigrant workers including at least 230,000 non-regular immigrant workers, moved 
to South Korea (Social Watch, 2008). In South Korea, workers doing so-called 3D jobs – 
dirty, difficult and dangerous types of work mainly in the construction and manufacturing 
sectors have been replaced by migrant workers mainly from South Asia or Southeast Asia.  
 
Migrant workers in South Korea can be categorized into two groups: professional workers 
and technical trainees, who are working legally in South Korea on the one hand, and the rest 
of them, that is, illegal unskilled workers on the other hand. Those who entered South Korea 
with no work permission and only a visa for travel but with the intention of being employed 
in Korean enterprises fall into the latter category (Kang Su-dol, 1996). However, the number 
“technical trainees” who entered the country with permits and later deserted their contracted 
workplaces to work and earn more money in factories with better conditions has rapidly 
increased. According to Kang Su-dol (1996), it is estimated that about one third of the 
technical trainees have become illegal workers. To prevent these trainees from fleeing and in 
order to stabilise the industrial relations, the government formally established medical 
insurance, compensation for industrial accidents and minimum wages for migrant workers 
in1995. The problem is that most employers do not abide by these regulations.  
 
Despite migrant workers’ contribution to the economy, there is discrimination against them 
including abusive working conditions, delay in the payment of wages, and refusal to treat 
them as equal to their South Korean counterparts. This has become a serious social problem in 
South Korea. One of the examples of this is that employers, in order to prevent migrant 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
205 
 
workers from escaping, often violate their human rights by restricting their freedom after 
work and preventing them from contacting people from outside the premises of the factory 
(Kang Su-dol, 1996). Employers misuse the fact that many of migrant workers are not 
familiar with the language and law in South Korea, and often have illegal status. Migrant 
workers cannot report their employers because their illegal status would be revealed, or 
workers are afraid that their contracts will be terminated and that they will have to go back to 
their home countries.  
 
Another characteristic of the non-regular workers of South Korea is related to the gender 
issue. The South Korean economy was initially based on the (light) manufacturing sector, and 
a large pool of female workers contributed to the export-led economy from the 1970s 
onwards. However, the participation of female workers in unions has become insignificant. 
This was noticeable in the democratisation process when the male-dominant unions at heavy, 
chemical and metal enterprises played a larger role (see 4-2-3). Unions in South Korea 
overwhelmingly represent male workers, which has left female workers vulnerable to 
unfavourable wage bargains and insecure employment. Among regular workers, the ratio was 
60.9 per cent for males and 40.1 per cent for females (Kim Yu-sun, 2012). Male-dominated 
unions neglected to address the disproportionate expansion of females becoming non-regular 
workers (Ko Young-kook, 2011).  
 
The growing problems of non-regular workers became the rationale for the “Special 
Committee on Measures for Non-regular Workers” set up by the KTC on July 23, 2001. From 
2001 to 2003, the KTC held more than 100 meetings and seminars which were also attended 
by members of civil society and academics seeking solutions for non-regular workers. 
However, there was no consensus at the KTC despite the long process, and the agendas from 
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labour and business were separately delivered to the state to take into account in July, 2003 
(KTC, 2007). This illustrates that the KTC which was supposed to coordinate the actors’ 
opinions, could not function, and in the end, the state had to come up with its own solution, 
and simply pushed ahead. Obviously, this did not meet labour’s demands, and trade unions 
and civil society have continuously asked government to protect non-regular workers. As a 
result, the Non-regular Workers Protection Act came into effect in July 2007 after it was 
stalled for a while. The main purpose of this Act is to transform non-regular workers into 
regular workers after a certain period of contract and to provide non-discriminative benefits to 
them. 
 
Regarding the Non-regular Workers Protection Act, the KTC established a sub-commission 
(13 April 2007 – 12 April 2008, later extended to April 2009) in order to discuss further 
issues mainly with regard to more specific measures. The Non-regular Workers Protection 
Act was first applied in 2007 to workplaces with more than 300 employees, then expanded to 
workplaces with 100 employees in 2008. In 2009, workplaces with more than 5 employees 
were also subjected to the Act. Since its scope will expand in three years’ time, it is inevitable 
that more workers will be subject to the Act, thus it is necessary to formulate specific 
measures to protect workers.  
 
Even though the KCTU and the DLP were heavily opposed to the idea of using non-regular 
workers, the state, business and the FKTU agreed during the decision-making process, that 
the use of non-regular workers was unavoidable. At the KTC, the actors (the state, the FKTU 
and business) agreed to control excessive use of non-regular workers and get rid of 
discrimination against them. They reached a consensus that the new act would become a 
foundation that could protect vulnerable segments of the populations. However, the KCTU 
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continuously contended that the use of non-regular workers should be banned, as there was no 
legal and institutional framework that could protect them. In reality, this view was perceived 
as radical since the use of non-regular workers had already become widespread. It was 
concluded at the KTC that the state should introduce protection for non-regular workers rather 
than abolishing the practice itself.  
 
Often, the antagonistic relationship among actors extended to outside the KTC. For example, 
the Conservative Party, the majority, passed the laws blocking the DLP. This illustrates while 
the actors opposed each other, often obstructing the decision-making process, there was no 
intervention by the KTC. Also, the KCTU and the DLP tried to interfere/obstruct the 
enforcement of legislation by arranging a general strike. While the FKTU, a soft-line 
organisation, cooperated to some extent with the state and business (even though it sometimes 
joined in rallies with the KCTU outside the KTC), the KCTU organised mass rallies, petition 
campaigns, and hunger strikes and other protest actions outside the KTC, opposing the 
discussions at the KTC. During an interview with a  senior official from the KCTU, it became 
clear that this destructive behaviour  resulted in loss of support from the public and that the 
leadership has to come up with a new strategy that can gain wider support from the public. 
 
4-3-4-2. THE KTC, WHOSE INTERESTS DOES IT REPRESENT? 
 
In the previous section the background of non-regular worker issues in South Korea; the 
process of the establishment of the “Special Committee on Measures for Non-regular 
Workers” and later the Non-regular Workers Protection Act, and a sub-commission which 
was established to commit to further discussion on the Non-regular Workers Protection Act, 
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were discussed. The uncooperative relations among the actors at the KTC, which resulted in 
each actor pursuing a unilateral approach and bypassing the KTC were also discussed.  
 
In this section the focus will be more on the interaction among actors regarding the Non-
regular Workers Protection Act of 2007. At the KTC the actors basically agreed on the 
problems that non-regular workers faced and that these would cause the polarisation of 
society. However, in terms of the measures that should be taken to deal with the non-regular 
workers’ issue, labour and business had different perspectives. Regarding the situation, Eo 
Su-bong, then the new chairman of the KTC,  argued as follows: “This idea of the state 
cannot be the solution to the matter, the state actually pushed us to reach consensus in order to 
pass the legislation but it will be difficult since there are big gaps between labour, business 
and the state” (KTC, 2009). This indirectly showed the unstable status of the KTC and that 
although it is supposed to be autonomous, it is under pressure from the state.  
 
One of the most hotly debated topics was that under the new law, non-regular workers are 
eligible to become regular workers if they have been employed at one workplace for two 
years. In response to this law, the KCTU argued that businesses would dismiss contract 
workers before they reached the two-year tenure requirement and employ new non-regular 
workers. This concern became real in 2007. After July 2007 several big businesses asked for 
voluntary resignations by their non-regular workers who had been employed for nearly two 
years. This raised the question of whether the law was effective and furthermore what the role 
of the KTC and the outcome of the lengthy meetings were.  
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Labour argued that even though the KTC contributed to passing legislation protecting the 
rights of non-regular workers, business found loopholes, and abuse of the law existed 
(Interview with a senior official from the FKTU, 13 December 2012). One of the prominent 
examples was that just before the new law came into effect, E-Land Group, the second largest 
retailer in South Korea, laid off workers who would qualify as regular workers. The 
immediate response was a strike in January 2008, which lasted for 7 months. In the initial 
days of the strike, thousands of casual workers from other sectors all over South Korea came 
to help shut down E-Land stores.  
 
As there was no sign of a decrease in the number of non-regular workers, another conflictual 
situation was created when the state announced its intention of extending the two-year limit 
for fixed-term workers to four years. On 12 December 2008, the representatives of civil 
society at the KTC opposed the state’s agenda to extend the contract from 2 years to 4 years 
and submitted their written opinion to the state. The KCTU also published a statement 
accusing the state and business. The following was said:  
 
The state should support the efforts of labour at the KTC in order to overcome the economic crisis. 
However, the extension of the contract to 4 years might pour cold water on the endeavour … The 
state is only trying to pass the buck by making the most economically vulnerable segment, labour, 
take the responsibility and make the sacrifices (KCTU, 28 January 2009).
46
  
 
Unlike those of the KCTU, the FKTU’s responses seemed mild, as they said “business should 
stick to the principle that employers should hire non-regular workers after the 2-year contract 
                                                     
46경제위기 극복을 위한 노사간의 노력을 지지하고 뒷받침해야 할 정부와 여당이 이해관계가 첨예한 
비정규직법을 일방적으로 개악하겠다고 하는 것은 모처럼 조성된 노사민정간의 사회적 대화 노력에 
찬물을 끼얹는 작태가 아닐 수 없다… 정부와 여당이 정규직과 비정규직, 노동자와 사용자 등 사회 
각계각층간의 이해대립과 갈등을 부추기고 경제적 약자인 비정규직과 저임금 노동자들에게 희생과 
고통을 전가하려는 비정규직법 사용기간 연장을 절대로 용인하지 않을 것이다 (한국노총, 28 January 
2009). 
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expires” (KTC, 2009).47 With regard to the question whether the FKTU was too cooperative 
towards other actors, one of the FKTU advisory researchers who represented labour at the 
KTC in 2007, said “the FKTU mixed the two strategies, that is, dialogue/compromise and 
struggle, since the KTC was seen as a useful platform… the bottom line is that we would like 
to stick” (Interview, 13 December 2012).   
 
While the FKTU seems willing to cooperate with the KTC since it is the only mechanism that 
labour can use to participate in the decision-making process, business seems quite indifferent. 
In April 2008 when labour, civil society and the state agreed to extend the sub-commission 
for another year until 2009, business was the only actor that argued that there would be no 
need to discuss matters related to non-regular workers at the KTC any longer. This happened 
again at the 32nd meetings on 20 January 2009.  
 
We do not think there is need for another meeting to discuss the issue of non-regular 
workers since it was already decided at the previous meeting… We [business] want to 
clarify that it is inappropriate for us discuss non-regular workers’ issues any further. Also, 
we should avoid looking at measures without considering efficiency. In the process of 
problem-solving, not only labour but also business should be considered.
48
 
 
There was also an ongoing dispute between labour and business in terms of the definition and 
scope of non-regular workers. Since the definition and scope of non-regular workers would 
determine the range of protection for labour on one hand and business’s expenses on the other 
                                                     
47 노동계의의입장은 “비정규직법이 2 년 이내 한시적 고용의 필요성이 있는 경우에 비정규직을 
고용하는 것이라는 원칙을 지키는 것으로 정규직 전환의 실효성 확보 방안이다.” 
48
 “그동안 주요 쟁점별로 심도 깊은 논의를 진행하였으나 합의점을 찾지 못하였다. 노․사․정․공익 
의견을 원안 그대로 상급 회의체로 올려서 논의하고 별도의 결정 사항이 있으면 다시 논의할 수 있을 
것이다. 경영계는 비정규직대책위원회에서 관련한 일체의 논의가 이루어지는 것은 부적절하다는 
의견을 다시 한번 분명히 밝힌다. 대타협 논의 등에서 비정규직 문제가 걸림돌이 되지 않기 바란다. 
해법을 모색함에 있어 실효성을 따지지 않고 퍼붓는 식의 정책지원방안 마련 논의는 지양하고 노․사 
양측 모두를 고려한 대안 모색이 이루어지기 바란다”.  
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hand, the dispute developed into a fierce battle between labour and business, which included 
strikes and dismissals. In this situation, the state became dominant. 
 
On 8 October 2008 labour complained as follows:  
 
The state has already decided the scope of the law, and when to enforce it. In this situation, 
we doubt whether it would be meaningful or useful for us to participate in the KTC. In this 
context, the KTC itself should lodge complaints through official documents or channels, 
otherwise holding the meeting is meaningless.
49
 
 
Table 4. 10. Legislative proposals by labour, business and the state at the KTC (KTC 2009) 
 Labour Business State 
Fixed-term 
 
 
- Regulating the use of fixed-
term labour only for limited 
valid reasons  
- Imposing the duration limit 
of fixed-term employment for 
two years  
- Treating fixed-term workers 
exceeding two years as 
permanently employed  
- Stipulating the principle of 
the equal pay for equal value-
work  
 
 
- Opposing the stipulation of 
limited valid reasons for the 
use of fixed-term labour  
- Allowing the duration of the 
employment contract for 
three years  
- Opposing employer’s 
obligation to turn fixed-term 
workers into a permanent 
position  
- Opposing the stipulation of 
the ‘equal pay for equal 
value-work’ principle  
 
- Introducing the time limit of 
fixed-term contract and 
treating fixed-term workers 
exceeding the limit as 
permanently employed (2 
years to 4 years) 
- Stipulating prohibition of 
discrimination  
- Introducing employer’s 
obligation to elucidate 
working conditions in a 
written form  
 
                                                     
49
 “정부는 이미 관련 법령에 대해 범위 및 시기에 대해 [독단적으로] 결정하였다. 이런 상황에서 과연 
노사정 위원회에 참여하는 것이 어떠한 의미를 갖는가에 대해 의심을 가질 수 밖에 없다. 노사정 
위원회는 반드시 이를 시정하려는 노력을 해야하며 그렇지 않은 경우 일련의 회의들은 무의미할 수 
밖에 없다”. 
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Part-time 
 
 
- Setting a separate limit of 
daily working time for part-
time workers  
- Introducing the extra work 
allowance for part-time 
workers  
 
- Opposing the introduction 
of part-time working time 
limit and extra allowance  
 
 
- Stipulating the principle of 
proportionate protection and 
prohibition of discrimination 
for part-time workers  
- Paying extra work 
allowance for exceeding the 
pre-defined limit of part-time 
work  
- Introducing employer’s 
obligation to make written 
employment contract  
 
Dispatched 
 
   
- Limiting the use of 
dispatched labour only for 
professional jobs  
- Allowing the use of 
dispatched workers only for 
two years  
- Prohibiting dispatched 
workers from doing the same 
job over two years  
 
- Changing the positive list 
for the use of dispatched 
labour into the negative list  
- Abolishing the time limit of 
dispatched labour in use  
- Allowing to use dispatched 
labour in the same job 
without time limit  
 
- Regulating the illegal use of 
dispatched labour by letting 
employers employ them in 
regular jobs  
- Stipulating prohibition of 
discrimination  
- Introducing tripartite 
council to adjust the coverage 
of dispatched labour in use  
- Promoting labour rights of 
dispatched workers at their 
working sites  
 
Self-
employed 
 
 
- Guaranteeing the legal 
entity of worker for 
 
- Opposing the recognition of 
worker entity for dependent 
 
- Proposing the special law to 
guarantee quasi-workers 
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dependent self-employed in 
the trade union law  
- Extending the definition of 
worker in the labour 
standards law  
self-employed in the trade 
union and the labour 
standards laws  
- Resolving the issues of 
dependent self-employed by 
the civil or commercial laws  
(dependent self-employed) 
labour rights to organize and 
bargain  
- Suggesting additional 
policy-consultation to prepare 
for labour and social 
protection  
 
As seen above, non-regular workers were divided into four types. There were self-employed 
workers including insurance sales people, golf caddies, and home-visit teachers. They used to 
be directly employed by the employer and in the past signed labour contracts with their 
employers. However, the status of these jobs was changed to that of special employment - that 
is technically the status of being self-employed. The problem was the expansion of the service 
industry and the diversification of employment form. Special employment is being expanded, 
and these workers are suffering from worse labour conditions than those of non-regular 
workers by being placed outside of legislation.  
 
Under the circumstances, business consistently demanded a reform policy to ensure labour 
market flexibility and that the statutory regulations on the use of non-regular labour be 
minimised. South Korea again faced a global crisis in 2008 and business made aggressive 
demands for the deregulatory revision of non-regular labour laws; the state pursued a pro-
business labour policy to promote labour market flexibility. 
 
Despite the criticism, the state argued that the employment situation had shown improvement 
after the Act (see Figure 4. 2. and 4. 3.). The state argued that after the law was adopted, 37 
per cent of non-regular workers were converted into regular workers, however what was 
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overlooked is that almost the same number of such workers lost their jobs and there was no 
follow-up research regarding whether these workers could enter the labour market again. 
Even though the employment situation seemed a bit improved, as the state argued, there was 
lack of analysis of the impact.  
 
Figure 4. 2. The actual situation of non-regular workers (fixed-term) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Department of Labour, 2009. 
 
Figure 4. 3. The percentage of non-regular workers as measured by the state and labour 
 
 
 
Source: Lee Byung-hoon, 2009.  
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Figure 4. 3. shows the gap between the estimation of the number of non-regular workers by 
the state and labour. Figure 4. 3. shows that there a was slight decrease in the percentage of 
non-regular workers, however, the statistics submitted by the government and labour differed 
by 10 per cent, which tarnished the credibility of each actors’ argument, 
 
One of the issues that created a rift between business and labour is that labour tabled 
comprehensive issues concerning fundamental labour rights, public sector restructuring, and 
other social issues and hoped that these would be discussed by a practical consultation body. 
Labour’s attempt to raise issues relevant to the entire working class is related to the expansion 
of the service industry and the diversification of forms of employment. However, this was 
seen as idealistic but not realistic. For example, business at the 25th meeting on 23 July 2008 
pointed out that “the discussion on social security is too broad and irrelevant to the mandate 
of the sub-commission which was established to discuss non-regular workers” (KTC, 23 July 
2008). Business continued to justify their position by saying that their hands were tied in the 
globalising context, and demanded the loosening of employment protection legislation on the 
grounds of enhancing corporate competitiveness. Business repeatedly took in the same 
position namely that labour should stick to matters directly related to non-regular workers’ 
issues instead of the issues affecting the entire working class. The KEP argued that the Act 
would undermine the autonomy and the productivity of business. 
 
In the South Korean context, the rigidity of the labour market derived from the 
overprotection of regular workers, the Non-regular Workers Protection Act has a negative 
impact on hiring in general and has become a burden. Many of the workers who have a 
fixed-term contract, which is one of the various forms of employment and lawful, 
misunderstand and think that this act guarantees their conversion to regular workers. 
Employers should adapt to the fast-changing business environment, however the rigidity of 
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the labour market and labour’s unilateral demands have led to the deterioration of labour 
relations.
50
 
 
At the 5th meeting on 28 May 2007 the Korea Chamber of Commerce (KORCHAM) 
participated and argued that labour’s demands could lead to a deterioration of the labour 
market’s flexibility and productivity, and that this in turn, could possibly aggravate the entire 
employment situation, KORCHAM also advocated the autonomy of business.  
 
At first, the FKTU welcomed the Act as it established a platform where labour could 
participate in matters which would largely affect workers. Since it was the first Act that was 
created with the intention of protecting non-regular workers, the FKTU expected to find a 
way to improve the Act, as well as working conditions in general. However, this did not take 
place.  
 
Nowadays, how the KTC and the state deal with labour relations makes FKTU members 
feel that their strategies are useless [for labour]… our official response is the state has no 
strategy and no regulation itself. Without these, the KTC will not be successful. The FKTU 
could also withdraw (Interview with the union activist from FKTU in December 2012). 
 
In December 2013, the FKTU did actually withdraw from the KTC. This is not directly 
because of the Act, but rather because the FKTU itself has suffered frustration. Since the 
FKTU has been seen to cooperate with the KTC, it was striking that the FKTU also decided 
not to participate at the KTC. The fact that the KTC does not have labour as a partner means 
                                                     
50 경영계는 “정규직 과보호로 인한 노동시장 경직성이 심각한 가운데, 현행비정규직법이 기업 
인력운용을 제약하는 규제적 법률로 작용함. 비정규직법이 정규직전환법 으로 오인되고 있으며, 
‘기간제 계약’ 이라는 적법한 계약형태 자체가 노동시장에서 인정받지 못하는 등 비정규직법 본질이 
왜곡되고 있다. 또한 급변하는 경영환경에 기업이 대처하기 위해서 인력운영상 탄력성 확보가 
필요함에도, 과도한 정규직 보호에 더하여 노동계가 일방적인 정규직 전환만을 요구하는 등 기업 
부담을 강요함으로써, 현장 노사관계 불안을 초래하고 있다.” 
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that all the on-going discussion has to be halted and this will undermine the KTC’s authority 
in the end.  
 
4-3-4-3. THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS OF THE KTC  
 
The KTC was expected to play a significant role by bringing about social stability and 
economic growth, however, it did not make any significant contribution in this regard. Also, 
participants continuously showed their dissatisfaction with the KTC and the decisions which 
were taken at the KTC. Related to this, it is interesting to note that Kim Sung-jung, former 
chairman of the KTC (2007-2008), argued as follows:  
 
In 1998, while facing the financial crisis, it was possible to reach consensus through 
compromise, however, after that, labour and business simply stuck to their own agendas, 
and there was a limit to what mediation could do. There were also problems with the 
leadership of both labour and business, for example the withdrawal from the KCTU and the 
low density of FKTU, also there was no coordination between businesses. These all 
negatively affected the KTC (25 October 2007).
51
 
 
The role of the KTC was to narrow the gap between the two actors, business and labour, by 
means of discussions leading to an agreement or settlement reached by each side making 
concessions. However, several fundamental problems related to the KTC as a social dialogue 
mechanism, were revealed.  
                                                     
51
 "98 년 초에는 위기의식이 작용, 상호 양보에 의한 대타협이 가능하였으나, 이후 노사가 자기 
주장을 고수하고 세부 사항까지 합의를 추진함으로써, 노사단체의 이해관계 충돌 시 공익위원의 중재 
역할에 한계가 있었다. 또한,민주노총의 불참, 낮은 노조 조직률(노동계), 경제단체간 조정기능 
미비(경영계) 등으로 노사단체의 대표성과 리더십이 확보되지 아니하여 협의과정에 어려움이 있었다. 
노사정위는경제위기시 대타협을 맺으면서 잘 넘겼지만 사실 그런 경제위기가 와서는 안 되지 
않습니까. 지난해 노사관계로드맵, 산재보험법 등을 노사정 논의를 통해 타협했기 때문에 과거와 
같은 노동법 파동이 발생하지 않은 것입니다. 거창한 합의를 기대하기보다는 실질적이고, 일상적인 
대화체제로 나아가야 한다.” 
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In April 2007, the Minister of Labour, Chang Ue-sung argued at the end of the meeting,  
 
If we cannot reach consensus smoothly in terms of the selection of agendas, we will discuss 
this at the plenary meeting (higher level). However, you (labour, business and the state) 
should attend without any conditions then. In order to proceed, let’s decide on the agenda, 
let’s say, a ‘fact-finding’ research, and we will discuss this in more detail at the managerial 
meeting.… (also) I hope you actors will unify your voices, otherwise an enforcement decree 
will be pushed through by the state unilaterally.
52
 
 
While labour focused on enhancing general working conditions through the making of new 
labour laws at the KTC, it is also argued that labour should have brought up something 
negotiable and should have tabled something feasible. In general, business reacted passively 
and reactively. Business always showed reluctance and avoided further discussion, sometimes 
attempting to bypass the KTC, “so far we have had in-depth discussions but we have not 
found any middle ground. Thus each actor can submit (its) own opinion to higher level, so 
that they can decide”. In this situation, the KTC could not play the role of coordinator and 
aggregator of the actors’ demands. 
 
In addition, there are several underlying problems that prevented the KTC from functioning 
properly. Firstly, both business and labour were highly fragmented. Business was fragmented 
into KEF, the KORCHAM and the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI). A representative 
from each organisation attended meetings at the KTC from time to time. However, they often 
did not coordinate their agendas. Rather from the beginning, they submitted their own 
agendas separately (at the 5th meeting, 28 May 2007). The fragmentation caused confusion 
                                                     
52
 “일단노사정 협의의 진행 상황 및 내용을 후속대책위원회에 보고하기로 한다. 단, 외부의 
노사정협의가 원만히 이루어지지 못할 경우 본 회의체에 의제로 채택할지 여부를 다시 논의하도록 
한다. 노․사․정 모두 각자 입장에서 갖는 어떤 조건도 붙이지 말고, 일단 ‘실태조사’를 의제로 정하고 
자세한 내용은 간사회의 조정을 거쳐 추후 논의하기로 한다.” 
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and adversely influenced the efficiency of the KTC meetings as the actors submitted 
uncoordinated agendas. The rising (in)efficiency of the meeting was repeatedly emphasised 
throughout the meetings in 2007 and can be seen again a year later at the 24th meeting 
(actually the first meeting in 2008) on 9 July 2008.  
 
From the labour side, the overall power of labour has been divided between two umbrella 
organisations, the FKTU and the KCTU. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to build one 
united voice at the KTC. The labour unions have not been successful in gaining support from 
and making alliances with a wide variety of social groups in civil society. The public and 
especially the middle class often see labour disputes and protests as expressing selfish group-
interests (Asia Economy News, 6 September 2013). Labour is also well aware of this criticism. 
However it does not seem to use the KTC as a mechanism to forge alliances with other 
societal actors (Interviews with the senior officials from the KCTU and the FKTU, 13 
December 2012). 
 
As discussed already, from the beginning (since 1999), the KCTU refused to join the KTC 
since it argued that the act itself should be abolished and that the act would become an 
alternative legislation for controlling the use of non-regular workers. This withdrawal was 
severely criticised by other actors. Kim Dae-whan, a chairman of the KTC, during his 
interview with Labour Law, said “The KCTU has not suffered any disadvantages as a result 
of its withdrawal from the KTC, although this has negatively contributed to the deadlock at 
the KTC...”53 
 
                                                     
53 “민주노총은 노사위에 참여하지 않아도 손해보는 것이 없었다. 그래서 이런 상태가 계속 되는 
것이다.” 노동법률 2013년 10월호와의 인터뷰. 
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The withdrawal was the KCTU’s own decision, however, other actors were also reluctant to 
involve the KCTU in discussion at the KTC. Before the first meetings of the sub-commission 
took place in May 2007, there was an attempt by the FKTU to include the KCTU. The KTC 
also wanted the KCTU to participate in order to gain legitimacy as an institute promoting 
social dialogue, the other actors however resisted. The president of the KEP, Lee Su-young 
said, “I cannot attend the meeting with the KCTU” (10 April 2007). He further said “Unless 
the KCTU stops announcing nation-wide strikes, we businesses will also close our operations 
here [in South Korea] and relocate our businesses in other countries”.54 Business did not 
welcome the idea that the KTCU should join the KTC. All the other actors (except the FKTU) 
seemed to agree that they wanted to avoid unnecessary disputes by including the KCTU 
which showed hostility towards the corporatist institution.   
 
There has been no development of discussion among social partners. After the inauguration 
of the current government, the KTC excluded KCTU from discussions on these issues. The 
discussion ended without agreement, demonstrating the different positions of each party 
(KTC, 29 October 2009). 
 
The fragmentation of labour is closely linked to the issue of representation at the KTC. The 
KCTU and business representatives of SMEs were not included at the KTC.
55
 The reality is 
that SMEs faced more serious problems in terms of the employment of non-regular workers. 
As the law would apply to SMEs from July 2008 it was anticipated that SMEs which did not 
have as many resources as big businesses, would experience more problems absorbing non-
regular workers. The participants at the KTC agreed to provide various incentives for SMEs 
                                                     
54 “민주노총이 파업을 공언하는 상태가 지속된다면 기업인들이 공장 문을 닫고 한국을 떠나는 말없는 
‘스트라이크(파업, 해외공장이전)’를 할 것이다.” 
55
 The KCTU could not gain the broader support of the workers. The KCTU affiliates represent male workers 
employed under regular, full-time employment in chaebols. Therefore, there are limitations and the KCTU does 
not actually represent the workforce at large, especially the rapidly growing periphery of non-regular workers in 
lower-paid, more insecure jobs and the socially marginalised. 
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like tax reduction so that this could offset the hiring of non-regular workers after the 
expiration of their two-year contracts. However, there was no participation by SMEs at the 
series of meetings at the KTC. Also, while other business organisations based on chaebols 
conducted research on the impact of the Act in order to prepare for the consequences, SMEs 
showed lack of preparation. A fact-finding study conducted by the KTC, the results of which 
were published on 9 July 2008, shows that more than 35 per cent of SMEs would terminate 
contracts with their non-regular workers which would negatively affect the unemployment 
issue (KTC, 2008). In fact, there was no institution that represented non-regular workers even 
though the act itself was meant for non-regular workers. The lack of representation of the 
significant stakeholders undermined the KTC’s legitimacy.  
 
Secondly, despite the conflictual situation between business and labour, there was no active 
intervention from the state, and whenever the state tabled its agendas or outcomes including 
statistics, it was criticised by the both sides and accused of being unrealistic or of not 
reflecting the reality. Thus, the state was successful neither as an actor that took the initiative 
and became an active mediator, nor as an actor providing reliable statistics on which the 
further policy-making process could be based. Rather the state maintained an ambivalent 
stance after the 6th meeting on 15 June 2007, “the Act has not been enforced yet, therefore we 
should not hesitate to predict the outcome, the government will monitor the labour market and 
gradually complement the Act.” 56  However, it is difficult to observe any significant 
intervention from the state at the KTC when analysing the minutes of the sub-commission 
written during the rest of the period. .Rather the strategy of the state was to wait and see, in 
other words, they were inactive.   
                                                     
56
 “비정규직법이 아직 시행되지 않았고, 비정규직에 대한 정책들이 이제 출발단계에 있는 상황에서 
정책효과에 대한 판단은 너무 성급함. 앞으로 노동시장의 상황을 지켜보면서 문제점들을 보완해 나갈 
계획임.” 
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Whenever labour and business encountered strong antagonism, the agenda was halted for a 
while. The state did not take clear stance on the legislation concerning non-regular 
employment, nor did it make an active effort to mediate between labour unions and business 
associations.  
 
Thus, each actor started following its own path to push forward its own agenda and this 
tendency has increased. The KCTU used mass strikes, and business lobbied members of 
parliament in order to achieve their goals. The KEP directly approached the parliament 
members by distributing a report entitled Perspectives from Business towards Problems with 
the Non-regular Worker Act in April 2007. In the report, business argued that “business will 
suffer if it has to absorb non-regular workers… the additional cost will reach 5 trillion won”. 
Business expressed frustration saying, “we are under pressure to accept excessive demands 
and the state and labour should understand the principle that business is there to create 
profits”. Business claimed that the role of business was different from that of the public 
sector. It is possible to observe that both labour and business stuck to their own positions and 
did not show any willingness to settle the disputes over detailed issues.  
 
It seems that the state took a pro-business stance over time. The Lee Myung-bak government 
which made clear its pro-business administrative direction during the global crisis in 2008, 
gave consideration to business’ demands for the deregulation of labour policies including the 
non-regular employment laws, and made a public pledge to undertake aggressive policy-
making for the promotion of labour market flexibility. This impaired the autonomy and the 
neutrality of the KTC.  
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All in all, no genuine exchange took place between actors at the KTC. In order to resolve the 
issue, the new chairman of the KTC proposed a package of social dialogue in January 2014. 
He wanted there to be compromise or exchange (KTC, 8 January 2014). However, it was still 
not certain how other actors would perceive this agenda as the KTC was seen a deteriorating 
institution. Also it was uncertain how much they would be willing to yield in the name of 
corporatism.  
 
The contention and uncertainty regarding labour relations with regard to the revision of the 
non-regular employment laws have not been resolved up to the present. Labour (FKTU) 
agreed that to some extent, the Non-regular Workers Protection Act could have a positive 
effect (the agreement of 5th June 2009), but felt that the state would not be able to monitor 
whether big business misused the regulations. Business argued that the tendency to 
overprotect labour would negatively affect the rigidity of the labour market and labour argued 
that business would avoid hiring non-regular workers due to the law being a burden. Labour 
further alleged that this would negatively affect the entire employment situation since 
employers would prefer indirectly hired workers so as to avoid contact with the law.  
 
The series of KTC annual reports and minutes clearly indicated that all the participants 
recognised the non-regular workers’ problems. The KTC contributed to some extent by 
providing suggestions such as “Master plan Non-regular workers’ employment” which 
includes plans for expanding training opportunities, supporting vulnerable populations and 
collecting data on non-regular workers. Nevertheless, when analysing the annual reports and 
minutes, it is possible to see that there was a lack of productive and cooperative discussion; 
nevertheless it is possible to identify several characteristics of the discussions.  
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The KTC faced the representation issue. The actors who were directly affected by the Act, did 
not participate due to the characteristics of the corporatist institution in South Korea that 
allows only high-level actors to join. Thus, an ironical situation evolved namely that the union 
that was based on regular workers represented non-regular workers, and the KEF that consists 
of chaebols took part in the discussion representing SMEs.  
 
The outcome was in favour of business that wanted labour market flexibility. The state took 
unilateral action that allowed neo-liberal corporate restructuring including outsourcing, in 
order to cope with the changing business environment in the era of globalisation. Also, there 
was another crisis in 2008 when the pro-business government took power promising 
economic growth rather than distribution. Since the Kim Dae-jung and Rho Mu-hyun 
administrations could not be successful in terms of distribution, South Korea also stagnated, 
and people became inclined to treat economic growth as their top priority. The state pushed 
forward neo-liberal economic policies, which negatively affected the discussions at the KTC 
where the focus was on social protection for workers. 
In the case of the KTC, it is noticeable that none of the actors were cooperative. Labour could 
have used the KTC as a useful platform in order to create protection mechanisms for workers, 
however labour itself was divided between the FKTU and the KCTU. There have also been a 
series of clashes between the KCTU and the FKTU over participation in the KTC (Roh 
Joong-kee, 1999:98). Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the two largest unions 
were supportive of each other. Business was reluctant to join the KTC from the beginning and 
the state either acted reactively or was biased towards business.  
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4-4. THE IMBALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE STATE, LABOUR AND 
BUSINESS 
 
In this section, the balance of power between the state, business and labour over time will be 
focused on. The establishment of corporatism and its diminished influence are all related to 
the balance of power among these actors. Before democratisation, South Korea’s unique 
political economic situation due to the confrontation with North Korea, helped the state 
maintain sole power. However, the state faced the growing influence of labour, one of the 
principal societal actors leading democratisation. Right after democratisation, the state 
seemed to lose its influence over the society. Furthermore, South Korea faced another 
formidable transition, globalisation. How this has affected the state-society relations? Has this 
brought an opportunity for labour to become an equal partner vis-à-vis the state and business?  
 
4-4-1. BEFORE 1987: THE STRONG STATE-BUSINESS COALITIONS AND 
LABOUR’S GROWTH 
 
Prior to South Korea’s democratisation, the state maintained the dominant position towards 
societal actors. South Korea was a largely agrarian society until the early 20th century, when 
the working class began to gain prominence, along with industrialisation under colonialism. 
However, during this period most of labourers were impoverished due to the exploitive 
characteristics of Japanese colonialism. The number of wage workers was small; therefore, it 
was difficult to develop class consciousness among workers. Nevertheless, the working class 
became a strong force in the development of nationalism and became involved in independent 
movements. After independence, the state-led development plan was pushed forward under 
the authoritarian governments. In the process, the state and a small but stable number of 
business actors strengthened their ties. On the basis of the unprecedented support from the 
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state, in terms of grants and loans, these big businesses could develop into world class 
players. The state intervened in industrial relations maintaining low wages and long working 
hours. In the process, the state used suppressive methods. This resulted in the South Korean 
export industry becoming exceptionally competitive (Kang, 2002). 
 
The political situation that South Korea faced regarding the confrontation with North Korea, 
helped the state use its absolute power (Kim Eun-mee, 2010), which ultimately strengthened 
the state’s authority (Doner, Richie and Slater, 2005). In the 1960s, university students and 
intellectuals who were against the authoritarian government and in favour of democracy 
supported the labour movement. However, at that time, authoritarian governments treated 
anyone who was against the state, as if they were linked to communism or profited North 
Korea. Furthermore, since the first republic (1948-1960), the labour related laws and 
regulations inhibited labour from partaking in political activities. Labour could not raise its 
voice against increasing exploitation from the state and business (Koo, 2000). 
 
Ironically, along with the rapid industrialisation policies, some heavy industries such as 
automobile and steel were promoted by the state, and the influence of these sectors became 
crucial for the growth of the South Korean economy (Chang Dae-oup, 2002). These industries 
were the driving forces of the rapid growth of the Korean economy, and if they had exerted 
their influence through strikes and workplace stoppages, the negative impact on the economy 
would have been considerable.  
 
Therefore the state and business tried to maintain peaceful industrial relations. At that time, 
the major issue from the labour side was related to basic rights like increased wages, reduced 
working hours and improved conditions. The demands of labour had a direct impact on 
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competitiveness. Wage and other agreements that labour gained enhanced productivity, as 
well as increasing stability at the shop floor level. In the case of South Korea, labour was 
granted economic gains and material support from government, for example job training, 
insurance and housing allowances, among others in this regard. Vandenberg and Hundt 
(2011) argue that South Korea had a better social protection system than the United Kingdom 
and the United States in the 1990s. This led to labour’s loyalty helping to maintain high 
productivity, which in turn made South Korea achieve remarkable economic growth.
57
 
However, when South Korea was incorporated into a single global market, the state could no 
longer maintain the existing system, especially after 1997. The relations between the state, 
business and labour entered a critical transition phase in the democratisation period. 
 
4-4-2. THE LABOUR MOVEMENT AFTER DEMOCRATISATION  
 
Along with industrialisation, labour experienced change in terms of the number of members 
and the number of unions. Increasing union membership bolstered the power of labour. It is 
also possible to observe the development of regional and industrial unions. Later, this 
movement led to the creation of another union, the KCTU. The KCTU, which was based on 
considerable support from workers, played a significant role in strengthening the power of 
labour (Yang Jae-jin, 2010:454). However, it could not lead to a change in the relationship 
between the state and society.  
 
                                                     
57
 Amsden (1990) points out that wage increase policies were implemented by the state in order to gain loyalty 
under the authoritarian governments. Amsden (1990; 1992) notes that the higher wages can be seen as a type of 
populism. Higher wages were paid to encourage learning in technology. In this way, South Korea could achieve 
growth in a very short time. For the state, productivity was one of its top priorities in the course of economic 
development. In the process, big businesses could retain their profits even though they had to raise workers’ 
wages. At that time, in the 1980s, wages increased by an average of 15 per cent per annum, but the state could 
still maintain competitiveness, while it kept the three lows:, the low exchange rate, the low oil price and low 
interest rates. These could compensate for businesses’ losses (Amsden, 1992). 
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As discussed above, under the Kim Young-sam government, the KCTU and the FKTU 
showed their collective power. However, because of their different stances and conflict 
between soft liners and hard liners in each confederation, they were considerably fragmented 
(Yang Jae-jin, 2010:458). Furthermore, since democratisation, labour has experienced a sharp 
decrease in numbers. Also, South Korean unions are criticised because they are perceived to 
have pursued short-term distributive gains instead of pursuing the interest of the whole 
working class (Lee Yoon-kyung, 2006).  
 
In South Korea, enterprise unions, in other words, unions organised based on a single 
enterprise, had been dominant unlike those in most European countries and in South Africa 
that are organised at national/industrial level. Many point out that labour in South Korea 
needed to develop meso- and macro levels of collective bargaining (Kim Eun-sook, 1997; 
Labour Today, November 19 2012). South Korea has a tradition of enterprise-level unions, 
which were introduced by the state and aimed at disintegrating labour. Enterprise-level 
collective bargaining became the accepted mechanism for setting wages and working 
conditions after the colonial period. Relations between labour and business remained highly 
antagonistic over differences in the bargaining process (Roh Joon-kee, 2008). Of the two 
national labour federations, KCTU was more successful in transforming its affiliated unions 
into industrial unions than the FKTU. However, this movement has faced strong resistance by 
employers concerned about labour becoming strong and uncontrollable.  
 
In addition to the issue of fragmentation of unions, the distance between union leaders and the 
shop floor has become a new problem arising after democratisation. Especially, the union 
leaders and workers who belong to big businesses and have permanent positions, are criticised 
for belonging to a union aristocracy. This is clearly shown in the case of South Africa, where 
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shop floor workers criticise the distance between them and union leaders. For example, the 
unions of chaebols are more centrally organised. The high level of unionisation in large 
companies meant that the state and business were unable to forcibly constrain wage growth 
within the guidelines. Also union militancy in South Korea originated from unions belonging 
to chaebols. These made it easier for the unions of chaebols to protect their interests. The 
problem is that these unions focused on their own interests, thereby neglecting the interests of 
the working class as a whole. Sometimes, they were seen by the shop floor as being too 
cooperative towards employers and the state. One of the prominent examples is the dismissal 
of the KCTU leadership in 1998, on behalf of the rank and file of the KCTU, on the 
background of being too cooperative with the government, which made the organisation take 
a more militant line. The conflict between the union leadership and shop floor level members 
has continued to the present (2013) and has been pointed out as one of the main reasons for 
the ebb in the labour movement. 
 
Yoo Hyung-geun (2012) describes the characteristics of the labour movement in South Korea 
as “labour militancy without solidarity”. Before democratisation the labour movement in 
South Korea not only represented the narrow economic interests of organised labour, but also 
served as the central force of social movements. However, solidarity has weakened after the 
financial crisis of 1997. This weakened solidarity is largely due to globalisation and a 
restructuring of the workplace, this can also be seen in the case of South Africa (Von Holdt 
and Webster, 2008). 
 
There is another significant reason why labour could not achieve an extensive level of reform. 
Many scholars have pointed out that the labour movement could not develop into a political 
party that could represent the interests of the whole working class (Roh Joong-kee, 2010; 
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Yang Jae-jin, 2010). Even though labour could achieve a certain level of economic gain 
including wage increases, the political channel was blocked (see 4-1-3). Without political 
representatives who could promote labour’s interests, labour faced limitations in terms of the 
redistribution of wealth and other economic and social rights.  
 
Before democratisation, labour was successful in gaining the broad-based support of 
intellectuals, religious leaders and the middle class. This coalition became the driving force of 
democratisation (Sandbrook, 2007). As in the case of South Africa, after democratisation, 
labour failed to create broad coalitions which resulted in reforms, beneficial to organised 
labour only. Also, labour did not seize the leadership in the coalition and has remained as 
junior partner. Under the circumstances, labour could not push forward reform alone without 
the help of other segments of the coalition.  
 
It is also possible to observe that the coalitions between labour and the middle class rapidly 
disintegrated, in other words, labour lost its biggest support base. This can be related to the 
hierarchical structure of South Korean society. There is a deeply embedded idea that the 
working class is the lowest stratum in society (Guillen, 2000:431). Even though the labour 
movement was at the centre of the democratisation process, in practice, it was led by middle 
class people, such as intellectuals and white-collar workers. Choi Jang-jip (2012) notes that 
the democratic revolution was led by elites, and the authoritarian characteristics derived from 
this elite-led transition have influenced the current political system and became a barrier to 
incorporating a range of societal groups. Labour in itself was not strong enough to become an 
independent social force, without forging an alliance with other social groups.  
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After democratisation, once the middle class gained political freedom, they no longer 
supported labour movements.
58
 At that time, the state used the media which described labour 
movements as an obstacle to economic development. The middle class, which gradually 
looked for stability, stopped supporting labour; thus, the alliance became weak. What should 
be noted is that, as Koo (1991:499) argues, the original goals of the middle class and the 
working class in South Korea were different. While the middle class pursued political 
freedoms including direct and free elections and freedom of speech and association; better 
working conditions and higher wages were urgent issues to the working class. Ideology also 
played an important role in terms of the incorporation of labour. For example, communism or 
socialism was not accepted in South Korea until 2000, when the Democratic Labour Party 
(DLP) was established.
59
 South Korea took a strong anti-communist line and the state 
suspected labour movements of being linked to North Korea and planning to cause social 
disorder (Guillen, 2000) (see Footnote 35).  
 
4-4-3. THE SECOND (MISSED) OPPORTUNITY FOR LABOUR TO INCREASE ITS 
POWER 
 
The power of labour reached a peak during democratisation, which made the government 
incorporate the interests of labour, conferring a status of equal partner within the corporatist 
framework. However, it became clear that the existing relations between these three actors 
were not transformed. The transition in South Korea took place in relatively stable conditions; 
the ruling forces, including the state, had the capacity to weather the crisis. On the other hand, 
                                                     
58
 This alliance between labour and the middle class and the subsequent disintegration is not found in South 
Africa, since the country has a very small middle class and there are many fractions based on race and 
occupation. 
59
 The DLP is based on the KCTU. After democratisation, despite the decrease in union density in South Korea, 
the ratio of the KCTU’s membership to the total unionised members jumped from 27.4 per cent in 1996 to 43.5 
per cent in 2003. This shows that labour’s political inﬂuence grew stronger and its method of participation 
became more organised. 
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labour was relatively weak and decentralised; therefore, it was beyond its capacity to 
transform the society (Choi Jang-jip, 2012). 
 
At this juncture, from 1998 South Korea has had ‘liberal’ governments: the Kim Dae-jung 
government (1998-2002) and the Roh Moo-hyun government (2003-2007). Both of them 
were sympathetic towards labour and antagonistic towards business. This seemed to be the 
opportunity for labour to advance their interest, supported by these pro-labour governments. 
The appearance of the liberal government drew attention in terms of its relations with labour, 
in comparison to that of the previous authoritarian governments before democratisation. 
Moreover, the KTC was created under the liberal Kim Dae-jung government. Therefore, 
much attention has been paid to the role of these two governments (The Wall Street Journal, 9 
September 9, 1987). From 1998 onwards, the major issues that the government and the KTC 
faced were the assurance of labour rights and a social safety net through the corporatist 
institution (Yang Jae-jin, 2010:457). The Non-regular Workers Act can be understood as one 
of measures. 
 
The series of pro-labour programmes were implemented because both the governments were 
elected based on the support of labour. Especially, the Roh Moo-hyun government had 
sympathy with labour’s discontent with the neo-liberal economic reforms. The prime goal of 
his government’s economic policy was to achieve a balance between growth and distribution. 
The correction of distributional imbalance, and the chaebol regulation policy became pillars 
of the new government’s economic policy. President Roh had a strong aversion to the 
economic concentration on big business and campaigned for the reform of the chaebols. 
Despite a series of efforts to limit big businesses and their influence, labour gained no 
significant benefits with regard to political power after democratisation. However, as long as 
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labour participated in the KTC, it was bound to agree with the decisions made by the KTC. 
The structural change of the South Korean economy influenced labour and the negative 
influence has continued until today (2013). It was easy for the state and businesses to hire and 
fire workers in the name of market flexibility; thus, they had more leverage.  
 
Right after the 1997 crisis, business temporarily became a subordinate actor since the crisis 
originated due to their lax management (Cho Hui-yeon, 2009). In the wake of the 1997 crisis, 
15 of the 30 largest chaebols went bankrupt or had entered restructuring programmes by the 
end of 2000. More importantly, numerous big business affiliates, such as Daewoo Motors, 
were sold to foreign capital, which involves an erosion of the chaebol system. However, the 
two liberal governments failed to achieve substantial reforms in favour of labour, in terms of 
creating jobs and a more equal redistribution of wealth. One of the prominent reasons, as 
already mentioned, was the change in ownership structure of Korean big business due to 
foreign capital’s control of these companies. Even though the ownership structure changed, 
the influence of business remained strong, since the country’s economy heavily relies on the 
success of the chaebols. All in all, the state lost its ability to control business (Yang Jae-jin, 
2010:472). Under the developmental state, all chaebols enjoyed preferential treatment given 
by the state. Under the authoritarian governments when South Korea achieved the rapid 
economic growth, the state wanted to support big businesses, such as Samsung and LG in the 
interests of becoming competitive enough on the global market. However, as these chaebols 
became stronger, they no longer wanted government protection and regulations. Thus, their 
relations with the state have become antagonistic and government regulations have become 
regarded as barriers to their growth (Yonhap News, 18 February 2013). 
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As seen in 4-3, labour has been exposed to employment instability. Labour was incorporated 
into the policy-making process, however its internal problems (the split between the FKTU 
and the KCTU) and decreasing membership as well as public support did not help labour 
aggregate various demands and act as an equal partner vis-à-vis the state and business at the 
KTC. Kim Young-cheol (2010:35) points out, that corporatism in South Korea has become 
unstable. Labour negatively contributed to this instability by repeatedly withdrawing from and 
re-joining the KTC, which did not strengthen its bargaining power vis-à-vis the state and 
business.  
 
Despite the government’s efforts to institutionalise stable industrial relations, the outcome of 
the social pact was not promising. At the beginning of his administration’s term of office, 
President Roh pledged to institute a multi-level collective bargaining system, which implied 
that his government would endorse industrial unions and the industry-level bargaining that 
trade union leadership aspired to establish, which was expected to strengthen the bargaining 
power of labour (Lee Joo-hee, 2004). In the case of South Korea, the absence of one 
encompassing union like COSATU in South Africa has negatively influenced the strength of 
labour. At the negotiation table, the low level of political representation meant that labour 
could not initiate its own overarching agenda.  
 
The first year of Roh’s presidency was marked by a relatively high level of labour disputes, it 
clearly indicated that the KTC was not used as a forum for the state, business and labour. The 
Roh administration also took an even tougher stance toward striking workers (see Table 
4.11.). The government heavily criticised the labour leaders’ “aristocracy” and militancy. 
Ironically, the Kim Dae-jung government and the Roh Moo-hyun government were elected 
based on support from the working class; yet, these two governments have been criticised for 
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their use of coercive means to control labour (Roh Joong-kee, 2010). Guillen (2000) argues 
that the Kim Dae-jung government continued to maintain mild repressiveness towards labour, 
and tried to pacify labour by introducing corporatism. Kim Eun-mee (2010:112) argues that 
the Roh Moo-hyun government did not confer full autonomy on society, since the state was 
still inclined to lead society. Within the framework which was created by the state, society 
could enjoy only limited autonomy. 
 
Since democratisation, the state was expected to play an important role in coordinating all 
these actors’ demands (Yang Jae-jin, 2010:452). However, the relations between labour and 
business and between labour and the state have become hostile. In this process, the corporatist 
institution did not simply function through neglect. All the employment policies that were 
introduced by the government’s financial departments were supportive of neo-liberal 
economic policies, and the employment policy was subordinated to the economic policies of 
financial departments (Roh Joong-kee, 2010:8). This proves that labour’s rights were not 
afforded top priority. Consequently, the reform measures in the KTC were stalemated, and the 
legislative procedures for implementation were delayed. In the case of South Korea, 
corporatism seems to have failed to gain support from the all participants and agreements 
made through negotiations were not implemented.   
 
4-4-4. GLOBALISATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR LABOUR 
 
Roh Joong-kee (2010:6) argues that globalisation has resulted in numerous changes in the 
relationship between the state, business and labour in South Korea. From the Kim Dae-jung 
government, there have been two overarching pillars in economic policy: the expansion of the 
market economy and a flexible labour market. Shim Ji-hong (2008) argues that unlike the Lee 
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government that was clearly directed towards restoring economic growth, the Roh 
government was fixated on redistribution. However, the government could not achieve the 
economic growth in the first place. Under the circumstances, the redistribution programme, 
which was strongly pushed forward by the Roh government, negatively affected the domestic 
economy by discouraging investment from both foreign and domestic investors. This is 
similar to South Africa’s adoption of the RDP. At that time, the new South African 
government inherited debt from the NP and had to push forward a debt-based programme, 
which resulted in fear among foreign investors. In the case of South Korea, the Roh 
government’s ambitious redistribution programme brought about similar responses from 
international and national businesses.  
 
Roh’s policies were pushed forward without economic growth to buttress the redistribution 
programmes. During his presidency, the increasing bi-polarisation of society and the slow 
economic growth, led the South Korean society to choose the Lee Myung-bak government, 
which promised a new developmental state, emphasising economic growth.
60
 According to 
Roh Joong-kee (2010:7), regardless of the differences between them, the three governments 
(Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak) strictly applied labour law to labour 
disputes and used force to quell protests. There was resistance from labour and even the pro-
government KCTU held vast demonstrations. Table 4.11 shows that since the Kim Dae-jung 
government, the number of detainees arrested during demonstrations has increased. Even 
though the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations called themselves pro-labour 
                                                     
60
 Even though, the unemployed and those who are placed outside the labour market supported Kim Dae-jung 
and Roh Moo-hyun, pro-labour presidents, these presidents used the same violent methods against the labour 
movements and the promised redistribution failed to materialise. The society that used to enjoy relatively 
egalitarian distribution was disappointed and turned to President Lee Myung-bak who has a strong conservative 
inclination. In 2013 President Park Geun-Hye whose father is President Park Chung-hee who established a 
developmental state in South Korea, was elected. These two presidents promised to consider economic growth 
first. President Lee used to be called a neo-liberal bulldozer and President Park Geun-Hye also follows the 
doctrines of neo-liberalism.  
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governments, their repressiveness in dealing with strikes did not seem different from that of 
the previous authoritarian governments. This is also seen in the case of Marikana in South 
Africa, which reflected the government and police’s repressive use of force towards labour. 
 
Table 4. 11. The Number of Detainees during Labour Dispute 
 
 
Roh TW
61
 Kim YS Kim DJ Roh MH Lee MB 
Number of 
the 
detainees 
1973 632 892 1053 
334 
(2009. 
10.28) 
Annual 
average 
394.6 126.4 178.4 210.6 200.4 
 
Source: Roh Joong-kee, 2010.  
 
As the South Korean developmental state became democratic and liberal, it seems that the 
country has followed a new pattern, becoming a ‘developmental state’ with democracy. In 
other words, the state has incorporated labour’s interest within the corporatist framework, 
however, the state still uses suppression to deal with industrial relations. This can currently be 
seen in South Africa as well. There have been debates about whether it is possible for South 
Africa to construct a developmental state, within the framework of a constitutional democracy 
(Edigheji, 2010). It is important to extract some of the characteristics of a development state 
                                                     
61
 The Roh Tae-woo government was in power during the process of transition to democratisation. It still had 
largely authoritarian characteristics due to Roh’s military background, and his political base was the same as that 
of his predecessors, mainly the upper-middle class and the wealthy. The middle class sought stability after the 
transition period. 
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such as that it is a state with a long term developmental goal for the country, however, the 
oppressive relationship between the state and labour should not be replicated.  
 
4-5. AN ASSESSMENT OF CORPORATISM IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
After democratisation, Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun had a relatively 
cooperative relationship with labour at first. However, it seems that the two governments 
employed an institutional approach to controlling labour by using the KTC. The two 
governments applied tough measures when dealing with illegal strikes and the politicisation 
of the labour movement. Especially, a commentator points out that the ministry of labour 
came to be in charge instead of the KTC. The minister of labour was critical of labour’s 
militancy and preferred discussion of issues at forums other than the KTC (Roh Joong-kee, 
2006:6-7). The governments are theoretically expected to discuss issues with labour at the 
KTC, but it can be observed that the government’s willingness to push forward corporatism 
does not exist any longer. Kim Hwang-jo (2007) argues that since the establishment of the 
KTC, its meetings have never been attended by a president or prime-minister. According to 
him, this shows that the state has not considered the KTC as a significant institution. Taking 
this into consideration, in the case of South Korea, corporatism seems to remain symbolic and 
a new type of instrument with which the state could control society after democratisation.  
 
The pressure on the KTC increased when President Lee was elected in 2008. The Lee 
government stopped pushing forward social programmes that had been implemented by the 
previous governments, and switched to neo-liberal economic programmes (Roh, Joong-kee, 
2010:9-10). This has brought conflict between the state and labour at the KTC. Given this 
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situation, labour still repeatedly withdraws and does not participate in the negotiation, the 
state pushes forward policies in an unilateral manner.    
 
Roh Joong-kee (2010)’s argument is that while the state lost its power under the participatory 
democratic system, labour also experienced difficulties. In the aftermath of mass layoffs and 
the high unemployment rate, the membership of trade unions declined sharply. Furthermore, 
the multiple unionism somewhat accelerated internal disputes.
62
 Despite all these changes, 
business seems to remain in a prominent position vis-à-vis labour. Yang Jae-jin (2010:471) 
argues that business, especially chaebols have tried to put an end to the KTC by lowering its 
legal status and the scope of activities, since the KTC was regarded as an impediment to 
business.  
 
Yang Jae-jin (2010) argues that the state looked for a way to suppress labour. After 
democratisation the state needed to find a new strategy to take the place of physical 
repression. All these efforts were aimed at maintaining peaceful industrial relations and 
national competitiveness in the face of globalisation (Yang Jae-jin, 2010:462). However, 
these efforts were conducted at the expense of labour’s interests.  
 
Since South Korea does not have a tradition of corporatism based on trust among the state, 
business and labour, the environment of the KTC was not conducive to success. 
Commentators such as Shim Ji-hong (2008) and Yang Jae-jin (2010) doubt the efficiency of 
the KTC and point to the intervention of the state, as one of the causes of KTCs’ failure. 
                                                     
62
 Another significant change took place in industrial relations, that is multiple unions in a single workplace were 
accepted from 2007. The Trade Union and Labour Relations Adjustment Act was amended to allow multiple 
unions in the same workplace. The Act became effective from 2011. The multiple union system is still somewhat 
unusual in South Korea, having never been actively practiced before, and many problems have arisen which can 
result in decentralisation of the power of labour, particularly during the bargaining process of the enterprise level. 
Multiple representatives insisting on their own agendas can potentially disrupt the bargaining process. This 
pluralistic approach might impede corporatism in South Korea. 
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Whenever a new administration came into power, a new form of industrial relations was 
promulgated, which included the strengthening of KTCs’ status. However, these efforts did 
not bear any fruitful outcomes. Whether the corporatist institution in South Korea will 
eventually achieve its proposed goals remains to be seen; however, the prospects at the 
moment are not very bright. Kim Hwang-jo (2007) argued that the conditions for the success 
of corporatism did not exist in the case of South Korea.; rather, the KTC was used as a tool by 
the state to accomplish neo-liberal goals. It could be said that the KTC is no longer a viable 
forum for discussions and negotiations, but rather an entity whose legitimacy is now only 
enshrined on paper. This will be further discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
4-6. CONCLUSION 
 
Corporatism gave all the actors opportunities. For labour, the significance is that it could be 
involved in the policy-making process as an equal partner. Trade unions were allowed some 
political activity, with rising expectations of more progressive future changes. Labour did 
reap some benefits; however, its losses far outweigh those of the other actors in the corporatist 
institution. Although the state argued for equal burden sharing to overcome the economic 
crisis, labour bore the majority of that share. The doctrine of market economy and the 
principles of competitiveness and efficiency have exerted a prevailing influence on struggles 
between labour and business. Business argues that more flexibility along with globalisation is 
needed in the labour markets, as this will help attract foreign investors and result in job 
creation. Restructuring the labour market should have been accompanied by the construction 
of a social protection system so as to absorb the shock.  
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However, at the KTC, political exchange did not take place in earnest among the three actors 
in South Korea. By means of the KTC, business could prevent conflict and also maintain 
moderate wage levels throughout the bargaining process (Yang Jae-jin, 2010:465). In reality, 
business has benefitted from the KTC. Businesses were granted the legal right to lay off 
workers in times of mergers and the acquisition or handover of firms, or whenever 
management felt there was an urgent need.  
 
Also they were able to make use of replacement workers when the union members were on 
strike. In order to keep the industrial peace, the government took a tough stand against 
striking unionists, who were demonstrating against the restructuring and layoffs. The 
government often resorted to physical force to stop the strikes, and the frequently associated 
illegal actions. Although the KTC exists, it is hard to observe any sign that it ever acted or 
acts as a mediator; rather, the state uses physical power to control labour. Due to the 
fragmentation between the KCTU and FKTU, it has been difficult to aggregate the interests of 
labour. Furthermore, the labour leadership has been criticised for pursuing only the interests 
of those who belong to unions. Compared to the state and business, labour has lost its 
influence at the KTC.  
 
Under these circumstances, the question arises: if the KTC does not function properly, why 
does the institution still exist? Responding to this, Yang Jae-jin (2010:466-7) notes that the 
KTC has been granted official and legal status, and it is in the interest of the actors to retain 
their seats at the bargaining table, in order to at least have legitimacy. As long as the KTC 
exists, social pact in South Korea will remain. Under the circumstances, each actor should 
have strategic capacity. It is especially important that labour is organised at the industrial 
level, instead of the enterprise level. In South Africa, labour is organised at the national- or 
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industrial level, and can have a more unified voice based on its superiority in numbers, than 
the labour movement at the enterprise level. In the case of South Korea, wages are still likely 
to be determined by businesses; thus, the leverage of business is much stronger.  
 
The KTC has failed as a corporatist institution in South Korea for several reasons: 
 
 After democratisation, labour was incorporated as an equal partner vis-à-vis the state 
and business, however the balance of power among actors became asymmetrical as 
time went by.  
 At the KTC, the actors do not show cooperative attitudes, rather they seek a way to 
bypass the corporatist institution. Labour relies on strikes and business seeks to find 
loopholes in the decisions which were made at the KTC.   
 One of the main reasons for the imbalance of power between actors is related to 
labour’s diminished influence after democratisation. Labour has experienced a 
decrease in its membership along with massive layoffs after the financial crisis of 
1997. Also, the split between the KCTU and the FKTU, and furthermore the KCTU’s 
withdrawal al from the KTC negatively affected the influence of labour at the KTC.  
 Business has a reluctant attitude towards the KTC and the state also does not play its 
role as an active mediator. Rather, the state’s stance has favoured business pursuing 
neo-liberalism in the name of economic growth.  
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION 
 
5-1. INTRODUCTION 
 
When South Africa and South Korea introduced the corporatist institutions in the late 20th 
century, it was expected that corporatism would play a role in ensuring the maintenance of 
political stability in liberal democracies and improve the effectiveness of economic policies. 
This became the rationale for those who supported the adoption of corporatism in South 
Africa and South Korea. However, in the cases of South Africa and South Korea, the 
corporatist organisations have not functioned properly and this was followed by labour’s 
discontent and withdrawal from the corporatist institution.  
 
There have been significant changes in South African and South Korean state-society 
relations since democratisation. Labour in South Africa seems to have gained strong political 
economic influence through mass mobilisation, such as strikes; and labour in South Korea has 
also gained a certain level of political influence. For example, there are a number of new 
labour laws in South Korea, which guarantee the right to join unions and to defend and 
improve working conditions including the establishment of minimum wages. However, in the 
case of South Africa, there is no evidence that rampant inequality and unemployment have 
lessened after the county’s adoption of corporatism in 1994. In South Korea, the post 1997 
economic crisis in particular led to serious problems, especially the polarisation of the labour 
market between regular employees and non-regular workers, which widens the gap between 
the rich and the poor. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
244 
 
Against this background, in this final chapter the key aspects of this study are reviewed and 
the main contributions of the study are summarised. The chapter will begin with an overview 
of the argument and findings, similarities and differences and the insights gained from the 
analysis of the case studies will be listed. Corporatism has its origin in the Western European 
countries that have different political and economic backgrounds to those of South Africa and 
South Korea. Therefore, when it was applied to South Africa and South Korea, several 
differences were revealed. Based on this, theoretical reflections on the use of corporatism in 
these late-late-industrialising countries will be discussed.  
 
5-2. OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT AND MAIN FINDINGS 
 
Corporatism in South Africa and South Korea was adopted by the state in order to pre-empt 
the worsening political and socio-economic crises during the democratic transition period and 
the financial crisis in 1997. However, as a mechanism for maintaining cooperative state-
society relations, the corporatist institutions in South Africa and South Korea were less 
successful. This is mainly the result of the imbalance of power between the actors. Labour’s 
influence vis-à-vis the state and business has diminished. The decreasing influence of labour 
is projected through NEDLAC and the KTC. 
 
In order to overcome this limitation, labour in South Africa tends to use the tripartite alliance 
with the ANC and the SACP instead of NEDLAC. In South Korea, labour which does not 
have strong bargaining power, tends to use mass action. Under the circumstances, it is 
obvious that these corporatists institutions have not played significant roles in coordinating 
the actor’s demand.  
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5-2-1. MAIN FINDINGS  
 
This comparative study comprises not only an empirical analysis but also a discussion of the 
theoretical development of corporatism. This study has provided new insight into corporatism 
in late-late-industrialising countries in Asia and Africa. This study provided insight into 
whether corporatist institutions in South Africa and South Korea have brought any benefits, as 
was the case in Western European countries, where macro-economic stability was achieved. 
Also, several reasons were discussed with the focus on the imbalance over time between the 
actors. 
 
Can a balance of power among actors bring about the success of corporatism? 
 
In Western European countries, the balance of power among actors is relatively equal. Hassle 
(2009) argues that when the state and labour have moderate power, there is a greater 
possibility of corporatism being successful. Would corporatism have been more successful if 
the relationship was more balanced? It is worth looking at Woldendorp’s (2011) investigation 
on nine North Western European countries that have adopted corporatism and are well known 
for having a more equal relationship between the state and societal actors, particularly labour. 
In Finland and Norway, it is possible to observe that there is a cooperative relationship 
between the state and its counterparts. On the contrary, in Denmark and the Netherlands, the 
influence of labour seems subordinated to that of the state. 
 
Looking into the dynamics of each actor, it is noticeable that in the cases of South Africa and 
South Korea, labour is subordinate to the state and business. The balance of power among 
actors has become asymmetrical, which has negatively affected labour’s influence in the 
corporatist framework. The coalition between the state and business was formed again after 
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democratisation. In the process, neo-liberal economic policies, especially, the highlighting of 
a flexible labour market in both countries was unilaterally pushed forward by the state and 
business, without consultation with labour. Even though the actors reached consensus, the 
agreements were often not implemented.  
 
Can corporatism be successful in a country that has a weak institutional environment? 
 
On a theoretical level, Molina and Rhodes (2002:322) argue that the fundamental element of 
corporatism is political exchange, which can take place in a weak institutional environment, 
as well as a strong one. In South Africa and South Korea, some exchanges took place at first. 
However, due to the weak institutional environment, the corporatist institution itself did not 
function as many expected. As a result, each actor especially bypassed the KTC or NEDLAC. 
In many cases, labour directly influences the state and business by using strikes and an 
alliance framework. In the case of South Africa, it is noticeable that COSATU has a relatively 
strong influence vis á vis the ruling party, the ANC. Not only labour, but also business, uses 
its influence without going through the KTC or NEDLAC. Business uses its influence by 
using wage increases, restructuring and lobbying the state and labour. Under the 
circumstances, corporatist institutions in both countries do not play a significant role in 
creating a space for negotiation.  
 
Unlike Western European countries, in both South Africa and South Korea, the lack of a 
corporatist tradition has had a negative influence on the current corporatist structure. The 
conflict between business and labour in particular, and the asymmetry of power between the 
state and society, has made the situation worse. In this situation, it is hard to observe any 
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intervention from the corporatist institutions in either of the countries. Consequently, in both 
South Africa and South Korea, many have questioned the usefulness of these institutions.  
 
Corporatism is not the panacea for all cases. 
 
Corporatist theory is a relatively recent development and it has been through rapid changes as 
time went by. For example, many European countries that have a strong corporatist tradition 
have experienced economic crisis and many have questioned the usefulness of corporatism.  
 
When corporatism was adopted in South Africa and South Korea, it was expected to bring 
about macro-economic stability and the incorporation of labour as an equal partner in the 
decision-making process. These are the main outcomes, expected from the successful 
experiences in Western European countries. However, it should be noted that it is not 
necessary for a country to adopt a certain model, even though it has been successful 
elsewhere. In this context, it would be useful to look at the case of Sweden. Although the 
socio-economic context of Sweden is similar to that of other European countries where 
corporatism was successful; Sweden decided not to adopt corporatism, as the different actors 
did not perceive themselves as receiving enough benefits, and because they did not think that 
the country as a whole would either (Lindvall, 2005). In the end, it seems that Sweden has 
maintained the corporatist institution, however, labelled as “creative corporatism”, which is 
focusing on economic adjustment and facilitating new high-technology industries (Ornston, 
2014). Belgium is another country that shows a declining tendency in corporatist policy 
formation, for the same reasons as Sweden (Woldendorp, 2011). 
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As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, one of the methodological constraints is the exclusion of a 
third case from Latin America or Eastern Europe. However, at the time of writing this final 
chapter, it seems that the imbalance of power between the actors at corporatist institutions 
will also largely impact corporatism in Latin America. For example, corporatism is deeply 
ingrained within Latin America’s political structure, and is practised widely in labour 
relations as well as a variety of public policy programmes. However, when looking at 
corporatism in Peru under Alberto Fujimori (where labour was strong in the 1970s but has 
weakened considerably since) and Venezuela under Hugh Chávez (weak labour, only about 
11% of the workforce belongs to a union), it is clear that none of the goals to of corporatism, 
namely economic growth and social stability, have been achieved.  
It was hoped that these corporatist institutions would contribute to social stability, as well as 
peace in industrial relations, and the qualitative development of the labour movements in both 
countries. However, even in the cases of Western European countries there are various and 
asymmetrical relationships among participants. Corporatism has been successful in some 
countries. However, other country, such as Ireland, which was referred to as a successful 
country with corporatist experience, has experienced economic crises (The Economist, 21 
March 2009). According to The Economist (2009), its economic growth fell to -2.5 per cent in 
2008 and the unemployment rate soared from 5 per cent to 10.4 per cent. These indices 
directly show that the adoption of corporatism does not guarantee successful economic 
growth and the question whether it can be successful in the era of globalisation remains. 
Corporatism might not be a successful social organisation in the globalised economy.  
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5-2-2. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH KOREA 
 
The relations between the state and societal actors have changed over time. 
After democratisation, societal actors have gained more influence vis á vis the 
state. 
 
Under their authoritarian governments, the state in both South Africa and South Korea used to 
exert its power vis á vis societal actors. In the name of economic development in South Korea 
and as part of the apartheid policy in South Africa, the states were authoritarian regulators. On 
the one hand, the states suppressed collective action by labour and on the other hand, 
stimulated economic growth through coalitions with business. However, through the 
industrialisation process, from the 1970s onwards, labour in both countries gained power 
against the coalition of the state and business, which became strong enough to hamper 
political stability and bring about socio-economic crises.  
 
In the process of economic development, labour has become influential in strategically 
significant sectors in both countries. Labour in the mining sector in South Africa and in heavy 
industry in South Korea still has a strong impact on the economy in general. Under the 
circumstances, the state realised that it no longer had the power to mobilise society, including 
labour, as it used to do in the past.  
 
In terms of the reversing of state-society relations in South Africa and South Korea, not only 
did these societal actors pressurise the states in terms of industrial relations, but also 
international actors, such as transnational companies and international organisations forced 
the states to incorporate labour. In the case of South Africa, the sanctions imposed due to 
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apartheid, undermined the exploitation policies of the white regime. South Korea was under 
pressure from OECD and the IMF and had to abide by regulations that guaranteed a certain 
level of labour rights.  
 
For the first time in each country’s history, labour played a significant role in gaining an equal 
position vis á vis the state and business through democratisation. In the case of South Africa, 
COSATU is one of the pillars of the tripartite alliance with the ruling party, the ANC and the 
SACP. Particularly, COSATU has exerted its power, especially in politics. One of the 
prominent examples of COSATUs’ political power was exhibited in 2007, when it supported 
Jacob Zuma in his bid to replace Thabo Mbeki, the ANC president at the time. In South 
Korea, labour has also been successful in achieving a certain level of political power. During 
the elections in 1997 and 2002, President Kim Dae-jung and President Roh Moo-hyun, 
advocating pro-labour policies were elected based on a wide range of support from labour in 
South Korea. In 2000 for the first time in the history of South Korea, a labour party, the DLP, 
was established. As the labour movement has grown in stature, socio-civil rights are now 
(2014) protected to a significant extent.  
 
Along with globalisation, the states have had to diminish their role in all the stages of 
industrial relations. It is significant that the increasing power of business has also challenged 
the state’s autonomy. Both South Africa and South Korea have internationalised their 
economies and expanded their international trade. In this process, the ownership structure of 
business has become transnational, which makes it more difficult for the state to intervene in 
industrial relations. The state is no longer the unilateral decision maker with regard to action. 
Along with globalisation, it is noticeable that business has gained much leverage against the 
state and labour. This will be further discussed in the following section. 
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The power of business has become dominant and it challenges corporatist 
institutions and their functions. 
 
Before democratisation, business used to exert a relatively strong influence on industrial 
relations through the coalition with the state. In South Africa and South Korea, big businesses 
were strategically chosen and received unprecedented support from the state. They were also 
big employers, and their authoritarian supervision on labourers was accepted by the state. 
However, as the power of labour expanded, business became eroded by the actions of trade 
unions through strikes and lock-outs.   
 
However, since the adoption of a more flexible labour market system and the impacts of 
globalisation, the dominance of business has re-emerged. This pattern was reinforced after the 
1997 economic crisis in South Korea, when the majority of financial and public sector 
organisations, as well as large private firms, undertook major restructuring and made 
increased use of non-standard labour practices. South Africa has also experienced large-scale 
restructuring in the major economic sectors. Flexible labour methods were introduced that 
legalised mass layoffs and relaxed restrictions on the use of non-regular workers. Using non-
standard labour, based on temporary and casual workers, has become more common in both 
countries. Wages of non-regular workers are usually half of those of their regular 
counterparts. This has resulted in a large pool of a working poor, which are additionally 
excluded from social protection schemes.  
 
Basically, labour market flexibility was chosen by many businesses to cut down cost in order 
to boost productivity. It has been said that: “the intention behind productivity enhancement is 
not higher wages for workers, but the increased profitably of the firm” (Sharp, 2011 in 
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Forslund, 2013:97). On the contrary, labour market flexibility has had a negative impact on 
flexible workers and they have remained poor and underpaid. Under the circumstances, trade 
unions have not been effective in resolving the issue nor able to properly represent the 
workers.  
 
While the influence of the state and labour has diminished, business uses their access to 
political parties and parliament in order to modify the business environment in its favour. In 
both countries it is possible to observe that big businesses are not interested in corporatism 
and/or regard it as a barrier. In both South Africa and South Korea, big business formed a 
structural barrier against the creation of favourable conditions for corporatism. Businesses 
have used various ways to access politicians, in order to lower the legal status of corporatism. 
In the case of South Korea, for example, a new law that allows multiple unions was enacted in 
1997. However, businesses have strongly opposed this law. This law has been implemented 
only since 2011. In the South African context, there are conflicting attitudes towards labour 
brokers. COSATU has been continuously calling for a ban on labour brokers, but BUSA 
argues that overregulation will result in the rising cost of employment, which will lead to job 
losses. The conflicting perspectives of business and labour have not converged. The state has 
not intervened in this situation. On the contrary, the state has shown a tendency to side with 
business.  
 
There are no significant positive outcomes from corporatism, considering that one of its 
major purposes is closely linked to economic efficiency and competitiveness. 
 
In both South Africa and South Korea, corporatism was adopted in order to overcome 
economic crises and improve industrial productivity and national competitiveness. Policies 
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associated with corporatism are supposed to bolster competitiveness in a peaceful manner via 
changes in the existing antagonistic industrial relations system. This stems from the European 
experience. European welfare states adopted a model of corporatism in order to increase 
economic internationalisation and the subsequent economic integration in Europe. As a result 
of the adoption of corporatism, countries such as the Netherlands could attain competitiveness 
as well as macro-economic stability (Molina and Rhodes, 2002).  
 
Bearing this in mind, when looking at the cases of South Africa and South Korea, the Global 
Competitiveness Index ranking directly shows that the competitiveness landscape of the two 
economies have not significantly improved.
63
 In fact, these rankings for both cases have 
dropped since 1997 when the ranking report was first compiled.
64
 At best it is possible to say 
that the two countries could maintain the status quo in some respects. This shows that the 
adoption of corporatism did not automatically create favourable conditions for the economy 
and improve competitiveness.  
 
In addition to this, it is hard to find any evidence that corporatism contributed to high 
rankings in other macro-economic indices. It was anticipated that corporatism would bring 
about peaceful industrial relationships, but the statistics do not look positive for South Africa 
and South Korea. Compared to the European countries that recorded an average of 30.6 
working days lost per 1,000 employees per year during 2005-2009, South Africa lost 507 
working days per year from 2006 to 2010. 17,290,552 working hours were lost to illegal 
strikes in 2012 and during the same period, a total of 99 strikes were recorded (News 24, May 
                                                     
63
 The Global Competitiveness Index is composed by 12 variables such as institutions, infrastructure, macro-
economic environment, health and primary education, higher education and training, goods market efficiency, 
labour market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, market size, business 
sophistication and innovation.  
64
 South Korea was ranked 13
th
 out of 134 countries in 2008, 19
th
 out of 134 countries in 2009, and 22
nd
 in 2010 
and South Africa was ranked 45
th
 out of 134 countries in 2008, and 54
th
 in 2010.  
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28, 2013). In South Korea the situation is similar. There were 105 recorded strikes in 2012 
(Korea Labour Institute, 2013). The number of average working days lost has been decreasing 
in South Korea since 2000. This can be seen as part of the achievements of corporatism, since 
the main focus of the KTC’s is to create benefits in the form of reduced strikes. However, it is 
still high compared to other OECD member countries.   
 
In both countries, it seems that strikes are the best way for labour to exert its power and 
negotiate wage increases. For example, Hyundai, the fifth-largest automaker in the world, has 
a long history of militant action. The workers are among the best paid workers in the country. 
Due to their high productivity, Hyundai could afford this raise. It is reported that Hyundai 
made profits of US$ 49,730 per worker in 2012. This is nearly three times higher than one of 
its competitors, Toyota’s US$ 17,250 (Bloomberg News, 2013). However, the situation is 
somewhat different in South Africa. For example, as a result of the Marikana incident in 
2012, Lonmin workers lost approximately 12 per cent of annual wages. According to Brand 
(2013), as a result of the incident, direct losses in gold and platinum amounted to R 10.1 
billion. This brought about R 15.3 billion in financial losses across all mining sectors, which 
negatively affected GDP growth forecast, dropping down from 3 per cent to 2.5 per cent in 
2012. Thus Lonmin has planned to lower the production cost by reducing labour cost. It is 
possible to see that a strike has a negative impact on labour, as well as the mining sector and 
furthermore the entire economy of the country. This reflects that the corporatist institutions in 
both South Africa and South Korea do not prevent strikes, which can cause tremendous 
damage to the country’s economy.  
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Corporatism has failed to help achieve social stability. 
 
Economic development and social cohesion are essential contributing factors to social 
stability. It is possible to see that corporatism has failed not only because it has not helped 
achieve economic growth but also because it has failed to forge a comprehensive social pact 
addressing inequality, poverty and unemployment.  
 
According to Etzioni (1996), community is defined in terms of shared values and identity. 
These shared values in turn reinforce relationships among groups and individuals to allow 
them to reach decisions peacefully. In other words, these shared values help a society function 
in a peaceful way. In the opinion of Etzioni, representative institutions like corporatist 
institutions should facilitate social cohesion. However, the increasing level of inequality 
between workers and the unemployed, and between better paid and poorly paid workers, 
hampers the attainment of social cohesion in both South Africa and South Korea.   
 
Social cohesion is defined as a society’s ability to secure the long-term well-being of all its 
members. There are four central principles of social cohesion, namely: fair and equal access 
to resources, individual and collective dignity, autonomy of the individual and participation in 
community life (Council of Europe, 2005). Some of the sub-indicators are employment, 
income and housing, all of which many South African citizens urgently need. In both South 
Africa and South Korea, relative poverty has become a problem. Considering relative 
deprivation is more prevalent in more unequal societies (Wilkinson, 2007), South Korean 
society has become steadily more unequal, whereas the economic circumstances of most 
South Africans have remained largely the same. 
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Even though the South African government created a social grant system and expanded the 
number of beneficiaries, the efforts have not been sufficient to diminish the inequality. Marais 
(2012:317) describes the situation using the data from Statistics SA of 2008, “in the mid-
2000s, the poorest 5 million South Africans received about 0.2 per cent of national income 
(through wages and social grants), while the richest 5 million pocketed 51 per cent of national 
income, according to the latest income and expenditures survey”.  
 
South Korea, which used to be egalitarian in the past, throughout promoting equal educational 
opportunity, redistribution of land, has also experienced problems with regard to social 
cohesion. In order to provide social security to the poor, the governments of both South 
Africa and South Korea have designed various programmes targeted at reducing gaps among 
groups. Social assistance to the poor has been directed from national revenue in the form of 
social grants. However, while government has expanded social assistance to households over 
the past decade, employment and economic growth, which have to be the main economic 
drivers of income growth and poverty reduction, have not improved, particularly in the case 
of South Africa.  
 
This is shown by income distribution and the Gini coefficient index. Current research shows 
that wage disparities between regular workers and irregular workers have become wider, and 
this can be seen in both countries. In South Africa, inequality rose strongly from 1994 to 2000 
and this trend showed little change between 2000 and 2006. Between 1995 and 2008 South 
Africa’s ranking according to the Gini coefficient, rose from 0.64 to 0.67, identifying South 
Africa as one the world’s most unequal countries, with 31.3 per cent of the population living 
in poverty in 2009 (World Bank 2011; World Bank 2012).  
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The income inequality in South Korea increased consistently from the late 1990s until 2009, 
after which it somewhat decreased in 2010. The decrease in income inequality in 2010 is due 
to expanded social welfare benefits, which transfer income to the poor. Despite the attempts 
to decrease income inequality, South Korea now has a more unequal society than the average 
OECD member, thereby raising concerns over the widening economic disparity between the 
rich and poor. The 2012 OECD report showed that South Korea’s income distribution 
measured by the so-called Gini coefficient, stood at 0.31, still the lowest level, indicating 
however, that its economic disparity is growing (OECD, 2012).  
 
Figure 5.1. Inequality in South Korea 
 
 
 
Source: OECD Economic Surveys. 2012, p18.  
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Figure 5.1. shows that South Korean society has quickly become polarised, since early 2000. 
After the structural adjustment, following the IMF bailout and economic crisis in 1997, the 
Gini coefficient has been increasing, indicating an increasingly unequal distribution of wealth 
among the population. In spite of continuing economic growth, unequal wealth distribution is 
worsening. Interestingly, while this polarisation is worsening, economic indicators of South 
Korea demonstrate growth. However, many have concerns about the current situation, where 
economic growth continues without employment, while the paradox of income disparity 
prevails.  
 
After democratisation, the adoption of corporatism did not resolve the problem of rampant 
inequality and unemployment, which stands in the way of achieving social cohesion. 
Interviewees also highlighted that the corporatist institutions would experience further 
difficulties if they fail to contribute to resolving the inequality issue. Consensus and 
harmonious interaction by different actors is necessary in order to achieve social cohesion, 
and increasing social capital as a tool is significant. High levels of social capital will not only 
provide resources to individuals, but will also be a collective resource leading to healthier, 
stable and integrated societies (Zetteret al., 2006: 22). Under the circumstances of South 
Africa and South Korea that experienced ethnic diversity (South Korea as a result of 
increasing numbers of immigrants from Southeast Asia and South Asia) and skewed income 
distribution, both countries need such institutions to promote social cohesion. In this context, 
neither corporatist institution has been successful  
 
In both South Africa and South Korea labour’s diminished power which is linked to 
the imbalance of power among the actors negatively influenced corporatism 
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The relations between the state and societal actors have changed over time, as has been 
discussed. In both South Africa and South Korea, the power of labour reached a peak at the 
time of democratisation. However, right after that its influence decreased remarkably. The 
decline in labour’s influence derives from its loss of members, along with the impacts of 
globalisation. It is also possible to observe that South African and South Korean labour has 
become highly fragmented. During my interviews, it was confirmed that shop floor members 
feel distant from their union leaders and indirectly show mistrust of them. For example, high-
level trade unionists are accused of bribery, corruption and scandals. In the case of South 
Korea, there have repeatedly been scandals involving union leaders. In South Africa, 
COSATU leader, Zwelinzima Vavi’s scandal damaged the credibility of labour movements. 
As a result, labour leadership has lost support not only from union members but also from 
those who do not belong to unions; in other words, the larger part of the population.  
 
In this context, labour has failed as an agenda setter in the corporatist structure, which in 
return, has resulted in lack of public support for labour and corporatism. As can be seen 
above, labour has lost its credibility by being engaged in corruption and mismanagement. The 
series of scandals contributed to the public keeping its distance from the labour movement.  
 
Furthermore, in both South Africa and South Korea, labour has failed to set an agenda 
regarding ways in which to protect or promote labours’ basic rights, through corporatist 
institutions. This is despite some initial achievement such as the Labour Relations Act, the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act, and the Employment Equity Act. Rather, the state still 
plays the dominant role by proposing and implementing related regulations. In both countries, 
even though the unemployment and related social issues, in which labour is directly involved, 
have been dealt with in a serious manner, the problem is that labour was largely excluded 
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from the related policy-making process. Labour is not strong enough to restructure the whole 
of society as it was during the democratisation process; rather, labour has used its power to 
gain immediate and short term gains for a limited number of members.  
 
In South Africa, the political system is dominated by the ANC, even though COSATU is in an 
alliance partnership with the ruling party. The problem is that the ANC largely supported by 
labour, does not seem to consider its performance seriously; rather, it seems that the ANC has 
only focused on electoral victory and made populist promises, usually shortly before 
elections. In South Korea, the political system is much different from that of South Africa. 
The presidency is the centre of power, especially in terms of policy formation and 
implementation, and labours’ vote has very little chance of changing this. Even though the 
labour party, the DLP in South Korea which was established in 2000, has gained power based 
on labour and the young progressive population; at the parliament, it has been one of the 
minor parties with only a small number of members elected to parliament. Despite the 
different relations between the ruling party/state and labour in the two countries, labours’ 
influence on policy-making process or policy outcomes in both countries seem insignificant. 
 
Corporatist institutions themselves have been losing ground in both countries. 
 
Despite the initial enthusiasm about the adoption of corporatism, the corporatist institutions in 
both South Africa and South Korea have lost ground and public support. First of all, these 
institutions only provide negotiation rounds before parliament delivers the final decision. In 
South Korea, the KTC only makes recommendations. In South Africa, the state’s perspective 
towards NEDLAC is that it can always bypass it when necessary in the name of the efficiency 
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of the decision-making process. Therefore, agreements made at NEDLAC or the KTC have 
often not been implemented, particularly by business.  
 
In the case of South Korea, more than half of the public (58.1 per cent) thought, right from the 
beginning that the KTC did not represent the national interest. According to research 
conducted by the Korea Labour Institute, this perception has not changed since its 
establishment (KLI, 2013). In South Africa, many do not know what NEDLAC is and what it 
does (Cherry, 2006). Furthermore, the institution itself was criticised in 2012 for not being 
transparent. Recently, as a result of its poor performance, many have questioned its worth 
(News 24, 2012). The institutions in both countries have become formalities and their actual 
implications have become marginal. Also, it can be seen from interviews that social dialogue 
has little legitimacy amongst unions, which see it as a continuation of government dominance, 
and ineffectual in solving labour market polarisation problems. 
 
5-2-3. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH KOREA 
 
Several differences exist between the two cases of South Africa and South Korea. Labour in 
South Korea does not have political linkages with the state. There is no common history 
between the state and labour in South Korea, unlike the case in South Africa, where the 
relations between the ANC and COSATU were built during the struggle against the apartheid 
government. Also, South Korea has a relatively better socio-economic environment than 
South Africa, in terms of the level of inequality and poverty. Despite the different political 
and socio-economic conditions in the two countries, it is noticeable that there were more 
similarities than differences between the two countries as time went by.  
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Firstly, labour in South Africa has maintained a closer relationship with the state. This is 
derived from the liberation movement experience during the fight against apartheid. Unlike 
South Africa, in South Korea, labour and the state do not share any historically long and close 
relationship. However, although COSATU and the ANC are members of the tripartite 
alliance, the rift between the state and labour has been growing as seen in Chapter 3. This also 
did not have a positive influence on corporatism in South Africa. 
 
Secondly, South Korea achieved economic growth in the 1970s, which elevated the standard 
of living. This became the foundation for the country’s fast growing middle class, which is 
currently dominant. This has a long-term impact in various ways. One of the prominent 
examples is that South Korea’s productivity level is much higher than that of South Africa, 
due to the country’s high level of education and technology. Nevertheless, after the financial 
crisis in 1997, along with the increasing numbers of non-regular workers, the society has 
become rapidly polarised. The size of the middle class has become smaller and the inequality 
level has significantly increased.   
 
5-3. CONCLUSION  
 
When the corporatist institutions were introduced in South Africa and South Korea, there 
were debates over their adoption. Some stakeholders expressed concern that corporatism was 
only adopted to suppress labour, by binding them within a corporatist framework. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of the KTC in South Korea and NEDLAC in South Africa was 
the best option that the states could choose at that time, especially in the face of political and 
socio-economic crisis. However, the adoption of corporatism turned out to be a prerequisite 
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for the management of the crisis situations. Nearly two decades later, in 2014, corporatism in 
both South Africa and South Koreas has become little more than a name. 
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